Supreme Court, U.S.
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No. 02-1784

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

ALBERTO SALDAJENO, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA LTD., *et al.*,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred by affirming a dismissal pursuant to Fed. Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of claims brought pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 354.6, by which the State of California sought to provide a forum for Filipino-Americans to recover damages for having been forced to perform slave labor for private Japanese businesses?

2. Whether the Petitioners possess inalienable rights to be free from violations of fundamental human rights which could not be waived by the 1951 Treaty of Peace?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The following individuals and entities are parties in the court below: Alberto Saldajeno, Acelopio Galedo, Generoso Jacob, Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., Ishihara Corporation (USA), Taiheiyo Cement, Onoda USA, Ernesto Santo Domingo, Imelda Santo Domingo, Perfecto Llanza, Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc., Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Corporation, Nippon Steel Corp., and Nippon Steel USA Inc.

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners **Alberto Saldajeno**, **Acelopio Galedo**, **Generoso Jacob**, **Ruben Resus**, **Perfecto Llanza**, **Ernesto Santo Domingo** and **Imelda Santa Domingo** respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari be issued in this case. Petitioners are Filipino-Americans who were forced to labor for private Japanese corporations during the Second World War. The Ninth Circuit, in violation of the United States Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has affirmed the dismissal of Petitioners' claims, denying them any form of relief. Petitioners seek this Court's review of the unconstitutional decision below in order to protect and enforce the human and civil rights of Petitioners as well as the sovereign powers of the State of California.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming the dismissal of this action is reported at 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit's order denying rehearing is set forth at pages 20-23 of the Appendix. The decision of the District Court dismissing the Filipino claims is reported at 164 F. Supp.2d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

JURISDICTION

The action was originally filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Francisco, and removed by Respondents to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on the

grounds of federal question jurisdiction. The judgment of the district court dismissing Petitioners' complaint was entered on September 28, 2001. A timely notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was filed on October 19, 2001 in the *Saldajeno* and *Santo Domingo* cases. As set forth above, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision affirming the dismissal on January 21, 2003, and an order amending the decision and denying rehearing on March 6, 2003 (see pages 15-23 of the Appendix).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND TREATIES INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, clauses 1, 3, 10-14 provide:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

* * *

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

* * *

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; . . .

United States Constitution, Art. II, § 2, clauses 1-2 provide:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.6 provides:

(a) As used in this section:

(1) "Second World War slave labor victim" means any person taken from a concentration camp or ghetto or diverted from transportation to a concentration camp or from a ghetto to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.

(2) "Second World War forced labor victim" means any person who was a member of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, or prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, forced to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.

(3) "Compensation" means the present value of wages and benefits that individuals should have been paid and damages for injuries sustained in connection with the labor performed. Present value shall be calculated on the basis of the market value of the services at the time they were performed, plus interest from the time the services were performed, compounded annually to date of full payment without diminution for wartime or postwar currency devaluation.

(b) Any Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War slave labor victim, Second World

War forced labor victim, or heir of a Second World War forced labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim or Second World War forced labor victim from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate. That action may be brought in a superior court of this state, which court shall have jurisdiction over that action until its completion or resolution.

(c) Any action brought under this section shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, if the action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010.

Peace Treaty of 1941, § 14(b)

> Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive [1] all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, [2] other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and [3] claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition seeks to remedy the deprivation of Petitioners' fundamental human rights, and the consequent unjust enrichment of Respondents, which resulted from the orders of the courts below dismissing Petitioners' complaint. The right to be free from slavery is perhaps, after the right to life, the most fundamental of human rights. Petitioners sought redress for this violation from

Respondents, private corporations which profited – and retained the profits – from Petitioners' forced labor. The deprivation of rights from which this case arises, and the disregard for that deprivation and for California's efforts to provide a forum for redress, cry out for correction by this Court. The Ninth Circuit erred by placing its gloss of historical events on the factual record, and in that manner violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioners are Filipino-Americans who were forced by Respondents to perform labor under inhuman conditions in the Phillippines during World War II. Petitioners suffered inhumane physical and mental torture and received starvation rations, no medical care, and no compensation of any kind for their work.

In order to provide redress to victims of Japanese corporate forced labor such as Petitioners, the Legislature of the State of California enacted California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.6, which extended the period in which any person could file an action seeking recovery against entities for which they performed forced labor during the Second World War. The statute provides that any "*Second World War forced labor victim*" may bring an action to recover "compensation" from any entity (or its successor in interest) for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate. *Id.* "*Second World War forced labor victim*" is defined as "any person who was a member of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, . . . forced to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6(a)(2).

The statute extends the statute of limitations for such actions for ten years to December 31, 2010 in recognition of the passing of this generation of men. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6(c). The full text of the statute is set forth in the immediately preceding section.

Private Japanese businesses were operating in the Phillippines before the Japanese invaded the Phillippines on December 8, 1941. After the Japanese army invaded the Phillippines, private companies forced Petitioners to work for them as slave and forced laborers.

Petitioners worked oppressive hours in mining and farming, with little nutrition. They were forced to perform back-breaking manual labor under extraordinarily harsh and dangerous conditions. **Alberto Saldajeno**, now 83 years old and a resident of Daly City, was forced to labor at a copper mine owned by **Ishihara Sangyo. Acelopio Galedo**, now 81 and a resident of San Francisco, was forced to build a road for **Ishihara Sangyo's** copper mine. **Genoroso Jacob**, now 80 years old and a resident of San Francisco, was forced to work in a coal mine owned by **Taiheiyo Kogyo** (now **Taiheiyo Cement**) where he was repeatedly beaten. **Ernesto Santo Domingo**, who has passed away since this action was filed, was 16 years old when he was forced to labor without pay in the copper mines owned by **Ishihara Sangyo**. He suffered physical and emotional abuse, and contracted malaria and dysentery while forced to labor.

Workers such as Petitioners were provided by the Japanese government at the request of private industry. The private companies would also kidnap people they found in public, herd them into trucks, and force them to work. One of the means that the private companies used to force Petitioners to work for them was to threaten their families with death.

Conditions in the mines were very dangerous. Cave-ins, tunnel collapses, and other threats were frequent, in large part due to the crude conditions in which the Petitioners were forced to work. Men, women, and children were forced to work, and were beaten if they failed to meet their quotas. Those who refused to perform labor were subject to being hunted, arrested, and tortured.

Section 354.6 was enacted to provide a means for slave and forced labor victims like Petitioners to seek redress in a court of law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest for Senate Bill 1245 states:

> This bill would authorize any World War II slave labor victim or World War II forced labor victim, or heir of the victim, to bring an action in superior court to recover compensation, as defined, from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom the labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate. It would provide that any action brought under these provisions shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, provided the action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010.

Section 1(c) of the same Legislative Counsel's Digest provides the policy reasoning for this Legislation:

> (c) California has a moral and public policy interest in assuring that its residents and citizens are given a reasonable opportunity to claim their entitlement to compensation for forced or slave labor performed prior to and during the Second World War.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 2, 2000, Petitioners in Saldajeno filed their Complaint against Respondents in the San Francisco County Superior Court. The Complaint in the Santa Domingo action was filed on October 11, 2000, also in the San Francisco County Superior Court. Respondents filed Answers to the Complaints, and removed them to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On June 5, 2000, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation ("MDL Panel") issued an order transferring 12 related cases that were pending in the Central and Northern Districts of California to Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District. On June 26, 2000, Judge Walker issued "Order No. 1" consolidating those 12 cases for pretrial purposes. The Filipino cases were then transferred to Judge Walker, and also consolidated for pretrial purposes.

Following oral argument, the District Court issued Order No. 4 on September 21, 2000, which dismissed with prejudice claims made by Allied POWs against the Japanese companies. *See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation*, 114 F. Supp.2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000). In this order, the District Court held the Treaty of 1951 waived claims of all Allied nationals. 114 F. Supp.2d at 945. Second, the Court found that there was no "sustainable distinction" between Japanese corporations and the Japanese government during the war years. 114 F. Supp.2d at 948.

On September 17, 2001 the District Court entered an order dismissing the Filipino cases on the same basis as the Allied POWs. *See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation*, 164 F. Supp.2d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2001). This order largely incorporated the prior Order No.

4 which dismissed the Allied POW cases. The District Court found that the Philippines was one of the Allied Powers which signed the Peace Treaty, albeit not ratifying it until 1956. *Id.* at 1157. The District Court reiterated its earlier position that it would be a "stretch" to distinguish between the conduct of Japan and the conduct of Japanese companies during the war. *Id.* at 1158.

In an opinion issued on January 21, 2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court on the ground that California's law providing redress to Petitioners and people like them intruded upon the "federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war." The opinion focused on the inhuman suffering and hardship of holocaust victims during the Second World War, rather than on the hardships suffered by Petitioners, and noted that both holocaust victims and United States prisoners of war were provided with mechanisms for – albeit limited – compensation. 317 F.3d 1024-1026. The opinion never mentions any type of compensation program for Filipino-Americans like Petitioners. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that all of the claims at issue were stale ***despite*** the extension of the statute of limitations provided by Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6. The opinion also noted the "uncertain jurisdictional issues" of cases like Petitioners' that had been removed to federal court, 317 F.3d at 1030, but concluded that lack of federal jurisdiction "could have no effect on the outcome of any of the cases." *Id.*

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. Petitioners' Claims Are Not Barred

In viewing the claims at issue in this case it is tempting to substitute the perception of history with the factual record. The error of the Court below was its acceptance of a broad and unlimited federal war power that far eclipses the powers of the Commerce Clause; indeed, a power so sweeping that anything tangentially connected to it is swallowed up. The Court below coupled that perspective of Federal power with a historical perception of the Second World War which fails to account for the ***private*** conduct underlying Petitioners' claims. As we now see in the perpetuation of the war in Iraq, a banal commonplace world carries on even during the heights of war. To assume without any exception that any conduct by any Japanese corporation during the Second World War was, in the terms of the governing phrase of this case, "in the prosecution of the war" and to accept this interpretation in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), was clear error and mandates granting this petition.

II. Claims Against Private Japanese Corporations That Used Slave Labor Are Not Barred by the "War" Power

Petitioners' claims are against private Japanese corporations for their profit-making activities, and not for acts committed in the prosecution of the war. The Courts below have refused to recognize the existence of factual issues concerning whether any of the Respondents' conduct was actually part of the prosecution of the war and thus subject to the War power. By doing so, all factual

inferences were granted in favor of Respondents, contrary to the law. *See Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); *Cost Management Services Inc. v. Washington National Gas Co.*, 99 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 1996).

Simple review of Article 14(b) demonstrates that the Peace Treaty was not intended to extinguish Petitioners' rights to sue Japanese companies for their private, profit-making commercial activities. Article 14(b) of the Peace Treaty states:

> Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive [1] all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, [2] other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and [3] claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Peace Treaty, Article 14(b) (bracket numbers added). Article 14(b) delineates three specific waivers, only one of which is relevant to the instant litigation.

The first is a waiver of all reparations claims of the Allied Powers. In the context of war, "reparations" is defined as "[p]ayment made by one country to another for damages during war." *Black's Law Dictionary* 1298 (6th ed. 1990). This first waiver, therefore, extinguishing the Japanese government's wartime debts to the governments of the Allied Powers, is not applicable here. The last waiver, extinguishing the claims of the Allied Powers for the costs of post-war occupation of Japan, also is not relevant to the instant suits.

The second waiver – at issue here – extinguishes "other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals

arising out of *any actions taken by* Japan and their *nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war . . . .*" *Id.*, clause 2 (emphasis added). In reading this waiver, this Court is instructed by its prior pronouncements that "treaties are the subject of careful consideration before they are entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express their meaning and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes of the high contracting parties." *Rocca v. Thompson,* 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912).

Recognizing that "a greater degree of professionalism and more painstaking care [is] given to the process of formulating the ideas to be embodied in [a treaty] and in drafting it than is generally the case for domestic statutes," 1A Singer, *Sutherland on Statutory Construction*, § 32.08 at 572 (4th ed. 1984), a court should seek to give meaning and value to each and every word in the Article 14(b), clause 2, provision. Clause 2, on its face, contains an important qualifier: Not all claims for any wartime actions taken by Japanese nationals are waived – rather only those wartime "actions taken . . . in the course of the prosecution of the war."

If the drafters of the Peace Treaty *chose* to limit the waiver to actions taken "in the course of the prosecution of the war," rather than a blanket waiver of *all* acts during the war, there is no basis to conclude that the Federal government intended to prohibit private claims for private conduct from going forward. While the Ninth Circuit held that the Constitution "allocates the power over foreign affairs to the federal government exclusively," 317 F.3d at 1025, certainly the Federal government may choose to permit individuals to recover on private claims – especially when it has provided no form of compensation to these individuals. Forfeiture of such claims would constitute a

denial of due process. Attributing value and meaning to every word, the second waiver, therefore, is only for the rights of claimants to seek redress for injuries inflicted by the Japanese corporations in the active engagement of the war. The phrase "in the course of the prosecution of the war" does not encompass private, commercial activity of the Japanese corporations committed between 1941-1945 – the very activity which forms the basis of this litigation. United States law has been clear on this going back to 1894. *Emory v. United States*, 19 Ct. Cl. 254 (1894).

Although neither Article 14(b) nor any other provision of the Peace Treaty defines "in the course of the prosecution of the war," the meaning of the phrase becomes clear when Article 14(b) is compared to Article 19(a) of the Peace Treaty. Article 19 is the parallel article to Article 14, waiving the claims *of Japan and its nationals* against the Allied Powers and their nationals.

> Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals ***arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.***

Peace Treaty, Article 19 (emphasis added).

Although similarly structured, the difference between these two articles is striking. While the drafters of the Peace Treaty specifically limited the second waiver of Article 14 to actions taken by Japan and its nationals only in the active engagement of the war ("during the course of the prosecution of the war"), the waiver of Article 19 is

expanded to any and all actions taken by the Allied Powers and their nationals during wartime ("arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war").

Clearly "actions taken because of the existence of a state of war" is *more* expansive than "action taken in the course of the prosecution of the war." Article 19(a) is more generalized and expansive, requiring only a passive nexus to war-related activity, and not actual activities resulting directly from the prosecution of the war.

Japanese law required designation of war-related businesses. On December 17, 1943 the Japanese government enacted the Munitions Law which allowed the government to designate companies as "munitions companies," appoint and discipline the directors and managers and conscript the employees as government workers. *See Jeong v. Onoda Cement Co. Ltd.,* 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985 at 25-26 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Thus, the Japanese themselves have a historical record of which companies the Japanese government officially identified as part of the war effort, and which were not – including the date when the Japanese government enlisted the company in the war effort.

The Munitions Law was construed by the United States Supreme Court in 1952 in *Kawakita v. United States*, 343 U.S. 717, 727-728 (1952) which affirmed a treason conviction of an American citizen who abused United States POWs while employed by a private Japanese company. The defendant, Kawakita, argued that his conduct during the war was coerced and that all Japanese companies were part of the war effort. Justice Douglas

rejected the argument that all Japanese companies should be deemed to be part of the war effort:

> The Oeyama Nickel Industry Co., Ltd., was a private company, organized for profit. It was engaged in producing metals used for war under contracts with the Japanese government. In 1944 it was designated by the Japanese government as a munitions corporation and under Japanese law civilian employees were not allowed to change or quit their employment without the consent of the government. The company's mine and factory were manned in part by prisoners of war. They lived in a camp controlled by the Japanese army. Though petitioner took orders from the military, he was not a soldier in the armed services; he wore insignia on his uniform distinguishing him as nonmilitary personnel; he had no duties to perform in relation to the prisoners, except those of an interpreter. His employment was as an interpreter for the Oeyama Nickel Industry Co., Ltd., a private company. The regulation of the company by the Japanese government, the freezing of its labor force, the assignment to it of prisoners of war under military command were incidents of a war economy. But we find no indication that the Oeyama Company was nationalized or its properties seized and operated by the government. *The evidence indicates that it was part of a regimented industry; but it was an organization operating for private profit under private management.* We cannot say that [Kawakita's] status as an employee of a private company was changed by that regimentation of the industry. (emphasis added)

Kawakita compels the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit's decision must be reversed.

The phrase "in the course of the prosecution of the war" is a term of art. It possesses a special meaning, as indicated by the specific use of the term in statutes and judicial decisions prior to, and during the time, that the Peace Treaty was negotiated.[1] Reference to these cases supports a broader scope of rights than the Ninth Circuit found.

The first reported use of the phrase "in the prosecution of the war" is found in a federal statute enacted in the aftermath of the Mexican-American War. The Act of February 19, 1879, ch. 90, 20 Stat. 316 (1879) (hereinafter "Act of 1879") used the phrase "in the prosecution of the war" to limit the scope of eligibility for extra war-time related compensation. Although all members of the armed services were employed during the war with Mexico, the statute "[p]rovided[] that the provisions of this act shall include . . . soldiers . . . employed in the prosecution of said war." *Id.*

The limiting phrase "in the prosecution of said war" was deemed to possess a meaning equivalent to "in actual service during the war." *Emory v. United States,* 19 Ct. Cl. 254 (1894) (explaining that the Act of 1879 was meant to continue a war service benefit that had lapsed and to allow soldiers as well as volunteers to recover, but was not meant to expand the eligibility requirements to those with an indirect connection to the fighting of the war). Both phrases have been interpreted to mean "'[s]omething more than a mere muster into service. . . . Recruits who had not

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[1] *See* Vienna Convention, art. 31(4) (requiring courts to apply the "special meaning" of a word if the parties so intended).

left the United States for the seat of war, or if they had left it, but had not joined their respective companies, [were] not entitled to the extra pay allowed by the fifth section of the act.'" *Emory,* 19 Ct. Cl. at 260.

Subsequent decisions also show that the phrase possesses a narrow meaning. In *United States v. North*, 112 U.S. 510 (1884), the Supreme Court affirmed a statutory award under the Act of 1879, citing the reasoning in *Emory,* 19 Ct. Cl. at 254. In *Mitchell v. United States*, 24 Ct. Cl. 399 (1889), the court denied the statutory grant of three months salary to a Navy lieutenant who served his time during the Mexican War at a naval base in Philadelphia because the term "employed in the prosecution of said war" in the Act of 1879 *demanded proof* that the lieutenant was "employed in such service as exposed [him], either immediately or prospectively, to danger, risk, or hardship, incident alone to the Mexican War, by actual service therein, to the exclusion of those who, while in the naval service and employed in their ordinary duties, were not in any way subject to those incidents." *Id.* at 401.

The phrase "in the prosecution of the war" was also used in three World War II statutes regulating rights and benefits of commercial contractors engaging in work "in connection with the prosecution of the war" or "necessary to the active prosecution of the war." As demonstrated in the cases cited below, courts are competent to distinguish between production of goods which contribute to the prosecution of war and those that do not. The First War Powers Act, § 201, 55 Stat. 838, 839 (1941); 50 U.S.C. app. 611 (Supp. IV 1941) (hereinafter "War Powers Act"), enabled the President to "authorize any department or agency of the Government exercising functions in connection with the prosecution of the war effort" to modify

contracts "whenever he deems such action would facilitate the prosecution of the war." The Act of August 7, 1946, ch. 864, 60 Stat. 902 (1946) (hereinafter "the Lucas Act"), authorizes equitable claims of contractors against the government for losses incurred between September 13, 1940 and August 14, 1945.

Interpreting the Lucas Act, the Claims Court in *Richardson v. United States,* 114 Ct. Cl. 695 (1949), held that the Act was also governed by the limiting clause of the War Powers Act, "in connection with the prosecution of the war effort," and therefore did not extend to all commercial contracts. *Id.* at 669-700. The Richardson court found petitioner's complaint fatally flawed because it failed to allege a sufficient nexus between the contract and the prosecution of the war. *Id.* at 700 (finding loss of profit for numerous contracts including canals, pipelines, and a bridge were an insufficient showing to establish a right to recovery under the Lucas Act).

In *Frankel v. Eder,* 185 Misc. 274, 56 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1945), the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court interpreted sections 2 and 8 of chapter 315 of the Laws of 1945, which provided special protection for "war contractors" who are "engaged in war work and [who] manufacture[] and/or produce[] or sell[] vital war materials necessary to the active prosecution of the war . . . " The *Frankel* court found that despite evidence that petitioner carried gasoline and petroleum products throughout the world for the War Shipping Administration, *id.* at 276, 56 N.Y.S.2d 727, petitioner "is not a 'war contractor' within the meaning and intent [of the statute]; it is not engaged in manufacturing, producing or selling vital war materials necessary to the active prosecution of the war; its business,

admittedly, is solely that of operating a fleet of tankers . . . ." *Id.* at 276, 56 N.Y.S.2d 727.

The above cases show that the phrase "in the prosecution of the war" (or its equivalent) was well known and had been interpreted in judicial decisions for over 60 years before the signing of the Peace Treaty. All of the decisions interpreted the phrase *narrowly*, limiting its meaning to activities that are part and parcel of the war effort and leaving intact claims outside of that scope. Activities tangential to a war were never found to be "in the prosecution of the war." These authorities demonstrate that, contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Treaty, the phrase "in the prosecution of the war" was given a limiting, rather than a broad, construction, and establish that the waiver in the Treaty should likewise be read narrowly rather than broadly. *See Geofroy v. Riggs*, 133 U.S. 258, 272 (1890) ("where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred")

If the drafters of the Peace Treaty had intended a waiver of all claims of nationals of the Allied Powers arising during the war, the Treaty would not have used the limiting language of "in the prosecution of the war," but rather more expansive language as they had in Article 19 and other provisions throughout the Treaty. The specific use of the narrow terminology in Article 14(b), in light of the previous court decisions confirming the limited meaning of such terminology, shows that Article 14(b) was not meant to extinguish claims based upon activities of the private Japanese corporations merely because such activities were committed by the corporations during wartime.

Whether Respondents' conduct was in the prosecution of the war raises issues of fact which preclude dismissal. If the United States Supreme Court refused to concede a blanket participation in the war by all Japanese companies and instead looked at the facts specific to a company, the Court below was obliged to do likewise.

III. The Rights of Petitioners That Have Been Violated by Respondents are *Jus Cogens* or Peremptory Norms of International Law That Are So Fundamental They Cannot Be Abrogated by Any Treaty or Agreement

Principles of international law known as "*jus cogens*" or "peremptory norms" incorporate values that are so central to the international community that no country may diverge or derogate from them. All nations are bound by *jus cogens* principles, regardless of consent, because "universal norms constituting *jus cogens* transcend such consent." *Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,* 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992). *See also* Vienna Convention, arts. 53,[2] 64[3](stating that treaty provisions in violation of

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[2] Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states:

> A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.

[3] Article 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that:

(Continued on following page)

jus cogens norms are void); *The Schooner Amistad*, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 553, 595-96 (1841) (treaty with Spain could not be invoked to require the return of fugitive slaves because "where human life and human liberty are in issue, and constitute the very essence of the controversy, a [treaty pertaining to ships and cargo] could never have intended to . . . deprive foreigners of the protection given them . . . by the general law of nations"); *United States v. Matta-Ballesteros*, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that *jus cogens* rules "[a]re nonderogable and peremptory, enjoy the highest status within customary international law, are binding on all nations and cannot be preempted by treaty"); *Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan*, 859 F.2d 929, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (describing *jus cogens* as an elite subset of the norms recognized as customary international law).

Slavery and the slave trade, torture, summary execution, disappearance, prolonged arbitrary detention, genocide and systematic racial discrimination all constitute *jus cogens* violations. *Siderman,* 965 F.2d at 715-16 (*citing* Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 cmt. n (1987)). Indeed, enslavement was classified by the Nuremberg Tribunal as a "crime against humanity." *The Nuremberg Trial*, 6 F.R.D. 69, 130 (Int'l Military Tribunal 1946). Private citizens and corporate entities were criminally prosecuted at Nuremberg for utilizing slave laborers in the *Industrial Cases. See United States of America v. Alfred Felix Alwyn Drupp von Bohlen*

"[i]f a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates."

und Halbach, IX Trials of War Council Law No. 10 (1950) (finding criminal liability because the company was a private profit making institution and defendants independently sought to improve their profit margin by increasing production with slave labor); *United States v. Friedrich Flick,* VI Trials of War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council No. 10 (1952) (finding criminal culpability for two defendants who took the initiative to increase the company's production of freight cars and attempted to further use of slave labor to accomplish this end); *United States of America v. Carl Krauch,* VIII Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1179 (1952) (finding criminal liability for members of chemical and pharmaceutical company for their actions in constructing a synthetic rubber plant adjacent to Auschwitz). *See also* Matthew Lippman, *War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The "Other Schindlers,"* 9 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 173 (1995).

The crime of slavery is thus classified as a universal crime, and "enslavement [is] to be opposed and punished, wherever [it] may have been committed." *Prosecutor v. Tadic*, Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, IT-94-1-AR72 (Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1994), *reprinted in* Jordan J. Paust, Joan M. Fitzpatrick, and Jon M. Van Dyke, *International Law and Litigation in the U.S.* 452, 453 (2000) (quoting from *General Wagener,* Revista Penale 753, 757 (Sup. Mil. Trib., Italy 1950)). Slavery includes forced labor. *United States v. Matta-Ballesteros*, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing *Siderman de Blake*, 965 F.2d at 717)). Civil liability for the use of slave labor is established by showing that a private party "participated [or cooperated] in the forced labor practices." *Id.* at 1310.

International law is part of the law of the United States. *The Paquete Habana*, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); *The Nereide*, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815); *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1980); *Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Wilkinson*, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-800 (D. Kan. 1980); Paust, Fitzpatrick, and Van Dyke, *supra,* at 110-33; Jordan J. Paust, *International Law as Law of the United States* 5-9 (1996). United States courts are bound to apply treaties ratified by the United States as well as customary international law. United States Constitution, arts. III, § 2, VI, cl.2; Paust, Fitzpatrick, and Van Dyke, *supra*, at 110-33, 345-60, 369-73; Paust, *supra*, at 5-9, 51-64, 81-101, and numerous references cited therein. United States courts are also obliged to interpret federal statutes and executive pronouncements to be consistent with customary international law. *See, e.g.*, *Murray v. The Charming Betsy*, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804); *Talbot v. Seeman*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); Paust, *supra*, at 34 n.37, 107-08 n.9; Paust, Fitzpatrick, and Van Dyke, *supra*, at 141-42, 283, 438, 635.

The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of whether the government may waive the *jus cogens* claims of its citizens. However, several decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that in those rare instances where the United States waives **commercial** claims for violations of international norms, the United States must compensate the holders of the claims notwithstanding any treaty to the contrary. The most important decision in this regard is *The Paquete Habana*, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), which is most often cited for the proposition that international law is part of United States law. In *The Paquete Habana* Cuban nationals sued the United States

for seizing and selling two coastal fishing vessels during the Spanish American War. The Supreme Court held that the seizure and sale were violations of customary international law and the Cuban nationals were entitled to damages notwithstanding the wartime actions of the United States in blockading the harbors of Cuba and the treaty ending the war.

Two other decisions bear upon what powers the United States has in concluding treaties that may impact on the **commercial** claims of its nationals. In *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 279 (1796) the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of a pre-Revolutionary War debt owed by a Virginia citizen to a British citizen notwithstanding a Virginia statute that nullified debts to British citizens if the amount of the debt was paid into the State treasury. In doing so, the Court upheld the Treaty of Paris of 1783 and the right of the new nation to preserve debts that may have been nullified by the States. Justice Chase rejected the idea that a government could waive private claims without compensation to the claimants:

> That Congress had the power to sacrifice the rights and interests of private citizens to secure the safety or prosperity of the public, I have no doubt; but the immutable principles of justice; the public faith of the States, that confiscated and received British debts, pledged to the debtors; and the rights of the debtors violated by the treaty; all combine to prove, that ample compensation ought to be made to all the debtors who have been injured by the treaty for the benefit of the public. This principle is recognized by the Constitution, which declares, "that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation". See Vattel. Lib. 1. c. 20. s. 244.

Id. at 245. Justice Chase's citation to "the immutable principles of justice" supports the conclusion that the Federal government cannot waive claims, even as part of a peace settlement, without compensating those whose claims have been violated.[4] Justice Iredell wrote in the same case that if Congress had given up the rights of private persons in a peace treaty "as the price of peace," the private individuals whose "rights were sacrificed" might well "have been entitled to compensation from the public" for their loss. *Id.* at 279.

Jus cogens claims stand on a different footing than commercial claims. They are ordinal rules of civilization which no nation can derogate or waive. The vindication of *jus cogens* claims is as essential to justice as is the payment of compensation. " . . . *[J]us cogens* (or "compelling law") enjoy the highest status in international law and prevail over both customary international law and treaties." *Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan*, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

> Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against murder and slavery may well have the domestic legal effect that appellants suggest. That is, they may well restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution restrains it.

Id. at 941.

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[4] *See also* 3 U.S. at 229 ("It is admitted, that Virginia could not confiscate private debts without a violation of the modern law of nations. . .") and *id.* at 242 ("If the treaty had been silent as to debts, and the law of Virginia had not been made, I have already proved that debts would, on peace, have been revived by the law of nations").

IV. The Ninth Circuit Erred in Holding That Petitioners' Claims Are Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Following its discussion of the War power, the Ninth Circuit concluded that in any event Petitioners' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit ruled that it would have to apply the statute of limitations which California would apply, 317 F.3d at 1027, but inexplicably concluded that the longer statute of limitations of section 354.6 was trumped by the shorter statutes of limitations otherwise provided under California law. 317 F.3d at 1028. This analysis errs, because it is purely a question of California law to determine what statute of limitations shall apply, and California already made this determination by providing for an extension of the statute of limitations for Petitioners' claims. Rather than pay proper deference to California, the Ninth Circuit abrogated California's effort to provide a forum for Petitioners' claims. This was error and mandates granting of this petition.

V. Conclusion

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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June 4, 2003

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

ALBERTO SALDAJENO, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA LTD., *et al.*,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEF TIBOR DEUTSCH, an individual; JOSEF TIBOR DEUTSCH, as the survivor of George Deutsch,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TURNER CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation with corporate regional headquarters located in California; KITCHELL CORPORATION USA, an Arizona Corporation authorized to do business in California; HOCHTIEF AG, German Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-56673

D.C. No.
CV-00-04405-SVW

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

WOODROW M. HUTCHISON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA, a business association purporting to be a California corporation; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a business association purporting to be a New York corporation;

No. 01-17115

D.C. No.
CV-00-02163-VRW

MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC., a business association purporting to be a Delaware corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

LESTER I. TENNY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUI & CO., LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI & CO (USA), INC, a business association purporting to be a New York Corporation; MITSUI MINING CO LTD, a Japanese business association; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a business association purporting to be a Delaware corp.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17116

D.C. No.
CV-00-02357-VRW

SHIRLEY M. RUBENSTEIN; JULIA E. STEVENSON; GLEN LEROY, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA, LTD; ISHIHARA CORPORATION, a California corporation, ISK AMERICAS, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17123

D.C. No.
CV-00-03737-VRW

RAYMOND HEIMBUCH; VIVIAN O. JOHNSON; WILLIAM R. LOWE; SAM P. BUSE; ALFRED BEREST; EDWIN F. LINDROS; MICHAEL BIBIN; J. S. GRAY; KARL WILLIAM HOLT; NORMAN R. MATTHEWS; DARREL D. STARK; CARMEL ZIPETO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA, LTD; a Japanese business association; ISHIHARA CORPORATION; ISK AMERICAS, INC., a business association purporting to be a Delaware corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17124

D.C. No. CV-00-00064-VRW

MELODY SOLIS, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL TRADING CO., LTD., a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL USA INC, a business association purporting to be a New York corporation; NIPPON STEEL TRADING AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17134

D.C. No. CV-00-02359-VRW

HARRY CORRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC.; MITSUI MINING USA INC; MITSUI MINING CO., LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17155

D.C. No.
CV-00-02690-VRW

GARTH G. DUNN
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL USA, a business association purporting to be a New York Corp.,
Defendants-Appellees.

and

JAPAN IRON & STEEL, a Japanese business association; YAWATA IRON & STEEL, a Japanese business association; FUJI IRON & STEEL, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI SHOJI; SUMITOMO CORP.; SUMITOMO COMMERCIAL COMPANY, a Japanese business association,
Defendants.

No. 01-17157

D.C. No.
CV-00-03239-VRW

JAMES O. KING,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORP; NIPPON STEEL USA,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17160
D.C. No.
CV-99-05042-VRW

PERFECTO LLANZA, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, ALBERTO SALDEJENO; ACELOPIO GALEDO; GENEROSO JACOB; ERNESTO SANTO DOMINGO; IMELDA SANTO DOMINGO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO (USA), INC, a business association; MITSUI MINING CO., LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; NIPPON STEEL CORP, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL USA INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17172
D.C. No.
CV-00-03240-VRW

ALBERTO SALDAJENO; ACELOPIO GALEDO; GENEROSO JACOB, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated; PERFECTO LLANZA; ERNESTO SANTO DOMINGO; IMELDA SANTO DOMINGO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA, LTD, a Japanese business association; ISHIHARA CORPORATION (USA); TAIHEIYO CEMENT, a Japanese business association; ONODA USA; KREHA CORPORATION OF AMERICA, INC.; MITSUI & CO. (USA); SHOWA DENKO AMERICA, INC.; MITSUI MINING USA INC; FURUKAWA ELECTRIC NORTH AMERICA, INC.; NIPPON SHARYRO USA, INC.; SUMITOMO HEAVY INDUSTRIES (USA); NIPPON STEEL USA INC.; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC., *Defendants-Appellees*.	No. 01-17176 D.C. Nos. CV-00-02960-VRW CV-00-03240-VRW CV-00-03828-VRW
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MANUEL A. ENERIZ; DEXTER ENERIZ, Executor of the Estate of Manuel A. Eneriz, *Plaintiffs-Appellants*, v. MITSUI & COMPANY LTD.; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC.; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD.; MITSUI MINING USA INC, *Defendants-Appellees*.	No. 01-17185 D.C. No. CV-00-02691-VRW
RALPH LEVENBERG, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, *Plaintiff-Appellant*, v. NIPPON SHARYO LTD.; NIPPON SHARYO USA., INC., *Defendants-Appellees*.	No. 01-17189 D.C. No. CV-99-01554-VRW
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SUK YOON KIM, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, *Plaintiff-Appellant*, v. ISHIKAWAJIMA HARIMA HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD.; IHI INC.; SUMITOMO HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD.; SUMITOMO HEAVY INDUSTRIES (USA) INC., *Defendants-Appellees*.	No. 01-17197 D.C. No. CV-99-05303-VRW
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RUBEN RESUS; CARLOS CADENILLA, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA; MITSUI & CO (USA), INC; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a business corporation; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC., a business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION, a business association; SUMITOMO CORP., a Japanese business association; SUMITOMO CORP. OF AMERICA, a business association; KUREHA CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a business association; FURUKAWA ELECTRIC NORTH AMERICA, INC., a business association; TAIHEIYO CEMENT, a Japanese business association; ONODA USA INC., a business association; SHOWA DENKO K K, a Japanese business association,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17204

D.C. No.
CV-00-03313-VRW

SHANG-TING SUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUI & CO, LTD., MITSUI & CO. (USA); MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; MITSUI MINING CO., LTD.; MITSUI MINING USA INC,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17207

D.C. No. CV-00-02358-VRW

RAYMOND WHEELER; ALEC CHARLES MURPHY; WILLIAM SCHMITT; HENDRICK ZEEMAN; TAMMERUS WILLEM CARTER-VISSCHER; DAVID CLARKE; WILLEM HENDRIK DE HAAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC., a business association; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI MINING USA INC; NIPPON STEEL USA; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORP.; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC.; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17210

D.C. No. CV-00-04278-VRW

JAE SIK CHOE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION;
MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17211

D.C. No.
CV-99-05309-VRW

FRANK A. MENTE; NEVILLE J. BOOKER, individually and on behalf of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD, a Japanese association, aka/Mitsui Bussan Kaisha; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC., a business association; NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, a Japanese corporation; NIPPON STEEL USA INC., a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a business corporation,
Defendants.

No. 01-17230

D.C. No.
CV-00-03530-VRW

and

MITSUI MINING USA INC, a business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC., a business association,
Defendants-Appellees.

AIZHU SU, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; CHUNSHENG TIAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUI & CO., LTD., a corporation; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD., a corporation; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC., a corporation; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17243

D.C. No.
CV-00-03586-VRW

DO GEUN OH; EUNG CHANG LEE; YONG HAE LEE, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO., LTD, a Japanese business association; MITSUI & CO. (USA), a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association;

No. 01-17251

D.C. No.
CV-00-03752-VRW

MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC., a business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION, a business association; NIPPON STEEL CORP, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL USA, a business association; SHOWA DENKO AMERICA, INC., a business association; SHOWA KOGYO, a Japanese business association,

Defendants-Appellees.

GLORIA TYLER ALFANO; MADELINE FELKINS; WARREN CARRINGER; HOWARD FRIEDMAN, Dr.; RICHARD GORDON, Maj.; OAKIE DENT PACK, on behalf of themselves and all others similarily situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC.; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD.; MITSUI MINING USA INC; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC., a corporation; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17252

D.C. No.
CV-00-04277-VRW

H. JOSEPH TERRENCE, aka Joseph E. Terfansky; FRANKLIN D. GROSS; FREDERICK M. FULLERTON, JR.; ERMA L. WEIMER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO., LTD., a Japanese business corporation aka Mitsui Bussan Kaisha; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC., a business association; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION, a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC., a business association,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17260

D.C. No. CV-00-03648-VRW

ARTHUR TITHERINGTON; HENRY GEORGE BLACKHAM; FERGUS DUNSMORE MCGHIE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

No. 01-17265

D.C. No. CV-00-02689-VRW

JAPAN ENERGY CORP, a Japanese business association; JAPAN ENERGY USA, a Delaware Corporation; IRVINE SCIENTIFIC SALES, a California Corporation
Defendants-Appellees.

FINNIE B PRICE, On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a corporation; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC.; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUI & CO (USA) INC.; MITSUI & CO. LTD., a corporation; MITSUI MINING CO LTD; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17499

D.C. No. CV-00-02761-VRW

ORDER AMENDING OPINION, DENYING PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC, AND HOLDING MANDATE OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vaughn R. Walker, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
October 7, 2002 – Pasadena, California

Filed January 21, 2003
Amended March 6, 2003

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Stephen S. Trott and Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

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ORDER

The opinion filed January 21, 2003 is hereby amended as follows:

1. Slip op. at 991, second full paragraph, line 6, after "because a state is," insert "generally."

2. Slip op. at 991, replace the last sentence (beginning "Because section 354.6 is substantive law"), including footnote 4, with the following:

   Nevertheless, that distinction does not affect the outcome here. Our determination of the foreign affairs doctrine issue does not depend on our conclusion that section 354.6 is substantive law. Whether substantive or procedural, section 354.6 creates a special rule that applies only to a newly defined class of tort actions – actions brought by Second World War slave labor victims against the entities that enslaved them. This new rule profoundly alters the likelihood that such actions will succeed, by not only extending the statute of limitations for claims that were timely when the statute took effect (although we doubt that any such claims existed), but, far more important, by reviving claims that were already time-barred. In the latter instance, the statute upset the repose of potential defendants. Such a revival of liability – even civil liability – is troubling and raises serious due process questions. We need not address those questions here, however. The important point for our foreign affairs analysis is that the California legislature created – or at least resurrected – a special class of tort actions, with the aim of rectifying wartime wrongs committed by our enemies or by parties operating under our enemies' protection.

3. Immediately following the passage inserted above (after "under our enemies' protection")

add a new footnote containing the following text:

> Two decisions of the California Court of Appeal, one by the Second Appellate District and one by the Fourth, have recently addressed whether section 354.6 is substantive or procedural in nature. The decisions reached opposite conclusions. *Compare Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior Court,* No. G030056, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2003) ("The legislation actually *creates* a state law claim which otherwise would not exist. . . . ") *with Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court,* No. B155736, slip op. at 24 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003) ("The sole purpose of section 354.6 is to extend the statute of limitations for common law claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries arising out of slave or forced labor."). Both decisions were issued after our opinion was sent to the Clerk for filing.

4. Slip op. at 1005, replace the first full paragraph with the following:

> Section 354.6 runs afoul of the restriction on the exercise of foreign affairs powers by the states. Because California lacks the power to create a right of action – or, alternatively, to resurrect time-barred claims – in order to provide its own remedy for war-related injuries inflicted by our former enemies and those who operated in their territories, we hold that section 354.6 is unconstitutional.

With these amendments, the panel has voted unanimously to deny the petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the petitions

for rehearing en banc, and no active judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35. The petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc are denied.

The mandate will be held pending a decision in *American Insurance Association v. Low,* 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003) (No. 02-722) (granting certiorari).

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants in these consolidated cases allege that they were forced to work as slave laborers for German and Japanese corporations during the Second World War. They seek damages and other remedies for lost wages and for other atrocious injuries they suffered in the course of their forced labor. Defendants-Appellees are corporations (or successors or affiliates of those corporations) that allegedly committed these atrocities.

A California statute passed in 1999 creates a cause of action against such defendants for claims involving Second World War slave labor.[1] Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6. Under the statute, these claims are not time-barred if commenced on or before December 31, 2010. *Id.* Although Appellants assert a variety of statutory and common law claims for relief, all raise section 354.6 as the primary basis for

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[1] Although the statute distinguishes between "slave laborers," *see* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6(a)(1), and "forced laborers," *see* § 354.6(a)(2), the distinction is generally immaterial to the analysis in this opinion. We generally use the term "slave laborer" to refer to both categories of workers.

bringing their suits so many years after the alleged wrongs were committed. Reluctantly, we hold that section 354.6 is invalid under the United States Constitution and that in its absence Appellants' remaining claims are time-barred.

Background

These cases concern the terrible abuses that German and Japanese corporate interests inflicted both on civilians and on soldiers captured by German and Japanese military forces during the Second World War. The corporations and their managers, with the cooperation and encouragement of their governments, subjected many individuals to vicious cruelties and forced them to work long hours without pay. The slave workers were often underfed, physically beaten, exposed to dangerous conditions, and denied medical care; many were murdered, and others died as a result of the maltreatment they suffered. Among these slave laborers were, tragically, many who became victims of the Holocaust, the most atrocious act ever perpetrated by a civilized (or uncivilized) people, an act unparalleled in history. Indeed, the Holocaust represents the worst historic manifestation of the perpetual human condition known as antisemitism, a phenomenon that is still thriving in all too many parts of the world today.[2]

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[2] It is plainly Holocaust survivors who are the intended beneficiaries of section 354.6, which speaks of "concentration camp[s]" and "ghettos[s]," [sic] mentions no power by name other than the "Nazi regime," and never employs the term "Axis Powers," which is the usual collective term for the enemies of the Allied Powers. Ironically, among the hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs in the cases before us, there is only one Holocaust survivor. All the other plaintiffs suffered their

(Continued on following page)

I. The Cases

A. *Deutsch v. Turner*

The suit by Appellant Josef Tibor Deutsch ("Deutsch") is the only action before us concerning wrongs committed by German rather than Japanese corporations and the only action that was not consolidated with other cases by the district court. It is, in other words, the only Holocaust case at issue here, and it, unlike most of the Japanese cases, involves only a single plaintiff.

Currently a resident of California, Deutsch, a Jew, was born and raised in Hungary. Deutsch asserts that, in 1944, when he was a child, the Nazis took over his town and transported him and his brother Georg to Auschwitz. There the brothers were tortured and forced to work as slaves for 14-hour days, seven days a week. Their work was for the benefit of private corporations, which entered into agreements with the Nazi government, whereby they paid the Nazis less than the prevailing wage for the work of the slaves. The corporations for which the Deutsch children labored included Appellee Hochtief AG ("Hochtief"), one of Germany's largest and oldest construction companies. A civilian employee of Hochtief overseeing the slave laborers in their work for Hochtief beat Deutsch's brother Georg. Georg ultimately died from his injuries. By a stroke of good fortune, Deutsch, unlike most of his co-religionists, survived.

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injuries in Asia at the hands of Japanese companies. Whatever the intended purpose of the California statute, the text of section 354.6 appears to be broad enough to encompass all the plaintiffs' claims, and not just those of the one Holocaust survivor. We follow the district court and all the parties before us in assuming that such is the case.

On April 7, 2000, Deutsch filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California against Hochtief, its wholly owned subsidiary the Turner Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and the Kitchell Corporation, an Arizona corporation that Hochtief owns in part. Deutsch alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful business practices under the California Business and Professions Code, quantum meruit, and wrongful death. The action was removed to federal court on the ground of diversity jurisdiction.

Deutsch's basis for bringing the action so long after the alleged acts is section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which confers jurisdiction on the Superior Court to hear claims by "[a]ny Second World War slave labor victim" or "Second World War forced labor victim," or their heirs, against "any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6(b). Section 354.6 permits such actions to be brought on or before December 31, 2010, regardless of any otherwise applicable statute of limitations. § 354.6(c).

The district court dismissed the action as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. *Deutsch v. Turner,* No. CV 00-4405 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2000).

B. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation*

The consolidated appeal before us also involves 28 other suits, all by victims and heirs of victims against Japanese business entities. Some were brought as class actions. Because there are so many complaints, and because the precise factual allegations do not bear on our decision, we do

not here recount the details of the injuries that the various Appellants endured. Unlike Deutsch, these individuals – some civilians, some soldiers who were prisoners of war – were not selected because of their religious affiliation and were not victims of an overall plan to exterminate an ethnic or religious group. Rather, they became subject to the Japanese slave labor program either because they opposed the Japanese war efforts, in one capacity or another, or simply because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. In any event, they were all subjected to serious mistreatment, including starvation, beatings, physical and mental torture, being transported in unventilated cargo holds of ships, and being forced to make long marches under a tropical sun without water. Some survived, while others were ultimately executed, or died from disease or physical abuse.

Twenty-seven of the suits against the Japanese corporate interests were originally brought in California Superior Court, while one was initiated in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The claimants demanded damages and other relief, raising claims under California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6, and alleging, variously, assault and battery, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, quantum meruit, unfair business practices under California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 *et seq.,* involuntary servitude under California Penal Code section 181 and Article I, § 6 of the California Constitution, and violations of international law under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. As defendants they name both Japanese corporations that they allege committed the injuries and successors and affiliates of those corporations. The suits filed in state court were removed to federal court; all were then consolidated in

the Northern District of California. The district court denied motions to remand and dismissed all claims.

Appellants in the majority of the Japanese cases were, at the time of the occurrences that form the basis for these lawsuits, nationals of the United States or of other Allied nations. Many were in military service and were taken as prisoners of war. The district judge dismissed these cases on the ground that they were barred by a provision of the Treaty of Peace ending the war between the Allied Powers and Japan.[3] *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 944-49 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (*Forced Labor (Allied I)*); *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, No. MDL-1347 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2001) (*Forced Labor (Allied II)*); *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (*Forced Labor (Filipinos)*).

Appellants in the remaining cases were Korean and Chinese nationals. The district court held that their claims were not affected by the Treaty of Peace between the Allies

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[3] The provision that had this effect is Article 14(b), which provides as follows:

> Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490. The district court held that claims by Allied nationals against Japanese corporations were barred under the clause waiving "other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war." *Forced Labor (Allied I)*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 944-49 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

and Japan, because these claimants were not Allied nationals or nationals of any signatory of that treaty. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165-68 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (*Forced Labor (Koreans)*). The court dismissed these cases nonetheless, on the grounds that section 354.6 was an unconstitutional intrusion on the foreign affairs powers of the United States, and that the remaining claims were time-barred. *Id.* at 1168-78.

II. Constitutionality of Section 354.6 Under Foreign Affairs Doctrine

A. Section 354.6 and Its Effect

All Appellants rely on section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Because it can best be understood when read as a whole, we quote it in full:

> § 354.6.
>
> (a) As used in this section:
>
> (1) "Second World War slave labor victim" means any person taken from a concentration camp or ghetto or diverted from transportation to a concentration camp or from a ghetto to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.
>
> (2) "Second World War forced labor victim" means any person who was a member of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers,

or prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, forced to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.

(3) "Compensation" means the present value of wages and benefits that individuals should have been paid and damages for injuries sustained in connection with the labor performed. Present value shall be calculated on the basis of the market value of the services at the time they were performed, plus interest from the time the services were performed, compounded annually to date of full payment without diminution for wartime or postwar currency devaluation.

(b) Any Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War slave labor victim, Second World War forced labor victim, or heir of a Second World War forced labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim or Second World War forced labor victim from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate. That action may be brought in a superior court of this state, which court shall have jurisdiction over that action until its completion or resolution.

(c) Any action brought under this section shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, if the action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010.

Appellants and the State of California as amicus seek to characterize section 354.6 as a purely procedural measure by reducing its scope to the provision regarding the limitations, as set forth in subsection (c). The entire effect of section 354.6, they argue, is to extend the statute of limitations for claims that are already available to remedy Nazi-era slave labor. They cite an impressive range of possible sources of substantive law prohibiting slave labor, including state statutes and common law, the United States Constitution, and international law. The reference in subsection (c) to "the applicable statute of limitations" supports their interpretation: If a statute of limitations is already "applicable," perhaps it is because subsection (c) contemplates a pre-existing cause of action, rather than a cause of action created under section 354.6.

However, section 354.6 can be viewed as purely procedural only when subsection (c) is viewed in isolation from the rest of the provision. Most important, the first sentence of subsection (b) explicitly creates a cause of action by providing that certain individuals "may bring an action" for certain wrongs. *See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,* 535 U.S. 635, ___, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 1759 (2002) (noting that language in a statute providing that party "may bring an action" "reads like the conferral of a private right of action"). Appellants' recitation of pre-existing causes of action for slave labor, whether under other statutes or other bodies of law, is therefore fruitless. Regardless of any pre-existing law, the California legislature chose to create a specific cause of action for persons subjected to slave labor by the Nazis and their allies and sympathizers. If confirmation of this reading is required, it is found in those passages of section 354.6 that set forth the details of the new cause of action. The section defines

the class of plaintiffs who may sue under that cause of action, *see* § 354.6(a)(1), (2), sets the method for measuring damages, *see* § 354.6(a)(3), and establishes a special rule regarding liability of corporations affiliated with the wrongdoer, *see* § 354.6(b). Even the language of the statute of limitations provision itself limits the application of the statute of limitations to "action[s] brought under this section," thus confirming that section 354.6 creates a cause of action.

Appellants' only remaining argument for the procedural nature of section 354.6 is its placement within the Code of Civil Procedure, in Title Two: Time of Commencing Civil Actions. However, where the meaning of a statutory provision is clear, we do not rely upon the location the legislature chose for it in its system of codification, *see Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C.*, 111 F.3d 1322, 1328 (7th Cir. 1997), just as we do not rely upon the headings and titles of sections in such circumstances. *Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.*, 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947). The reason for the placement of section 354.6 within the procedural code is, in any event, not difficult to explain: The most striking aspect of the section is, indeed, its statute of limitations, which would allow the commencement of a suit more than 60 years after the occurrence of the injury. *Id.* Section 354.6's placement, therefore, does not change our view that the section is substantive in nature.

The parties debate whether section 354.6 is substantive or procedural primarily in the context of the Appellees' due process challenge, which we do not address. The substantive nature of the provision, however, is relevant also to the foreign affairs doctrine analysis in which we engage below, because a state is generally more likely to

exceed the limits of its power when it seeks to alter or create rights and obligations than when it seeks merely to further enforcement of already existing rights and duties. Nevertheless, that distinction does not affect the outcome here. Our determination of the foreign affairs doctrine issue does not depend on our conclusion that section 354.6 is substantive law. Whether substantive or procedural, section 354.6 creates a special rule that applies only to a newly defined class of tort actions – actions brought by Second World War slave labor victims against the entities that enslaved them. This new rule profoundly alters the likelihood that such actions will succeed, by not only extending the statute of limitations for claims that were timely when the statute took effect (although we doubt that any such claims existed), but, far more important, by reviving claims that were already time-barred. In the latter instance, the statute upset the repose of potential defendants. Such a revival of liability – even civil liability – is troubling and raises serious due process questions. We need not address those questions here, however. The important point for our foreign affairs analysis is that the California legislature created – or at least resurrected – a special class of tort actions, with the aim of rectifying wartime wrongs committed by our enemies or by parties operating under our enemies' protection.[4]

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[4] Two decisions of the California Court of Appeal, one by the Second Appellate District and one by the Fourth, have recently addressed whether section 354.6 is substantive or procedural in nature. The decisions reached opposite conclusions. *Compare Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior Court*, No. G030056, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2003) ("The legislation actually *creates* a state law claim which otherwise would not exist. . . . ") *with Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v.*

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B. Foreign Affairs Doctrine Analysis

Appellees argue that section 354.6 exceeds California's power to engage in foreign affairs. We agree.[5]

The Constitution does not create an express, general power over foreign affairs but rather allocates particular powers related to foreign affairs to particular federal actors. It appoints the President as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and authorizes him to "make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur," to "appoint Ambassadors" with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate," *id.* cl. 2, and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," *id.* § 3. It grants to Congress the power to "lay and collect . . . Duties, Imposts, and Excises," to "provide for the common Defence," *id.* art. I, § 8, cl. 1, to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," *id.* art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," *id.* cl. 4, to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," *id.* cl. 10, to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," *id.* cl. 11, to "raise and support Armies," *id.* cl. 12, to "provide and maintain a Navy," *id.* cl. 13, and to regulate "the land and naval forces," *id.* cl. 14.

Superior Court, No. B155736, slip op. at 24 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2003) ("The sole purpose of section 354.6 is to extend the statute of limitations for common law claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries arising out of slave or forced labor."). Both decisions were issued after our opinion was sent to the Clerk for filing.

[5] Some Appellants assert that federal jurisdiction is lacking over their claims. We address that issue below.

While the Constitution allocates these foreign affairs powers specifically to the federal government, it also expressly prohibits the states from exercising certain foreign relations powers, including both some of those expressly allocated to the federal government and a few others. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" or, without consent of Congress, "lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports," "keep Troops or Ships of War in time of Peace," "enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power," or "engage in War, unless actually invaded." *Id.* § 10.

Because the Constitution mentions no general foreign affairs power, and because only a few specified powers related to foreign affairs are expressly denied the states, one might assume that, with certain exceptions, states are free to pursue their own foreign policies. This is not, however, the case. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has long viewed the foreign affairs powers specified in the text of the Constitution as reflections of a generally applicable constitutional principle that power over foreign affairs is reserved to the federal government. The Court has sometimes expressed this principle in expansive terms, declaring, for example, that "[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively." *United States v. Pink,* 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); *see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States,* 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (*The Chinese Exclusion Case*) ("For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.").

The implication of the general principle is that "even in [the] absence of a treaty" or federal statute, a state may violate the constitution by "establish[ing] its own foreign

policy." *Zschernig v. Miller,* 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).[6] *Zschernig* concerned an Oregon statute that provided for escheat of estate property claimed by a nonresident alien unless United States citizens had reciprocal rights in the country of the alien's residence and foreign heirs in that country would have the right to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates without confiscation. *Id.* at 430-31. The Court held that, while a reciprocity statute of this sort was not facially invalid, probate courts applying it impermissibly relied on

> inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations – whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights, whether the so-called "rights" are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, whether there is in the actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of confiscation.

Id. at 434. In short, the Court found that the application of the statute depended less on an evaluation of the stated law of a particular country than on whether that country's political system was legitimate in the view of the Oregon courts. *See id.* at 440 (noting that state courts had held that communist and fascist countries did not grant rights reciprocal to those of Oregonians). To condition the application of

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[6] The doctrine has been referred to as "dormant foreign affairs preemption," or simply as "the foreign affairs power." *See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low,* 240 F.3d 739, 751 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks removed), *cert. granted sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low,* 71 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2003).

state law on the political system of a foreign country was "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress." *Id.* at 432.

Despite the broad language of *Pink* and the *Chinese Exclusion Case*, however, *Zschernig* is "[t]he only case in which the Supreme Court has struck down a state statute as violative of the foreign affairs power." *Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke*, 148 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), *rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Locke*, 529 U.S. 89 (2000). *Zschernig* has been applied sparingly, because the Supreme Court has held that a statute does not violate the constitution where it merely has "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." *Clark v. Allen*, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (upholding facially a statute similar to that subsequently struck as applied in *Zschernig*).[7]

Noting that "the federal government's foreign affairs power. . . . is rarely invoked by the courts," we have declined to invalidate under *Zschernig* a California statute with certain superficial similarities to section 354.6.

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[7] Other courts have, however, invalidated statutes under foreign affairs doctrine. *See, e.g., Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios*, 181 F.3d 38, 49-61 (1st Cir.1999) (invalidating Massachusetts law restricting ability of Massachusetts and its agencies to purchase goods or services from individuals or companies engaged in business with Burma), *aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000); *Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson*, 115 Ill.2d 221, 236-37, 104 Ill.Dec. 743, 503 N.E.2d 300 (1986) (invalidating state statute excluding South African coins from otherwise generally applicable state tax exemptions).

Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 752 (9th Cir. 2001), *cert. granted sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low,* 71 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2003). *Gerling* concerned California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, Cal. Ins.Code §§ 13800-13807 ("HVIRA"), which requires insurers doing business in California to file certain information about any insurance policies that they or companies "related" to them sold in Europe and that were in effect between 1920 and 1945. *Id.; see Gerling,* 240 F.3d at 743, 753. While recognizing that HVIRA involved foreign affairs, we held that it was constitutional because of the combination of two factors: first, "HVIRA, on its face, involves commerce alone" – and thus should be considered under the Supreme Court's foreign commerce cases rather than under the foreign affairs cases; and second, HVIRA "is not, on its face, directed at any particular foreign country" – and thus is comparatively unlikely to interfere with the foreign relations of the federal government. *Id.* at 753.

While *Gerling* shows that the general prohibition against state involvement with external affairs is not as broad as some judicial statements would imply, it also suggests a mode of analysis that is relevant to the cases before us. In particular, *Gerling* distinguishes among statutes according to the foreign affairs functions that they implicate. *Gerling* suggests that statutes that "mainly involve foreign commerce" are among those least likely to be held invalid under the foreign affairs power. *Id.* The regulation of commerce is simply not central to the foreign affairs power that is off limits to states.[8] For present

[8] State regulation of foreign commerce might, however, exceed constitutional limitations under other constitutional doctrines. *See, e.g.,*

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purposes, we must consider the importance to foreign affairs analysis of another subset of foreign affairs powers: the power of the federal government to make and to resolve war, including the power to establish the procedure for resolving war claims.

While neither the Constitution nor the courts have defined the precise scope of the foreign relations power that is denied to the states, it is clear that matters concerning war are part of the inner core of this power. Of the eleven clauses of the Constitution granting foreign affairs powers to the President and Congress, *see supra,* seven concern preparing for war, declaring war, waging war, or settling war.[9] Most of the Constitution's express limitations on states' foreign affairs powers also concern war.[10] Even those foreign affairs powers in the Constitution that do not expressly concern war and its resolution may be understood, in part, as a design to *prevent* war. Indeed, as the *Federalist* shows, supporters of the new Constitution

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Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328 (1994) (considering whether state's international tax reporting system violated either dormant commerce clause or federal government's ability to speak in "one voice.")

[9] *See* U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (making President Commander in Chief); *id.* cl. 2; (authorizing President to make treaties with advice and consent of Senate); *id.* art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to "provide for the common Defence"); *id.* cl. 11 (authorizing Congress to declare war); *id.* cl. 12 (authorizing Congress to raise and support armies); *id.* cl. 13 (authorizing Congress to "provide and maintain a Navy"); *id.* cl. 14 (authorizing Congress to regulate "the land and naval forces").

[10] *See id.* § 10 (prohibiting states from entering "any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation," or, without congressional authorization, from "keep[ing] Troops or Ships of War in time of Peace" and from "engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded.")

believed that disunity in international affairs risked unnecessary war. *See, e.g.*, THE FEDERALIST, NO. 3, at 13 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[F]ewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, [and] it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably."). The Supreme Court cases under the foreign affairs power have also been driven, in part, by this concern. Thus the inheritance provision at issue in *Zschernig*, although superficially unrelated to war, was seen by a Court operating at the height of the Cold War as a potential provocation to foreign powers. " 'Experience has shown,' " the Court wrote in striking the provision, " 'that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.' " 389 U.S. at 441 (quoting *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)). Matters related to war are for the federal government alone to address.

Among the six district court decisions we review here, the only one to reach the foreign affairs challenge to section 354.6 held that the provision was unconstitutional under that doctrine for six reasons:

> (1) the terms of section 354.6 and its legislative history demonstrate a purpose to influence foreign affairs directly, (2) the statute targets particular countries, (3) the statute does not regulate an area that Congress has expressly delegated to states to regulate, (4) the statute establishes a judicial forum for negative commentary about the Japanese government and Japanese companies, (5) the Japanese government asserts that litigation of these claims could complicate and impede diplomatic relationships of the countries involved, and (6) the United

> States, through the State Department, contends that section 354.6 impermissibly intrudes upon the foreign affairs power of the federal government.

Forced Labor (Koreans), 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1173. Although we agree that section 354.6 violates the foreign affairs power, we base our holding on a narrower consideration. We hold that section 354.6 is impermissible because it intrudes on the federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims.

With section 354.6, California seeks to redress wrongs committed in the course of the Second World War. By its terms, only "Second World War slave labor victims" and "Second World War forced labor victims" can bring suit under the provision. § 354.6(b). The wrong-doers under the statute – the enslaving individuals or entities – include "the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies or sympathizers." § 354.6(a)(1), (2). The governmental entities are, by definition, wartime enemies of the United States, while the "enterprises" identified in the provision, if not themselves our wartime enemies, were operating in enemy territory and presumably – no party disputes this – with the consent and for the benefit of our wartime enemy. Wrongs committed after the end of the war are not cognizable under section 354.6; the provision concerns only acts that took place during the years leading up to the war and during the years of the war itself. *Id.* In short, California has sought to create its own resolution to a major issue arising out of the war – a remedy for wartime acts that California's legislature believed had never been fairly resolved.

The United States has already exercised its own exclusive authority to resolve the war, including claims

arising out of it. It did not choose, however, to incorporate into that resolution a private right of action against our wartime enemies or their nationals. The United States resolved the war against Germany by becoming a party to a number of treaties and international agreements, beginning with the 1945 agreements at Yalta and Potsdam, in which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to extract reparations from Germany and its nationals but did not include a private right of action against either. *See* Protocol of the Proceedings, Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, art. (B)(111), 3 Bevans 1207. Subsequent agreements also failed to create a private right of action, including the Paris Reparations Treaty of 1946 between the United States and 17 other nations, Agreement on Reparations From Germany, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S. 1655 ("Paris Reparations Treaty"); the Transition Agreement of 1952 between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952 (as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954), 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 219; the London Debt Agreement of 1953 between the United States and 20 other nations, Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3; and the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which reunified Germany and became effective on

March 15, 1991, Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1186.[11] Most recently, the Foundation Agreement of July 17, 2000, an executive agreement between the governments of Germany and the United States, provided a limited form of remedy for claimants such as Deutsch. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future." The Foundation was created by Germany, in negotiation with the United States, five Central and Eastern European countries, Israel, and the non-governmental Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany,

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[11] For useful and accessible surveys of these agreements as they apply to war reparations, see *Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.*, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 448-56 (D.N.J. 1999), and *Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG*, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 265-73 (D.N.J. 1999). The district court in *Deutsch* relied heavily on these cases and adopted their conclusion that Deutsch's claim raised a nonjusticiable political question, *Deutsch*, No. CV 00-4405, at 2-6, a conclusion with which we disagree. The district court determined that the postwar agreements created the exclusive remedy to the matters raised by Deutsch, and that to order relief would therefore require the court to interfere with the foreign affairs choices of the political branches. *Id.* Under political question doctrine, the court noted, it is impermissible for a court to make policy related to foreign affairs. *Id.* at 2 (citing *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). Therefore, the district court supposed, *Deutsch* raised a nonjusticiable political question. The problem with this argument is that it makes every dispute over the proper application of a treaty into a political question, because treaties inherently involve foreign affairs. No political question, however, is raised by the simple application of the requirements of a treaty to which the United States is a party. Treaties have the force of law, *see Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and, if they are self-executing or have been implemented through legislation, must be applied by the courts. *See United States v. Alvarez-Machain*, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992).

for the purpose of making payments to people who suffered at the hands of German companies during the Nazi Era. It provides for payment of up to 15,000 German Marks (roughly $7500) to individual claimants who were subjected to forced labor. *See id.* at Annex A. We do not have the authority to consider the adequacy of such payments here. Indeed, we acknowledge that no possible compensation could be sufficient to remedy the harm done to Holocaust victims and their families.

No party argues that any of these agreements provides the authority for a state of the United States to create a private right of action enabling individuals to recover for wartime injuries against German corporations. Deutsch argues, however, that the terms of these various agreements do not *prohibit* a state from creating such a right of action, and that in the absence of such a prohibition, his action may proceed. Deutsch's argument cannot carry the day. As we explained earlier, the Constitution allocates the power over foreign affairs to the federal government exclusively, and the power to make and resolve war, including the authority to resolve war claims, is central to the foreign affairs power in the constitutional design. In the absence of some specific action that constitutes authorization on the part of the federal government, states are prohibited from exercising foreign affairs powers, including modifying the federal government's resolution of war-related disputes.

The war with Japan ended with the Treaty of Peace, signed in San Francisco, on September 8, 1951, by the representatives of the United States and 47 other Allied powers and Japan, and ratified by the United States Senate on April 28, 1952. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490. Although

the parties dispute whether that treaty by its own terms precludes the claims brought by any of the Appellants,[12] that is the only dispute regarding the treaty. No party asserts that the treaty either creates – explicitly or implicitly – a private right of action against Japan or its nationals, or authorizes states of the United States to create such a right.[13] Once again, without such authorization,

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[12] The central disagreement concerns the meaning of Article 14(b) of the treaty, which is quoted in full *supra* note 3. The district judge held that Appellants' claims were waived because they are claims of Allied nationals "arising out of actions taken by [Japanese] nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war." *Id.; Forced Labor (Allied I),* 114 F. Supp. 2d at 944-49. Appellants argue that the actions of the Appellee corporations were not taken "in the course of the prosecution of the war," or that it is an issue of fact whether they were or not.

[13] Appellants do assert that, if Article 14 of the treaty waives claims against Japanese nationals, as Appellees assert, then Article 14 is superceded by Article 26. Article 26 provides, in pertinent part:

> Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, the same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Treaty of Peace with Japan, at art. 26. Appellants argue that other foreign states have entered into agreements with Japan that do not waive private claims and that those agreements thereby extend to those foreign states "greater advantages" than the terms extended to the United States. The district court found that Article 26 confers rights only on the "parties" to the treaties, not on individuals. *Forced Labor (Allied I),* 114 F. Supp. 2d at 949. We agree, at least as to the right to invoke the clause. It is the prerogative of the United States, not of California or of Appellants, to determine whether a foreign state has been granted greater advantages and, if so, whether it is in the interest of the United States to incorporate those advantages (along with any concomitant lesser disadvantages) into the treaty. The United States has not invoked Article 26 to authorize a private right of action. Appellants' reliance on the article is, therefore, unavailing.

states lack the power to alter the federal government's resolution of disputes relating to the war.[14]

The grievances of at least one class of potential plaintiffs identified in section 354.6, prisoners of war, were addressed by the federal government in domestic legislation. *See* § 354.6(a)(2). Under the War Claims Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2001-2017p, assets seized from Germany, Japan, or their nationals within the United States and its territory were used to compensate American prisoners of war whose rights had been violated. *See* U.S. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION FROM SEPTEMBER 14, 1949 TO MARCH 31, 1955, at 10-11 (1955); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2005(d)(2)(A). The Act required prisoners of war to submit their claims to a federal agency, whose decision was final; it conceived of no private right of action against German or Japanese entities. *See* 50 U.S.C. app. § 2010.

California was dissatisfied with how the federal government chose to address the various wartime injuries suffered by victims of the Nazis and their allies after the United States brought the Second World War to a close. The California legislature found that, under the treaties and compensatory programs that the federal government had established, "victims of Nazi persecution have been deprived of their entitlement to compensation for their

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[14] It is immaterial that many of the Appellants are nationals of two nations, China and Korea, that were not signatories of the San Francisco treaty. When the United States has been a party to a war, the resolution it establishes to that war is the resolution for the whole of the United States. States lack the power to modify that resolution, regardless of the citizenship of those seeking redress.

labor and for injuries sustained while performing that labor as forced or slave laborers prior to and during the Second World War." 1999 Cal. Stat. 216, § 1(b) (codified in notes to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6). The state legislature therefore enacted section 354.6 to remedy these 54-year-old injuries in a manner favored by California but not provided for by the federal government. Appellants assert that no international agreement or other federal action prohibits California from doing so. However, as we have stated, because the issue is the lack of state power, it is immaterial whether the federal government enacted a prohibition. The federal government, acting under its foreign affairs authority, provided its own resolution to the war; California has no power to modify that resolution.[15]

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[15] One might argue that the Holocaust was distinct from the German war effort, that claims for injuries arising from the Holocaust do not, therefore, relate to the war, and that such injuries, because they are unrelated to the war, do not implicate the war powers of the federal government. We need not assume that the acts of enslavement encompassed by section 354.6 served military purposes or advanced the war effort of the Nazis or their allies. We simply note that, by its terms, section 354.6 creates a right of action only for "Second World War" slave labor victims. For the purposes of the provision, the California legislature explicitly defined the harms suffered by such victims as pertaining to the war. Moreover, the federal government's exclusive power to resolve the war necessarily includes an exclusive power to address the injuries that section 354.6 attempts to remedy. The treaties themselves confirm that the federal government regarded all wartime injuries as matters integral to peacemaking, regardless of the purpose or effect of the wrong-doer's acts. In the Paris Reparations Treaty, for example, the United States and the other signatories "agree[d] among themselves that their shares of reparation, as determined by the present Agreement, shall be regarded by each of them as covering all its claims and those of its nationals against the former German Government and its Agencies, of a governmental or private nature arising out of the war." Paris Reparations Treaty, Jan. 14, 1946, art. 2(A), 61 Stat. 3157, 3163;

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Before concluding our discussion of this issue, we must consider Appellants' most vigorous argument in favor of the constitutionality of section 354.6: that the provision "presents striking parallels" to HVIRA, the insurance reporting requirement that we upheld in *Gerling*. Appellants correctly note two points of similarity: first, like section 354.6, HVIRA is related to Nazi-era wrongs; second, as under section 354.6, at least as applied to the cases before us, the parties regulated by HVIRA are businesses. The similarity ends there, however. Unlike section 354.6, HVIRA does not attempt to require the affected businesses to compensate victims for past wrongs: Specifically, as we noted in *Gerling*, HVIRA does not impose obligations on "European insurance companies to pay or not to pay claims on European policies." *Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 745 (internal quotation marks removed). HVIRA, rather, is merely a reporting requirement and the only consequence of noncompliance is the inability to do business in California in the future. *Id.* Whereas section 354.6 seeks to provide a monetary remedy for decades-old wartime wrongs, HVIRA is a forward-looking regulatory statute.[16] In short, unlike section 354.6, HVIRA does not

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see also, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 30(4), 61 Stat. 2109, 2126 (bilateral treaty between Allied Powers and Hungary) ("Hungary waives on its own behalf and on behalf of Hungarian nationals all claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding on May 8, 1945, except those arising out of contracts and other obligations entered into, and rights acquired, before September 1, 1939.").

[16] Appellants in *Gerling* originally challenged two other statutes that did attempt to force payment of Nazi-era insurance claims, *see* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.5; Cal. Ins. Code § 790.15, but those claims were dismissed for lack of standing and not addressed on appeal. *Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 745; *see also Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v.*

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attempt to hold defendants liable for their past wartime conduct; it therefore does not implicate the exclusive power of the federal government to make and resolve war, including the resolution of claims arising out of such actions.

Section 354.6 runs afoul of the restriction on the exercise of foreign affairs powers by the states. Because California lacks the power to create a right of action – or, alternatively, to resurrect time-barred claims – in order to provide its own remedy for war-related injuries inflicted by our former enemies and those who operated in their territories, we hold that section 354.6 is unconstitutional.

III. Statutes of Limitations

In addition to section 354.6, Appellants bring various tort claims under common law, California statutory and constitutional law, as well as for violations of international law under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ("ATCA"). *See supra*. All these claims are barred by their respective statutes of limitations.

Appellants apparently bring their common law claims under California law, although in many instances they do not identify the jurisdiction under whose law they seek relief. Some of the parties, including both defendants and plaintiffs, are California residents, while others are not; the alleged injuries all took place outside of California. Regardless of the source of the substantive law, because all the claims, including both common law and statutory, were brought in California state court or in a district court

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Low, 296 F.3d 832, 842 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2002), *cert. granted sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low*, 71 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2003).

within California, we apply to them the statute of limitations that would be applied in California state court.[17] California applies the "governmental interest" approach to conflict of law issues. *Hurtado v. Superior Court,* 11 Cal. 3d 574, 579-80 (1974). Under this approach, the correct choice of law depends on "an analysis of the respective interests of the states involved." *Id.* at 579. Where the conflict concerns a statute of limitations, the governmental interest approach generally leads California courts to apply California law. Witkin, 3 CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 104 (4th ed. 1996); *see, e.g., Peterson v. Kennedy,* 771 F.2d 1244, 1251 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985); *American Bank of Commerce v. Corondoni,* 169 Cal. App. 3d 368 (Ca. Ct. App. 1985), and especially so where California's statute would bar a claim. California's interest in applying its own law is strongest when its statute of limitations is shorter than that of the foreign state, because a "state has a substantial interest in preventing the prosecution in its courts of claims which it deems to be 'stale.' Hence, subject to rare exceptions, the forum will dismiss a claim that is barred by its statute of limitations." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142, cmt. f (1988).

All the claims in the cases before us, other than those under the ATCA, have been stale for several decades under the applicable California statutes of limitations. *See* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340 (one-year statute for personal injury torts, wrongful death and false imprisonment); *id.* § 338 (three-year statute for taking of or injury to personal

[17] The district court addressing the claims brought by Korean and Chinese Appellants found that the non-federal claims would be time-barred under Chinese and Japanese law, as well as under the law of California. *Forced Labor (Koreans),* 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.

property, and for fraud); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (four-year statute for claims of unfair business practices). Only an extraordinarily strong interest of a foreign state in keeping these claims alive could overcome the presumption that California will not hear claims that have been stale for so long under its own law. No such strong foreign interest has been demonstrated here.

The statute of limitations under the ATCA is 10 years. *Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, ___ F.3d ___, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *27 (9th Cir. 2002).[18] Appellants have thus brought these claims far too late as well.[19]

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[18] The 10-year limit is not stated in the provision. Rather, we adopted it from the Torture Victim Protection Act, *see* Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, statutory notes) ("TVPA"), which has an explicit 10-year statute. *Papa v. United States,* 281 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002). We did so because where a federal statute lacks a specified statute of limitations,

> courts apply the limitations period provided by the jurisdiction in which they sit unless "a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."

Papa, 281 F.3d at 1011-12 (citing *North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,* 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995)). We held that ATCA was closely analogous to the TVPA both in its purpose and in its mechanism for achieving that purpose. *Papa,* 281 F.3d at 1012. Appellants ask us to reconsider our decision in *Papa,* at least as it applies to the present cases, and hold that the ATCA is more closely analogous to section 354.6 than to the TVPA. The result, Appellants argue, would be that the claims are not barred until 2010. For the reasons we stated in *Papa,* and because we hold that section 354.6 is unconstitutional, we reaffirm that the ATCA statute of limitations in this case, as in other cases, is 10 years.

[19] Some Appellants who did not bring a claim under the ATCA argue that they should be permitted to amend their complaints to do so. In light of our holding, such an amendment would be futile.

Some Appellants contend, however, that their claims under both state law and the ATCA are equitably tolled and could therefore survive our invalidation of section 354.6. Although the district court found that they did not allege facts sufficient to trigger equitable tolling, these Appellants contend that they were not required to allege such facts, because a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, which a plaintiff is not required to anticipate in the complaint. They also contend that even if they were required to allege such facts, the district court should have granted them leave to amend in order to give them the opportunity to do so. The curious aspect of this argument is that all of the Appellants who make this argument *did* plead equitable tolling in their complaints. Furthermore, they alleged *facts* that they believed would trigger such tolling. They alleged, for example, that the defendants had kept the plaintiffs ignorant of essential facts in the defendants' possession. The district court considered these alleged facts and found them insufficient to trigger tolling. *Forced Labor (Koreans),* 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-82. Although the court's discussion of equitable tolling concerned only the ATCA, its reasoning applies equally to the state law claims. On appeal, these Appellants offer neither a satisfactory answer to the district court's finding regarding equitable tolling nor any hint of any additional facts that they might allege in an amended complaint. Under these circumstances, amendment would be futile. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's dismissal of the complaints with prejudice.[20]

[20] Deutsch argues for the first time on appeal that he should be permitted to amend his complaint to include a claim under the TVPA.

(Continued on following page)

IV. Jurisdiction

In many of the cases before us, there is indisputable federal jurisdiction. In some, for example in *Deutsch* and in *Dunn v. Nippon Steel Corp.*,[21] there is diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Appellants in several other cases, for example in *Terrence v. Mitsui & Co., Wheeler v. Mitsui & Co.,* and *Kim v. Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Indus. Co.*, assert claims under international law, thus giving rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

He offers no explanation, however, for why he failed to bring that claim in his first amended complaint. Moreover, as noted above, the TVPA has an explicit statute of limitation of 10 years. Deutsch argues that that period commenced on the effective date of the Act, rather than on the date on which the injury was complete. He cites no authority for this proposition, and we do not find it to be a reasonable or plausible one. As Deutsch notes, we have held that the TVPA is applicable to acts that took place prior to the effective date of the Act. *Alvarez-Machain v. United States,* 107 F.3d 696, 702-03 (9th Cir. 1996). In *Alvarez-Machain,* however, the plaintiff filed his claim only three years after the date of the alleged injury. *Id.* at 700. Nothing in our cases or the statute suggests that Congress intended the TVPA to open the federal courts to claims that were already more than 40 years old when the statute became effective or that no time limit exists under the TVPA as to the resurrection of claims for damages that may have occurred in the far distant past. Because the TVPA has a 10-year statute of limitations, permitting Deutsch to amend his complaint would be futile. We therefore affirm the dismissal with prejudice.

[21] In *Dunn,* the amount in controversy is not stated in the complaint, nor was the amount determined by the district court. However, the Appellant seeks compensation and punitive damages for roughly three years of withheld wages, as well as for severe physical and mental injuries he suffered at the hands of the defendants and their predecessors during that time. There is thus no doubt that this case meets the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Among the many cases that have been consolidated, there are some individual cases as to which federal jurisdiction may be uncertain. Appellants in those cases originally sought relief in state court, under state law,[22] against non-diverse defendants. After removal and consolidation, some of the Appellants sought remand to state court. The district court denied their motions, *Forced Labor (Allied I)*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 943, on the ground that "the complaints . . . , on their face, implicate the federal common law of foreign relations." *Id.* Appellees opposed remand on other grounds as well. Appellants in some of these cases – not precisely the same group that moved for remand below – now argue that federal jurisdiction is lacking.

Normally, of course, we would address all jurisdictional issues as an initial matter, as they would determine whether we could proceed to the merits. The situation is different with respect to the cases consolidated here, because the cases over which jurisdiction is disputed raise no merits issues that are not also raised by one or more cases over which jurisdiction is certain and which have been consolidated with the disputed cases. In short, we are compelled to address all of the merits issues in these consolidated cases, regardless of whether there is jurisdiction over each of them. Furthermore, the ultimate survival of all of these cases depends on the validity of the provisions of section 354.6. In light of our holding that section 354.6 is unconstitutional, remand to state court of the

[22] Although some plaintiffs amended or sought to amend their complaints, after removal, to include federal claims, such amendments do not bear on the evaluation of removal jurisdiction. *Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co.*, 300 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002).

cases of uncertain federal jurisdiction would be futile, as the state court would simply dismiss the claims with prejudice. *See Bates v. Jones,* 127 F.3d 870, 873 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the California Supreme Court "has yet to disregard a directly applicable decision of this court on a question of federal law"). Therefore, our determination of the uncertain jurisdictional issues could have no effect on the outcome of any of the cases.

For these reasons, we decline to address the uncertain jurisdictional issues and simply affirm the district court's dismissal of all the cases before us.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6 is an unconstitutional intrusion on the foreign affairs power of the United States and that Appellants' remaining claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The judgments of the district courts are

AFFIRMED.

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEF TIBOR DEUTSCH, an individual; JOSEF TIBOR DEUTSCH, as the survivor of George Deutsch,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TURNER CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation with corporate regional headquarters located in California; KITCHELL CORPORATION USA, an Arizona Corporation authorized to do business in California; Hochtief AG, a German Corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-56673

D.C. No.
CV-00-04405-SVW

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

WOODROW M. HUTCHSION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA, a business association purporting to be a California corporation; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association;

No. 01-17115

D.C. No.
CV-00-02163-VRW

MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a business association purporting to be a New York corporation; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC., a business association purporting to be a Delaware corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

LESTER I. TENNY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI & CO (USA), Inc, a business association purporting to be a New York Corporation; MITSUI MINING CO LTD, a Japanese business association; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a business association purporting to be a Delaware corp,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17116

D.C. No. CV-00-02357-VRW

SHIRLEY M. RUBENSTEIN; JULIA E. STEVENSON; GLEN LEROY, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

No. 01-17123

D.C. No. CV-00-03737-VRW

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA, LTD; ISHIHARA CORPORATION, a California corporation; Isk Americas, Inc., a Delaware corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

RAYMOND HEIMBUCH; VIVIAN O. JOHNSON; WILLIAM R. LOWE; SAM P. BUSE; ALFRED BEREST EDWIN F. LINDROS; MICHAEL BIBIN; J. S. GRAY; KARL WILLIAM HOLT; NORMAN R. MATTHEWS; DARREL D. STARK; CARMEL ZIPETO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA, LTD, a Japanese business association; ISHIHARA CORPORATION; ISK AMERICAS, INC., a business association purporting to be a Delaware corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17124

D.C. No. CV-00-00064-VRW

MELODY SOLIS, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL TRADING CO., LTD.,

No. 01-17134

D.C. No. CV-00-02359-VRW

a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL USA INC, a business association purporting to be a New York corportion; NIPPON STEEL TRADING AMERICA,

Defendants-Appellees.

HARRY CORRE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC.; MITSUI MINING USA INC; MITSUI MINING CO., LTD.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17155

D.C. No. CV-00-02690-VRW

GARTH G. DUNN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL USA, a business association purporting to be a New York Corp.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

JAPAN IRON & STEEL, a Japanese business association; YAWATA IRON & STEEL, a Japanese business association; FUJI IRON & STEEL, a Japanese business

No. 01-17157

D.C. No. CV-00-03239-VRW

association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI SHOJI; SUMITOMO CORP.; SUMITOMO COMMERCIAL COMPANY, a Japanese business association,

Defendants.

JAMES O. KING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORP; NIPPON STEEL USA,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17160

D.C. No. CV-99-05042-VRW

PERFECTO LLANZA, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO (USA), INC, a business association; MITSUI MINING CO., LTD., a Japanese business association; Mitsubishi Corporation; Nippon Steel Corp, a Japanese business association; Nippon Steel USA Inc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17172

D.C. No. CV-00-03240-VRW

ALBERTO SALDAJENO; ACELOPIO GALEDO; GENEROSO JACOB, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA, LTD, a Japanese business association; ISHIHARA CORPORATION (USA); TAIHEIYO CEMENT, a Japanese business association; ONODA USA,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17176

D.C. No.
CV-00-02960-VRW
CV-00-03240-VRW
CV-00-03828-VRW

ERNESTO SANTO DOMINGO, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated; IMEDLA SANTO DOMINGO, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA, LTD, a Japanese corporation; ISHIHARA CORPORATION U.S.A., California corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17177

D.C. No.
CV-00-03828-VRW

MANUEL A. ENERIZ; DEXTER ENERIZ, Executor of the Estate of Manuel A. Eneriz,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & COMPANY LTD.; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC.; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD. MITSUI MINING USA INC,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17185

D.C. No. CV-00-02691-VRW

RALPH LEVENBERG, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON SHARYO LTD.; NIPPON SHARYO USA., INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17189

D.C. No. CV-99-01554-VRW

HAROLD W. POOLE; ERNEST LOY; FRANCIS W. AGNES; ROBERT C. CLARK; CLARENCE S. KELLOGG, *Plaintiffs-Appellants,* v. NIPPON STEEL CORP, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL TRADING CO., LTD., a business association purporting to be a New York corporation; NIPPON STEEL TRADING AMERICA, a business association purporting to be a California corporation, *Defendants-Appellees.*	No. 01-17195 D.C. No. CV-00-02360-VRW
SUK YOON KIM, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, *Plaintiff-Appellant,* v. ISHIKAWAJIMA HARIMA HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD.; IHI INC.; SUMITOMO HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD.; SUMITOMO HEAVY INDUSTRIES (USA) INC., *Defendants-Appellees.*	No. 01-17197 D.C. No. CV-99-05303-VRW
ZHENHUAN MA, *Plaintiff-Appellant,* v.	No. 01-17201 D.C. No. CV-01-02592-VRW

KAJIMA CORPORATION; KAJIMA CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.; KAJIMA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; KAJIMA ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.; KAJIMA INTERNATIONAL, INC.; KAJIMA U.S.A., INC,

Defendants-Appellees.

SA SON SIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUI & CO, LTD.; MITSUI & CO. (USA); MITSUI ENGINEERING & SHIPBUILDING CO., LTD.; PACECO CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17203

D.C. No. CV-00-03242-VRW

RUBEN RESUS; CARLOS CADENILLA, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA; MITSUI & CO (USA), INC; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a business corporation; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association;

No. 01-17204

D.C. No. CV-00-03313-VRW

MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICAN INC., a business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION, a business association; SUMITOMO CORP., a Japanese business association; SUMITOMO CORP. OF AMERICA, a business association; KUREHA CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a business association; FURUKAWA ELECTRIC NORTH AMERICA, INC., a business association; TAIHEIYO CEMENT, a Japanese business association; ONODO USA INC., a business association; SHOWA DENKO K K, a Japanese business association,

Defendants-Appellees.

SHANG-TING SUNG,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUI & CO, LTD.; MITSUI & CO. (USA); MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION; MITSUI MINING CO., LTD.; MITSUI MINING USA INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17207

D.C. No.
CV-00-02358-VRW

RAYMOND WHEELER; ALEC CHARLES MURPHY; WILLIAM SCHMITT; HENDRICK ZEEMAN; TAMMERUS WILLEM CARTER-VISSCHER; DAVID CLARKE; WILLEM HENDRIK DE HAAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD, a Japanese business association; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC., a business association; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI MINING USA INC; NIPPON STEEL USA; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORP.; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC.; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17210

D.C. No. CV-00-04278-VRW

JAE SIK CHOE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD.

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17211

D.C. No. CV-99-05309-VRW

FRANK A. MENTE; NEVILLE J. BOOKER, individually and on behalf of persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO. LTD, a Japanese association, AKA/Mitsui Bussan Kaisha; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), Inc., a business association; NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, a Japanese corporation; NIPPON STEEL USA INC., a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a business corporation,

Defendants,

and

MITSUI MINING USA INC, a business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC., a business association,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17230

D.C. No.
CV-00-03530-VRW

AIZHU SU, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; CHUNSHENG TIAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUI & CO., LTD. a corporation; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD., a corporation; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC., a corporation; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17243

D.C. No. CV-00-03586-VRW

DO GEUN OH; EUNG CHANG LEE; YONG HAE LEE, individually and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO., LTD, a Japanese business association; MITSUI & CO. (USA), a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC.,

No. 01-17251

D.C. No. CV-00-03752-VRW

a business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION, a business association; NIPPON STEEL CORP, a Japanese business association; NIPPON STEEL USA, a business association; SHOWA DENKO AMERICA, INC., a business association; SHOWA KOGYO, a Japanese business association,

Defendants-Appellees.

GLORIA TYLER ALFANO; MADELINE FELKINS; WARREN CARRINGER; HOWARD FRIEDMAN, Dr.; RICHARD GORDON, Maj.; OAKIE DENT PACK, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC.; MITSUI MINING COMPANY, LTD.; MITSUI MINING USA INC; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC., a corporation; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17252

D.C. No.
CV-00-04277-VRW

H. JOSEPH TERRENCE, aka JOSEPH E. TERFANSKY; FRANKLIN D. GROSS; FREDERICK M. FULLERTON, JR.; ERMA L. WEIMER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MITSUI & CO., LTD., a Japanese business corporation aka Mitsui Bussan Kaisha; MITSUI & COMPANY (USA), INC., a business association; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS CORPORATION, a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a Japanese business association; MITSUBISHI MATERIALS USA CORPORATION, a business association; MITSUBISHI CORPORATION, a business association; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA, INC., a business association,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17260

D.C. No. CV-00-03648-VRW

ARTHUR TITHERINGTON; HENVRY GEORGE BLACKHAM; FERGUS DUNSMORE MCGHIE, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 01-17265

D.C. No. CV-00-02689-VRW

v.

JAPAN ENERGY CORP, a Japanese business association; JAPAN ENERGY USA, a Delaware Corporation; IRVINE SCIENTIFIC SALES, a California Corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

FINNIE B PRICE, On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MITSUBISHI CORPORATION; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., a corporation; MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES AMERICA INC.; MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, a corporation; MITSUI & CO (USA) INC.; MITSUI & CO. LTD., a corporation; MITSUI MINING CO LTD; MITSUI MINING USA INC, a corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 01-17499

D.C. No. CV-00-02761-VRW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Vaughn R. Walker, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 7, 2002 – Pasadena, California

Filed January 21, 2003

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Stephen S. Trott and Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

COUNSEL

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John H. Beisner and John F. Niblock, O'Melveny & Meyers LLP, Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees Mitsubishi Materials Corporation and Mitsubishi Materials U.S.A. Corporation.

Arne D. Wagner, Morrison & Foerster LLP, for defendants-appellees Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi International Corporation.

Matthew Digby, Bingham Dana LLP, for defendants-appellees Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd., Mitsui Mining U.S.A., Inc., Nippon Sharyo U.S.A., Inc., Taiheiyo Cement U.S.A., Inc., Japan Energy Corporation, Japan Energy U.S.A., Furukawa Electric North America, Inc., and Irvine Scientific Sales Co., Inc.

Sara D. Schotland, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, for defendant- appellee Showa Denko America, Inc.

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Neil A.F. Popovic, Heller, Ehrman, White & Mcauliffe, for defendant-appellee Showa Denko America, Inc.

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Christopher Landau, Kirkland & Ellis, for defendant-appellee Sumitomo Heavy Industries (U.S.A.) and Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd.

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Junji Masuda, Masuda & Ejiri, for defendant-appellee Japan Energy Corporation, Japan Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., and Irvine Scientific Sales Co., Inc.

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OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge

Plaintiffs-Appellants in these consolidated cases allege that they were forced to work as slave laborers for German and Japanese corporations during the Second World War. They seek damages and other remedies for lost wages and for other atrocious injuries they suffered in the course of their forced labor. Defendants-Appellees are corporations (or successors or affiliates of those corporations) that allegedly committed these atrocities.

A California statute passed in 1999 creates a cause of action against such defendants for claims involving Second

World War slave labor.[1] Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6. Under the statute, these claims are not time-barred if commenced on or before December 31, 2010. *Id.* Although Appellants assert a variety of statutory and common law claims for relief, all raise section 354.6 as the primary basis for bringing their suits so many years after the alleged wrongs were committed. Reluctantly, we hold that section 354.6 is invalid under the United States Constitution and that in its absence Appellants' remaining claims are time-barred.

Background

These cases concern the terrible abuses that German and Japanese corporate interests inflicted both on civilians and on soldiers captured by German and Japanese military forces during the Second World War. The corporations and their managers, with the cooperation and encouragement of their governments, subjected many individuals to vicious cruelties and forced them to work long hours without pay. The slave workers were often underfed, physically beaten, exposed to dangerous conditions, and denied medical care; many were murdered, and others died as a result of the maltreatment they suffered. Among these slave laborers were, tragically, many who became victims of the Holocaust, the most atrocious act ever perpetrated by a civilized (or uncivilized) people, an act unparalleled in history. Indeed, the Holocaust represents

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[1] Although the statute distinguishes between "slave laborers," *see* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6(a)(1), and "forced laborers," *see* § 354.6(a)(2), the distinction is generally immaterial to the analysis in this opinion. We generally use the term "slave laborer" to refer to both categories of workers.

the worst historic manifestation of the perpetual human condition known as antisemitism, a phenomenon that is still thriving in all too many parts of the world today.[2]

I. The Cases

A. *Deutsch v. Turner*

The suit by Appellant Josef Tibor Deutsch ("Deutsch") is the only action before us concerning wrongs committed by German rather than Japanese corporations and the only action that was not consolidated with other cases by the district court. It is, in other words, the only Holocaust case at issue here, and it, unlike most of the Japanese cases, involves only a single plaintiff.

Currently a resident of California, Deutsch, a Jew, was born and raised in Hungary. Deutsch asserts that, in 1944, when he was a child, the Nazis took over his town and transported him and his brother Georg to Auschwitz. There the brothers were tortured and forced to work as slaves for 14-hour days, seven days a week. Their work was for the benefit of private corporations, which entered

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[2] It is plainly Holocaust survivors who are the intended beneficiaries of section 354.6, which speaks of "concentration camp[s]" and "ghettos[s]," [sic] mentions no power by name other than the "Nazi regime," and never employs the term "Axis Powers," which is the usual collective term for the enemies of the Allied Powers. Ironically, among the hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs in the cases before us, there is only one Holocaust survivor. All the other plaintiffs suffered their injuries in Asia at the hands of Japanese companies. Whatever the intended purpose of the California statute, the text of section 354.6 appears to be broad enough to encompass all the plaintiffs' claims, and not just those of the one Holocaust survivor. We follow the district court and all the parties before us in assuming that such is the case.

into agreements with the Nazi government, whereby they paid the Nazis less than the prevailing wage for the work of the slaves. The corporations for which the Deutsch children labored included Appellee Hochtief AG ("Hochtief"), one of Germany's largest and oldest construction companies. A civilian employee of Hochtief overseeing the slave laborers in their work for Hochtief beat Deutsch's brother Georg. Georg ultimately died from his injuries. By a stroke of good fortune, Deutsch, unlike most of his co-religionists, survived.

On April 7, 2000, Deutsch filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California against Hochtief, its wholly owned subsidiary the Turner Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and the Kitchell Corporation, an Arizona corporation that Hochtief owns in part. Deutsch alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful business practices under the California Business and Professions Code, quantum meruit, and wrongful death. The action was removed to federal court on the ground of diversity jurisdiction.

Deutsch's basis for bringing the action so long after the alleged acts is section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which confers jurisdiction on the Superior Court to hear claims by "[a]ny Second World War slave labor victim" or "Second World War forced labor victim," or their heirs, against "any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6(b). Section 354.6 permits such actions to be brought on or before December 31, 2010, regardless of any otherwise applicable statute of limitations. § 354.6(c).

The district court dismissed the action as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. *Deutsch v. Turner,* No. CV 00-4405 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2000).

B. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation*

The consolidated appeal before us also involves 28 other suits, all by victims and heirs of victims against Japanese business entities. Some were brought as class actions. Because there are so many complaints, and because the precise factual allegations do not bear on our decision, we do not here recount the details of the injuries that the various Appellants endured. Unlike Deutsch, these individuals – some civilians, some soldiers who were prisoners of war – were not selected because of their religious affiliation and were not victims of an overall plan to exterminate an ethnic or religious group. Rather, they became subject to the Japanese slave labor program either because they opposed the Japanese war efforts, in one capacity or another, or simply because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. In any event, they were all subjected to serious mistreatment, including starvation, beatings, physical and mental torture, being transported in unventilated cargo holds of ships, and being forced to make long marches under a tropical sun without water. Some survived, while others were ultimately executed, or died from disease or physical abuse.

Twenty-seven of the suits against the Japanese corporate interests were originally brought in California Superior Court, while one was initiated in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The claimants demanded damages and other relief, raising

claims under California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6, and alleging, variously, assault and battery, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, quantum meruit, unfair business practices under California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 *et seq.*, involuntary servitude under California Penal Code section 181 and Article I, § 6 of the California Constitution, and violations of international law under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. As defendants they name both Japanese corporations that they allege committed the injuries and successors and affiliates of those corporations. The suits filed in state court were removed to federal court; all were then consolidated in the Northern District of California. The district court denied motions to remand and dismissed all claims.

Appellants in the majority of the Japanese cases were, at the time of the occurrences that form the basis for these lawsuits, nationals of the United States or of other Allied nations. Many were in military service and were taken as prisoners of war. The district judge dismissed these cases on the ground that they were barred by a provision of the Treaty of Peace ending the war between the Allied Powers and Japan.[3] *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor*

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[3] The provision that had this effect is Article 14(b), which provides as follows:

> Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

(Continued on following page)

Litig., 114 F. Supp.2d 939, 944-49 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (*Forced Labor (Allied I)*); *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, No. MDL-1347 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2001) (*Forced Labor (Allied II)*); *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (*Forced Labor (Filipinos)*).

Appellants in the remaining cases were Korean and Chinese nationals. The district court held that their claims were not affected by the Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Japan, because these claimaints were not Allied nationals or nationals of any signatory of that treaty. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165-68 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (*Forced Labor (Koreans)*). The court dismissed these cases nonetheless, on the grounds that section 354.6 was an unconstitutional intrusion on the foreign affairs powers of the United States, and that the remaining claims were time-barred. *Id.* at 1168-78.

II. Constitutionality of Section 354.6 Under Foreign Affairs Doctrine

A. Section 354.6 and Its Effect

All Appellants rely on section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Because it can best be understood when read as a whole, we quote it in full:

Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490. The district court held that claims by Allied nationals against Japanese corporations were barred under the clause waiving "other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war." *Forced Labor (Allied I)*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 944-49 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

§ 354.6.

(a) As used in this section:

(1) "Second World War slave labor victim" means any person taken from a concentration camp or ghetto or diverted from transportation to a concentration camp or from a ghetto to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.

(2) "Second World War forced labor victim" means any person who was a member of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, or prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, forced to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers.

(3) "Compensation" means the present value of wages and benefits that individuals should have been paid and damages for injuries sustained in connection with the labor performed. Present value shall be calculated on the basis of the market value of the services at the time they were performed, plus interest from the time the services were performed, compounded annually to date of full payment without diminution for wartime or post-war currency devaluation.

> (b) Any Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War slave labor victim, Second World War forced labor victim, or heir of a Second World War forced labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim or Second World War forced labor victim from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate. That action may be brought in a superior court of this state, which court shall have jurisdiction over that action until its completion or resolution.
>
> (c) Any action brought under this section shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation, if the action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010.

Appellants and the State of California as amicus seek to characterize section 354.6 as a purely procedural measure by reducing its scope to the provision regarding the limitations, as set forth in subsection (c). The entire effect of section 354.6, they argue, is to extend the statute of limitations for claims that are already available to remedy Nazi-era slave labor. They cite an impressive range of possible sources of substantive law prohibiting slave labor, including state statutes and common law, the United States Constitution, and international law. The reference in subsection (c) to "the applicable statute of limitations" supports their interpretation: If a statute of limitations is already "applicable," perhaps it is because subsection (c) contemplates a pre-existing cause of action, rather than a cause of action created under section 354.6.

However, section 354.6 can be viewed as purely procedural only when subsection (c) is viewed in isolation from the rest of the provision. Most important, the first sentence of subsection (b) explicitly creates a cause of action by providing that certain individuals "may bring an action" for certain wrongs. *See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,* 535 U.S. 635, ___, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 1759 (2002) (noting that language in a statute providing that party "may bring an action" "reads like the conferral of a private right of action"). Appellants' recitation of pre-existing causes of action for slave labor, whether under other statutes or other bodies of law, is therefore fruitless. Regardless of any pre-existing law, the California legislature chose to create a specific cause of action for persons subjected to slave labor by the Nazis and their allies and sympathizers. If confirmation of this reading is required, it is found in those passages of section 354.6 that set forth the details of the new cause of action. The section defines the class of plaintiffs who may sue under that cause of action, *see* § 354.6(a)(1), (2), sets the method for measuring damages, *see* § 354.6(a)(3), and establishes a special rule regarding liability of corporations affiliated with the wrong-doer, *see* § 354.6(b). Even the language of the statute of limitations provision itself limits the application of the statute of limitations to "action[s] brought under this section," thus confirming that section 354.6 creates a cause of action.

Appellants' only remaining argument for the procedural nature of section 354.6 is its placement within the Code of Civil Procedure, in Title Two: Time of Commencing Civil Actions. However, where the meaning of a statutory provision is clear, we do not rely upon the location the legislature chose for it in its system of codification, *see Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C.,* 111

F.3d 1322, 1328 (7th Cir. 1997), just as we do not rely upon the headings and titles of sections in such circumstances. *Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.*, 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947). The reason for the placement of section 354.6 within the procedural code is, in any event, not difficult to explain: The most striking aspect of the section is, indeed, its statute of limitations, which would allow the commencement of a suit more than 60 years after the occurrence of the injury. *Id.* Section 354.6's placement, therefore, does not change our view that the section is substantive in nature.

The parties debate whether section 354.6 is substantive or procedural primarily in the context of the Appellees' due process challenge, which we do not address. The substantive nature of the provision, however, is relevant also to the foreign affairs doctrine analysis in which we engage below, because a state is more likely to exceed the limits of its power when it seeks to alter or create rights and obligations than when it seeks merely to further enforcement of already existing rights and duties. Because section 354.6 is substantive law, we do not have occasion to address whether the extension of the statute of limitations, without more, would be legally permissible.[4]

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[4] Even if it were merely procedural, section 354.6 would go further than merely extending the statute of limitations for existing claims; it would actually revive claims that had been previously time-barred, thus upsetting the repose of potential defendants. This revival of liability – even civil liability – is troubling. We do not address here whether such a revival violates due process.

B. Foreign Affairs Doctrine Analysis

Appellees argue that section 354.6 exceeds California's power to engage in foreign affairs. We agree.[5]

The Constitution does not create an express, general power over foreign affairs but rather allocates particular powers related to foreign affairs to particular federal actors. It appoints the President as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and authorizes him to "make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur," to "appoint Ambassadors" with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate," *id.* cl. 2, and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," *id.* § 3. It grants to Congress the power to "lay and collect . . . Duties, Imposts, and Excises," to "provide for the common Defence," *id.* art. I, § 8, cl. 1, to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," *id.* art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," *id.* cl. 4, to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," *id.* cl. 10, to "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," *id.* cl. 11, to "raise and support Armies," *id.* cl. 12, to "provide and maintain a Navy," *id.* cl. 13, and to regulate "the land and naval forces," *id.* cl. 14.

While the Constitution allocates these foreign affairs powers specifically to the federal government, it also expressly prohibits the states from exercising certain foreign relations powers, including both some of those

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[5] Some Appellants assert that federal jurisdiction is lacking over their claims. We address that issue below.

expressly allocated to the federal government and a few others. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" or, without consent of Congress, "lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports," "keep Troops or Ships of War in time of Peace," "enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power," or "engage in War, unless actually invaded." *Id.* § 10.

Because the Constitution mentions no general foreign affairs power, and because only a few specified powers related to foreign affairs are expressly denied the states, one might assume that, with certain exceptions, states are free to pursue their own foreign policies. This is not, however, the case. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has long viewed the foreign affairs powers specified in the text of the Constitution as reflections of a generally applicable constitutional principle that power over foreign affairs is reserved to the federal government. The Court has sometimes expressed this principle in expansive terms, declaring, for example, that "[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively." *United States v. Pink,* 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); *see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States,* 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (*The Chinese Exclusion Case*) ("For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.").

The implication of the general principle is that "even in [the] absence of a treaty" or federal statute, a state may violate the constitution by "establish[ing] its own foreign

policy." *Zschernig v. Miller*, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).[6] *Zschernig* concerned an Oregon statute that provided for escheat of estate property claimed by a nonresident alien unless United States citizens had reciprocal rights in the country of the alien's residence and foreign heirs in that country would have the right to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates without confiscation. *Id.* at 430-31. The Court held that, while a reciprocity statute of this sort was not facially invalid, probate courts applying it impermissibly relied on

> inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations – whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights, whether the so-called "rights" are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, whether there is in the actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of confiscation.

Id. at 434. In short, the Court found that the application of the statute depended less on an evaluation of the stated law of a particular country than on whether that country's political system was legitimate in the view of the Oregon courts. *See id.* at 440 (noting that state courts had held that communist and fascist countries did not grant rights

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[6] The doctrine has been referred to as "dormant foreign affairs preemption," or simply as "the foreign affairs power." *See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low*, 240 F.3d 739, 751 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks removed), *cert. granted sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low*, 71 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2003).

reciprocal to those of Oregonians). To condition the application of state law on the political system of a foreign country was "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress." *Id.* at 432.

Despite the broad language of *Pink* and the *Chinese Exclusion Case,* however, *Zschernig* is "[t]he only case in which the Supreme Court has struck down a state statute as violative of the foreign affairs power." *Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke,* 148 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998), *rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Locke,* 529 U.S. 89 (2000). *Zschernig* has been applied sparingly, because the Supreme Court has held that a statute does not violate the constitution where it merely has "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." *Clark v. Allen,* 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (upholding facially a statute similar to that subsequently struck as applied in *Zschernig*).[7]

Noting that "the federal government's foreign affairs power . . . . is rarely invoked by the courts," we have declined to invalidate under *Zschernig* a California statute with certain superficial similarities to section 354.6.

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[7] Other courts have, however, invalidated statutes under foreign affairs doctrine. *See, e.g., Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,* 181 F.3d 38, 49-61 (1st Cir. 1999) (invalidating Massachusetts law restricting ability of Massachusetts and its agencies to purchase goods or services from individuals or companies engaged in business with Burma), *aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,* 530 U.S. 363 (2000); *Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson,* 115 Ill. 2d 221, 236-37 (1986) (invalidating state statute excluding South African coins from otherwise generally applicable state tax exemptions).

Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 752 (9th Cir. 2001), *cert. granted sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low,* 71 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2003). *Gerling* concerned California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, Cal. Ins.Code §§ 13800-13807 ("HVIRA"), which requires insurers doing business in California to file certain information about any insurance policies that they or companies "related" to them sold in Europe and that were in effect between 1920 and 1945. *Id.; see Gerling,* 240 F.3d at 743, 753. While recognizing that HVIRA involved foreign affairs, we held that it was constitutional because of the combination of two factors: first, "HVIRA, on its face, involves commerce alone" – and thus should be considered under the Supreme Court's foreign commerce cases rather than under the foreign affairs cases; and second, HVIRA "is not, on its face, directed at any particular foreign country" – and thus is comparatively unlikely to interfere with the foreign relations of the federal government. *Id.* at 753.

While *Gerling* shows that the general prohibition against state involvement with external affairs is not as broad as some judicial statements would imply, it also suggests a mode of analysis that is relevant to the cases before us. In particular, *Gerling* distinguishes among statutes according to the foreign affairs functions that they implicate. *Gerling* suggests that statutes that "mainly involve foreign commerce" are among those least likely to be held invalid under the foreign affairs power. *Id.* The regulation of commerce is simply not central to the foreign affairs power that is off limits to states.[8] For present

[8] State regulation of foreign commerce might, however, exceed constitutional limitations under other constitutional doctrines. *See, e.g.,*

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purposes, we must consider the importance to foreign affairs analysis of another subset of foreign affairs powers: the power of the federal government to make and to resolve war, including the power to establish the procedure for resolving war claims.

While neither the Constitution nor the courts have defined the precise scope of the foreign relations power that is denied to the states, it is clear that matters concerning war are part of the inner core of this power. Of the eleven clauses of the Constitution granting foreign affairs powers to the President and Congress, *see supra,* seven concern preparing for war, declaring war, waging war, or settling war.[9] Most of the Constitution's express limitations on states' foreign affairs powers also concern war.[10] Even those foreign affairs powers in the Constitution that do not expressly concern war and its resolution may be understood, in part, as a design to *prevent* war. Indeed, as the *Federalist* shows, supporters of the new Constitution

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Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328 (1994) (considering whether state's international tax reporting system violated either dormant commerce clause or federal government's ability to speak in "one voice.")

[9] *See* U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (making President Commander in Chief); *id.* cl. 2; (authorizing President to make treaties with advice and consent of Senate); *id.* art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (authorizing Congress to "provide for the common Defence"); *id.* cl. 11 (authorizing Congress to declare war); *id.* cl. 12 (authorizing Congress to raise and support armies); *id.* cl. 13 (authorizing Congress to "provide and maintain a Navy"); *id.* cl. 14 (authorizing Congress to regulate "the land and naval forces").

[10] *See id.* § 10 (prohibiting states from entering "any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation," or, without congressional authorization, from "keep[ing] Troops or Ships of War in time of Peace" and from "engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded.")

believed that disunity in international affairs risked unnecessary war. *See, e.g.,* THE FEDERALIST, NO. 3, at 13 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[F]ewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, [and] it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably."). The Supreme Court cases under the foreign affairs power have also been driven, in part, by this concern. Thus the inheritance provision at issue in *Zschernig,* although superficially unrelated to war, was seen by a Court operating at the height of the Cold War as a potential provocation to foreign powers. " 'Experience has shown,' " the Court wrote in striking the provision, " 'that international controversies of the gravest moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.'" 389 U.S. at 441 (quoting *Hines v. Davidowitz,* 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)). Matters related to war are for the federal government alone to address.

Among the six district court decisions we review here, the only one to reach the foreign affairs challenge to section 354.6 held that the provision was unconstitutional under that doctrine for six reasons:

> (1) the terms of section 354.6 and its legislative history demonstrate a purpose to influence foreign affairs directly, (2) the statute targets particular countries, (3) the statute does not regulate an area that Congress has expressly delegated to states to regulate, (4) the statute establishes a judicial forum for negative commentary about the Japanese government and Japanese companies, (5) the Japanese government asserts that litigation of these claims could complicate and impede diplomatic relationships of the countries involved, and (6) the United

> States, through the State Department, contends that section 354.6 impermissibly intrudes upon the foreign affairs power of the federal government.

Forced Labor (Koreans), 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1173. Although we agree that section 354.6 violates the foreign affairs power, we base our holding on a narrower consideration. We hold that section 354.6 is impermissible because it intrudes on the federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims.

With section 354.6, California seeks to redress wrongs committed in the course of the Second World War. By its terms, only "Second World War slave labor victims" and "Second World War forced labor victims" can bring suit under the provision. § 354.6(b). The wrong-doers under the statute – the enslaving individuals or entities – include "the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies or sympathizers." § 354.6(a)(1), (2). The governmental entities are, by definition, wartime enemies of the United States, while the "enterprises" identified in the provision, if not themselves our wartime enemies, were operating in enemy territory and presumably – no party disputes this – with the consent and for the benefit of our wartime enemy. Wrongs committed after the end of the war are not cognizable under section 354.6; the provision concerns only acts that took place during the years leading up to the war and during the years of the war itself. *Id.* In short, California has sought to create its own resolution to a major issue arising out of the war – a remedy for wartime acts that California's legislature believed had never been fairly resolved.

The United States has already exercised its own exclusive authority to resolve the war, including claims arising out of it. It did not choose, however, to incorporate into that resolution a private right of action against our wartime enemies or their nationals. The United States resolved the war against Germany by becoming a party to a number of treaties and international agreements, beginning with the 1945 agreements at Yalta and Potsdam, in which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to extract reparations from Germany and its nationals but did not include a private right of action against either. *See* Protocol of the Proceedings, Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, Aug. 2, 1945, art. (B)(111), 3 Bevans 1207. Subsequent agreements also failed to create a private right of action, including the Paris Reparations Treaty of 1946 between the United States and 17 other nations, Agreement on Reparations From Germany, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S. 1655 ("Paris Reparations Treaty"); the Transition Agreement of 1952 between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952 (as amended by Schedule IV to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954), 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 219; the London Debt Agreement of 1953 between the United States and 20 other nations, Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27,

1953, 4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3; and the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which reunified Germany and became effective on March 15, 1991, Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1186.[11] Most recently, the Foundation Agreement of July 17, 2000, an executive agreement between the governments of Germany and the United States, provided a limited form of remedy for claimants such as Deutsch. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future." The Foundation was created by Germany, in negotiation with the United States, five Central and

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[11] For useful and accessible surveys of these agreements as they apply to war reparations, see *Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.*, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 448-56 (D.N.J. 1999), and *Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG*, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 265-73 (D.N.J. 1999). The district court in *Deutsch* relied heavily on these cases and adopted their conclusion that Deutsch's claim raised a nonjusticiable political question, *Deutsch*, No. CV 00-4405, at 2-6, a conclusion with which we disagree. The district court determined that the postwar agreements created the exclusive remedy to the matters raised by Deutsch, and that to order relief would therefore require the court to interfere with the foreign affairs choices of the political branches. *Id.* Under political question doctrine, the court noted, it is impermissible for a court to make policy related to foreign affairs. *Id.* at 2 (citing *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). Therefore, the district court supposed, *Deutsch* raised a nonjusticiable political question. The problem with this argument is that it makes every dispute over the proper application of a treaty into a political question, because treaties inherently involve foreign affairs. No political question, however, is raised by the simple application of the requirements of a treaty to which the United States is a party. Treaties have the force of law, *see Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and, if they are self-executing or have been implemented through legislation, must be applied by the courts. *See United States v. Alvarez-Machain*, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992).

Eastern European countries, Israel, and the non-governmental Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, for the purpose of making payments to people who suffered at the hands of German companies during the Nazi Era. It provides for payment of up to 15,000 German Marks (roughly $7500) to individual claimants who were subjected to forced labor. *See id.* at Annex A. We do not have the authority to consider the adequacy of such payments here. Indeed, we acknowledge that no possible compensation could be sufficient to remedy the harm done to Holocaust victims and their families.

No party argues that any of these agreements provides the authority for a state of the United States to create a private right of action enabling individuals to recover for wartime injuries against German corporations. Deutsch argues, however, that the terms of these various agreements do not *prohibit* a state from creating such a right of action, and that in the absence of such a prohibition, his action may proceed. Deutsch's argument cannot carry the day. As we explained earlier, the Constitution allocates the power over foreign affairs to the federal government exclusively, and the power to make and resolve war, including the authority to resolve war claims, is central to the foreign affairs power in the constitutional design. In the absence of some specific action that constitutes authorization on the part of the federal government, states are prohibited from exercising foreign affairs powers, including modifying the federal government's resolution of war-related disputes.

The war with Japan ended with the Treaty of Peace, signed in San Francisco, on September 8, 1951, by the representatives of the United States and 47 other Allied powers and Japan, and ratified by the United States

Senate on April 28, 1952. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490. Although the parties dispute whether that treaty by its own terms precludes the claims brought by any of the Appellants,[12] that is the only dispute regarding the treaty. No party asserts that the treaty either creates – explicitly or implicitly – a private right of action against Japan or its nationals, or authorizes states of the United States to create such a right.[13] Once again, without such authorization,

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[12] The central disagreement concerns the meaning of Article 14(b) of the treaty, which is quoted in full *supra* note 3. The district judge held that Appellants' claims were waived because they are claims of Allied nationals "arising out of actions taken by [Japanese] nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war." *Id.; Forced Labor (Allied I),* 114 F. Supp. 2d at 944-49. Appellants argue that the actions of the Appellee corporations were not taken "in the course of the prosecution of the war," or that it is an issue of fact whether they were or not.

[13] Appellants do assert that, if Article 14 of the treaty waives claims against Japanese nationals, as Appellees assert, then Article 14 is superceded [sic] by Article 26. Article 26 provides, in pertinent part:

> Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, the same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Treaty of Peace with Japan, at art. 26. Appellants argue that other foreign states have entered into agreements with Japan that do not waive private claims and that those agreements thereby extend to those foreign states "greater advantages" than the terms extended to the United States. The district court found that Article 26 confers rights only on the "parties" to the treaties, not on individuals. *Forced Labor (Allied I),* 114 F. Supp. 2d at 949. We agree, at least as to the right to invoke the clause. It is the prerogative of the United States, not of California or of Appellants, to determine whether a foreign state has been granted greater advantages and, if so, whether it is in the interest of the United States to incorporate those advantages (along with any concomitant lesser disadvantages) into the treaty. The United States

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states lack the power to alter the federal government's resolution of disputes relating to the war.[14]

The grievances of at least one class of potential plaintiffs identified in section 354.6, prisoners of war, were addressed by the federal government in domestic legislation. *See* § 354.6(a)(2). Under the War Claims Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2001-2017p, assets seized from Germany, Japan, or their nationals within the United States and its territory were used to compensate American prisoners of war whose rights had been violated. *See* U.S. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION FROM SEPTEMBER 14, 1949 TO MARCH 31, 1955, at 10-11 (1955); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2005(d)(2)(A). The Act required prisoners of war to submit their claims to a federal agency, whose decision was final; it conceived of no private right of action against German or Japanese entities. *See* 50 U.S.C. app. § 2010.

California was dissatisfied with how the federal government chose to address the various wartime injuries suffered by victims of the Nazis and their allies after the United States brought the Second World War to a close. The California legislature found that, under the treaties and compensatory programs that the federal government

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has not invoked Article 26 to authorize a private right of action. Appellants' reliance on the article is, therefore, unavailing.

[14] It is immaterial that many of the Appellants are nationals of two nations, China and Korea, that were not signatories of the San Francisco treaty. When the United States has been a party to a war, the resolution it establishes to that war is the resolution for the whole of the United States. States lack the power to modify that resolution, regardless of the citizenship of those seeking redress.

had established, "victims of Nazi persecution have been deprived of their entitlement to compensation for their labor and for injuries sustained while performing that labor as forced or slave laborers prior to and during the Second World War." 1999 Cal. Stat. 216, § 1(b) (codified in notes to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 354.6). The state legislature therefore enacted section 354.6 to remedy these 54-year-old injuries in a manner favored by California but not provided for by the federal government. Appellants assert that no international agreement or other federal action prohibits California from doing so. However, as we have stated, because the issue is the lack of state power, it is immaterial whether the federal government enacted a prohibition. The federal government, acting under its foreign affairs authority, provided its own resolution to the war; California has no power to modify that resolution.[15]

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[15] One might argue that the Holocaust was distinct from the German war effort, that claims for injuries arising from the Holocaust do not, therefore, relate to the war, and that such injuries, because they are unrelated to the war, do not implicate the war powers of the federal government. We need not assume that the acts of enslavement encompassed by section 354.6 served military purposes or advanced the war effort of the Nazis or their allies. We simply note that, by its terms, section 354.6 creates a right of action only for "Second World War" slave labor victims. For the purposes of the provision, the California legislature explicitly defined the harms suffered by such victims as pertaining to the war. Moreover, the federal government's exclusive power to resolve the war necessarily includes an exclusive power to address the injuries that section 354.6 attempts to remedy. The treaties themselves confirm that the federal government regarded all wartime injuries as matters integral to peacemaking, regardless of the purpose or effect of the wrong-doer's acts. In the Paris Reparations Treaty, for example, the United States and the other signatories "agree[d] among themselves that their shares of reparation, as determined by the present Agreement, shall be regarded by each of them as covering all its claims and

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Before concluding our discussion of this issue, we must consider Appellants' most vigorous argument in favor of the constitutionality of section 354.6: that the provision "presents striking parallels" to HVIRA, the insurance reporting requirement that we upheld in *Gerling*. Appellants correctly note two points of similarity: first, like section 354.6, HVIRA is related to Nazi-era wrongs; second, as under section 354.6, at least as applied to the cases before us, the parties regulated by HVIRA are businesses. The similarity ends there, however. Unlike section 354.6, HVIRA does not attempt to require the affected businesses to compensate victims for past wrongs: Specifically, as we noted in *Gerling*, HVIRA does not impose obligations on "European insurance companies to pay or not to pay claims on European policies." *Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 745 (internal quotation marks removed). HVIRA, rather, is merely a reporting requirement and the only consequence of noncompliance is the inability to do business in California in the future. *Id.* Whereas section 354.6 seeks to provide a monetary remedy for decades-old wartime wrongs, HVIRA is a forward-looking regulatory statute. [16] In short, unlike section 354.6, HVIRA does not

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those of its nationals against the former German Government and its Agencies, of a governmental or private nature arising out of the war." Paris Reparations Treaty, Jan. 14, 1946, art. 2(A), 61 Stat. 3157, 3163; *see also, e.g.*, Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 30(4), 61 Stat. 2109, 2126 (bilateral treaty between Allied Powers and Hungary) ("Hungary waives on its own behalf and on behalf of Hungarian nationals all claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding on May 8, 1945, except those arising out of contracts and other obligations entered into, and rights acquired, before September 1, 1939.").

[16] Appellants in *Gerling* originally challenged two other statutes that did attempt to force payment of Nazi-era insurance claims, *see* Cal.

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attempt to hold defendants liable for their past wartime conduct; it therefore does not implicate the exclusive power of the federal government to make and resolve war, including the resolution of claims arising out of such actions.

Because California lacks the power to create a right of action for war-related claims against our former enemies and those who operated in their territories, and section 354.6 runs afoul of the restriction on the exercise of foreign affairs powers by the states, we hold that section 354.6 is unconstitutional.

III. Statutes of Limitations

In addition to section 354.6, Appellants bring various tort claims under common law, California statutory and constitutional law, as well as for violations of international law under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ("ATCA"). *See supra.* All these claims are barred by their respective statutes of limitations.

Appellants apparently bring their common law claims under California law, although in many instances they do not identify the jurisdiction under whose law they seek relief. Some of the parties, including both defendants and plaintiffs, are California residents, while others are not; the alleged injuries all took place outside of California. Regardless of the source of the substantive law, because all

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Code Civ. Proc. § 354.5; Cal. Ins. Code § 790.15, but those claims were dismissed for lack of standing and not addressed on appeal. *Gerling,* 240 F.3d at 745; *see also Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low,* 296 F.3d 832, 842 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2002), *cert. granted sub nom. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Low,* 71 U.S.L.W. 3373 (2003).

the claims, including both common law and statutory, were brought in California state court or in a district court within California, we apply to them the statute of limitations that would be applied in California state court.[17] California applies the "governmental interest" approach to conflict of law issues. *Hurtado v. Superior Court,* 11 Cal. 3d 574, 579-80 (1974). Under this approach, the correct choice of law depends on "an analysis of the respective interests of the states involved." *Id.* at 579. Where the conflict concerns a statute of limitations, the governmental interest approach generally leads California courts to apply California law. Witkin, 3 CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 104 (4th ed. 1996); *see, e.g., Peterson v. Kennedy,* 771 F.2d 1244, 1251 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985); *American Bank of Commerce v. Corondoni,* 169 Cal. App. 3d 368 (Ca. Ct. App. 1985), and especially so where California's statute would bar a claim. California's interest in applying its own law is strongest when its statute of limitations is shorter than that of the foreign state, because a "state has a substantial interest in preventing the prosecution in its courts of claims which it deems to be 'stale.' Hence, subject to rare exceptions, the forum will dismiss a claim that is barred by its statute of limitations." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142, cmt. f (1988).

All the claims in the cases before us, other than those under the ATCA, have been stale for several decades under the applicable California statutes of limitations. *See*

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[17] The district court addressing the claims brought by Korean and Chinese Appellants found that the non-federal claims would be time-barred under Chinese and Japanese law, as well as under the law of California. *Forced Labor (Koreans),* 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340 (one-year statute for personal injury torts, wrongful death and false imprisonment); *id.* § 338 (three-year statute for taking of or injury to personal property, and for fraud); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (four-year statute for claims of unfair business practices). Only an extraordinarily strong interest of a foreign state in keeping these claims alive could overcome the presumption that California will not hear claims that have been stale for so long under its own law. No such strong foreign interest has been demonstrated here.

The statute of limitations under the ATCA is 10 years. *Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, ___ F.3d ___, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *27 (9th Cir. 2002).[18] Appellants

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[18] The 10-year limit is not stated in the provision. Rather, we adopted it from the Torture Victim Protection Act, *see* Pub.L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, statutory notes) ("TVPA"), which has an explicit 10-year statute. *Papa v. United States,* 281 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2002). We did so because where a federal statute lacks a specified statute of limitations,

> courts apply the limitations period provided by the jurisdiction in which they sit unless "a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."

Papa, 281 F.3d at 1011-12 (citing *North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,* 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995)). We held that ATCA was closely analogous to the TVPA both in its purpose and in its mechanism for achieving that purpose. *Papa,* 281 F.3d at 1012. Appellants ask us to reconsider our decision in *Papa,* at least as it applies to the present cases, and hold that the ATCA is more closely analogous to section 354.6 than to the TVPA. The result, Appellants argue, would be that the claims are not barred until 2010. For the reasons we stated in *Papa,* and because we

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have thus brought these claims far too late as well.[19]

Some Appellants contend, however, that their claims under both state law and the ATCA are equitably tolled and could therefore survive our invalidation of section 354.6. Although the district court found that they did not allege facts sufficient to trigger equitable tolling, these Appellants contend that they were not required to allege such facts, because a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, which a plaintiff is not required to anticipate in the complaint. They also contend that even if they were required to allege such facts, the district court should have granted them leave to amend in order to give them the opportunity to do so. The curious aspect of this argument is that all of the Appellants who make this argument *did* plead equitable tolling in their complaints. Furthermore, they alleged *facts* that they believed would trigger such tolling. They alleged, for example, that the defendants had kept the plaintiffs ignorant of essential facts in the defendants' possession. The district court considered these alleged facts and found them insufficient to trigger tolling. *Forced Labor (Koreans),* 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-82. Although the court's discussion of equitable tolling concerned only the ATCA, its reasoning applies equally to the state law claims. On appeal, these Appellants offer neither a satisfactory answer to the district court's finding regarding equitable tolling nor any hint of any additional facts

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hold that section 354.6 is unconstitutional, we reaffirm that the ATCA statute of limitations in this case, as in other cases, is 10 years.

[19] Some Appellants who did not bring a claim under the ATCA argue that they should be permitted to amend their complaints to do so. In light of our holding, such an amendment would be futile.

that they might allege in an amended complaint. Under these circumstances, amendment would be futile. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's dismissal of the complaints with prejudice.[20]

IV. Jurisdiction

In many of the cases before us, there is indisputable federal jurisdiction. In some, for example in *Deutsch* and in *Dunn v. Nippon Steel Corp.*,[21] there is diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Appellants in several other cases, for

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[20] Deutsch argues for the first time on appeal that he should be permitted to amend his complaint to include a claim under the TVPA. He offers no explanation, however, for why he failed to bring that claim in his first amended complaint. Moreover, as noted above, the TVPA has an explicit statute of limitation of 10 years. Deutsch argues that that period commenced on the effective date of the Act, rather than on the date on which the injury was complete. He cites no authority for this proposition, and we do not find it to be a reasonable or plausible one. As Deutsch notes, we have held that the TVPA is applicable to acts that took place prior to the effective date of the Act. *Alvarez-Machain v. United States*, 107 F.3d 696, 702-03 (9th Cir. 1996). In *Alvarez-Machain*, however, the plaintiff filed his claim only three years after the date of the alleged injury. *Id.* at 700. Nothing in our cases or the statute suggests that Congress intended the TVPA to open the federal courts to claims that were already more than 40 years old when the statute became effective or that no time limit exists under the TVPA as to the resurrection of claims for damages that may have occurred in the far distant past. Because the TVPA has a 10-year statute of limitations, permitting Deutsch to amend his complaint would be futile. We therefore affirm the dismissal with prejudice.

[21] In Dunn, the amount in controversy is not stated in the complaint, nor was the amount determined by the district court. However, the Appellant seeks compensation and punitive damages for roughly three years of withheld wages, as well as for severe physical and mental injuries he suffered at the hands of the defendants and their predeces-sors during that time. There is thus no doubt that this case meets the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

example in *Terrence v. Mitsui & Co.*, *Wheeler v. Mitsui & Co.*, and *Kim v. Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Indus. Co.*, assert claims under international law, thus giving rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Among the many cases that have been consolidated, there are some individual cases as to which federal jurisdiction may be uncertain. Appellants in those cases originally sought relief in state court, under state law,[22] against non-diverse defendants. After removal and consolidation, some of the Appellants sought remand to state court. The district court denied their motions, *Forced Labor (Allied I)*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 943, on the ground that "the complaints . . . , on their face, implicate the federal common law of foreign relations." *Id.* Appellees opposed remand on other grounds as well. Appellants in some of these cases – not precisely the same group that moved for remand below – now argue that federal jurisdiction is lacking.

Normally, of course, we would address all jurisdictional issues as an initial matter, as they would determine whether we could proceed to the merits. The situation is different with respect to the cases consolidated here, because the cases over which jurisdiction is disputed raise no merits issues that are not also raised by one or more cases over which jurisdiction is certain and which have been consolidated with the disputed cases. In short, we are compelled to address all of the merits issues in these consolidated cases, regardless of whether there is jurisdiction over

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[22] Although some plaintiffs amended or sought to amend their complaints, after removal, to include federal claims, such amendments do not bear on the evaluation of removal jurisdiction. *Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co.*, 300 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002).

each of them. Furthermore, the ultimate survival of all of these cases depends on the validity of the provisions of section 354.6. In light of our holding that section 354.6 is unconstitutional, remand to state court of the cases of uncertain federal jurisdiction would be futile, as the state court would simply dismiss the claims with prejudice. *See Bates v. Jones,* 127 F.3d 870, 873 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the California Supreme Court "has yet to disregard a directly applicable decision of this court on a question of federal law"). Therefore, our determination of the uncertain jurisdictional issues could have no effect on the outcome of any of the cases.

For these reasons, we decline to address the uncertain jurisdictional issues and simply affirm the district court's dismissal of all the cases before us.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6 is an unconstitutional intrusion on the foreign affairs power of the United States and that Appellants' remaining claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The judgments of the district courts are

AFFIRMED.

IN RE: WORLD WAR II ERA JAPANESE FORCED LABOR LITIGATION,

This Document Relates To:
Choe v. Nippon Steel Corp., et. al., ND Cal. No. 99-5309;
Kim v. Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., et. al., ND Cal. No. 99-5303;
Oh v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et. al., ND Cal. No. 00-3752;
Sin v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et. al., ND Cal. No. 00-3242;
Su v. Mitsubishi Corp., et. al., ND Cal. No. 00-3586;
Sung, et. al. v. Mitsubishi Corp., et. al., ND Cal. No. 00-2358;
Ma v. Kajima Corp., et. al., ND Cal. No. 01-2592

Master File No. MDL-1347

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

The Honorable Vaughn R. Walker

164 F. Supp. 2d 1160;
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14640; 108 A.L.R.5th 743

September 17, 2001

ORDER NO. 10

The seven above-captioned cases are the only class actions remaining before the court in a set of consolidated cases in which World War II veterans forced to labor without compensation during World War II seek damages and other remedies from Japanese corporations or their successors in interest. These cases are brought by plaintiffs of Korean and Chinese descent. The other matters, which involved United States and Allied veterans, were previously dismissed because the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan waived all such claims. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation*, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939,

942 (ND Cal 2000) (Order No 4); *see also* Order No. 9. Defendants seek dismissal of the present cases as well.

The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs assert essentially the same claims as the United States and Allied veterans. Their primary cause of action arises under a statute enacted by the California legislature in 1999, California Code of Civil Procedure §§354.6. The statute attempts to provide a cause of action for all individuals forced to labor without compensation by "the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the [same regimes]" by extending the applicable statute of limitations to December 31, 2010. Cal CCP §§354.6(a), (c). The crux of section 354.6 states:

> Any Second World War slave labor victim, or heir of a Second World War slave labor victim, Second World War forced labor victim, or heir of a Second World War forced labor victim, may bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim or Second World War forced labor victim from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate.

Id. subsection (b). The statute does not limit the cause of action to California residents. *See id.*, subsection (a).

The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs also seek compensation and restitution under various other state laws, and two of the seven complaints assert violations of international law.

Defendants argue that these cases must be dismissed for several reasons. Most significantly, defendants contend

that section 354.6 is unconstitutional as applied against them. Notice of Claim of Unconstitutionality (Doc #243); Def Br (Doc #210) at 19-21; Def. Supp. Br. (Doc #336) at 1; *see also* United States Statement of Interest (SOI) (Doc #302) at 12-17. Defendants argue that application of the statute is unconstitutional because it infringes upon the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs and violates the Due Process clause of the Constitution.

Defendants also seek dismissal based on the following arguments: (1) the claims of these plaintiffs are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (2) the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan and subsequent treaties entered by Japan with Korea and China combine to bar the claims, (3) the claims raise nonjusticiable political questions, (4) consideration of the claims violates the principles of international comity, (5) evaluating the claims would contravene the act of state doctrine, (6) the doctrine of forum non conviens precludes this litigation in California and (7) the claims contravene the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.

The court concludes that section 354.6 is unconstitutional as applied to defendants in the case at bar because it infringes on the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs. To the extent the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs could assert claims under any other law, they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and other principles of law.

I.

Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to both FRCP 12(b)(6) and 12(c). Defendants move under both provisions because, consistent with the defendants in the Allied

matters, some of the defendants have filed answers in the present cases while others have not. As the court noted in Order No 4, the distinction between the two approaches is not important. The Ninth Circuit instructs that the standard for assessing a FRCP 12(c) motion is the same as the standard for a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion. *See Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co.*, 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir 1997) (citations omitted). On such motions, all material allegations in the complaint at issue must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner*, 31 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir 1994). Dismissal is only appropriate when it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." *Conley v Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). These cases are subject to dismissal based on questions of law only.

II.

As touched upon above, the present cases involve plaintiffs of Korean and Chinese descent. These cases require analysis separate from the cases dismissed earlier not because the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs assert claims that are distinct from the claims of the United States and Allied veterans, but because the cases are brought on behalf of nationals of countries that were not signatories to the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan. The treaty was signed only by representatives of the United States and 47 other Allied powers and Japan. *See* Treaty of Peace with Japan, [1952] 3 UST 3169, TIAS No 2490 (1951) (hereinafter, Treaty). Due to various historical and political circumstances during the time the treaty was negotiated and finalized, neither Korea nor China became

a signatory to the treaty. *See* US Dept of State, Record of Proceedings at the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan 84-85 (1951) (Exhibits in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Doc #212), Exh B). As the chief negotiator for the United States, John Foster Dulles explained at the time that Korea was not a signatory because technically Korea was part of Japan until the war ended, and thus "Korea was never at war with Japan." *Id.* at 84. With respect to China, Dulles likewise explained that it could not be brought to the negotiating table because "civil war within China and the attitudes of the Allied Governments * * * created a situation such that there [was] not general international agreement upon a single Chinese voice with both the right and the power to bind the Chinese nation to terms of peace." *Id.* at 85.

Hence, although the treaty granted certain rights and benefits to Korea and China, the two countries simply were not signatories to the treaty. According to the plain text of the treaty, therefore, Korea and China do not qualify as "Allied Powers" subject to the waiver provision of Article 14(b). *See* Treaty at 3190. As a result, unlike the claims of the United States and Allied plaintiffs, the Treaty of Peace with Japan cannot be interpreted to waive the claims of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs.

This circumstance creates a possible paradox that claims of non-Americans arising from forced labor experiences during World War II might be litigated in a court of the United States while the identical claims of American and Allied veterans are barred by the treaty. That possibility lays bare the significant foreign policy questions implicated in these cases and compels the court to address

the constitutionality of the statute upon which they are based.

A.

Before reaching the constitutional issues presented by these cases, the court must address whether the claims of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs made under section 354.6 are preempted by the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Although defendants simply suggest this in passing, *see* Def. Br. (Doc #210) at 3-4, the United States asserts in its amicus curiae brief that the treaty preempts the claims of all non-Allied plaintiffs, *see* United States SOI (Doc #302) at 9-12. The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs do not directly address this argument. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court instructs that federal courts faced with both statutory questions and constitutional questions should decide the former first in an attempt to avoid unnecessary constitutional inquiries. *See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives,* 525 U.S. 316, 343-44, 142 L. Ed. 2d 797, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999) (citations omitted); *see also Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis*, 273 U.S. 70, 71 L. Ed. 541, 47 S. Ct. 282 (1927) (applying doctrine to a challenge to a state statute); *Mass State Grange v. Benton*, 272 U.S. 525, 71 L. Ed. 387, 47 S. Ct. 189 (1926) (same).

As a preliminary matter, the court emphasizes that this inquiry is limited to whether the treaty preempts the claims of non-Allied plaintiffs only. To be sure, section 354.6 purports to provide a cause of action for other individuals as well. Indeed, section 354.6 appears to have been motivated mostly by a desire to give California, as opposed to foreign, "residents and citizens * * * a reasonable opportunity to claim their entitlement to compensation for

forced or slave labor performed prior to and during the Second World War." Cal CCP §§ 354.6, note §§ 1(c). But the only cases remaining before the court were brought by nationals of non-signatory nations. Accordingly, the question is not whether the treaty preempts section 354.6 generally, but whether the treaty preempts California's effort to supply a cause of action for non-Allied plaintiffs such as those of Korean and Chinese descent. This order addresses that issue only.

Under Article VI of the Constitution, the laws of the United States are "the supreme Law of the Land; * * * any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." US Const. art. VI, cl. 2. A treaty made by the President with the required approval of two-thirds of the Senate is part of the "supreme law of the land," and thus, similar to federal statutes, valid treaties override any conflicting state law. *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416, 432, 64 L. Ed. 641, 40 S. Ct. 382 (1920); *see also Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568 (1796). A treaty prevails whether it is ratified before or after the enactment of the conflicting state law. Laurence H Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 4-4 at 645 (3d ed 2000) (hereinafter, Tribe) (citing *Nielsen v. Johnson*, 279 U.S. 47, 73 L. Ed. 607, 49 S. Ct. 223 (1929)).

Although the Supreme Court has written extensively about when congressional acts have preemptive effect, *see, e.g., Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 147 L. Ed. 2d 352, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000); *United States v. Locke*, 529 U.S. 89, 146 L. Ed. 2d 69, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000), it has provided little guidance on the preemptive effect of treaties. For acts of Congress, the Court provides that such legislation preempts state law when (1) Congress expressly provided for preemption, (2) Congress

intended to "occupy the field," or (3) the state law conflicts with the congressional statute at issue. *Crosby*, 530 U.S. at 372; *see also English v. General Elec. Co.*, 496 U.S. 72, 79 n5, 110 L. Ed. 2d 65, 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990) (recognizing that these categories are not "rigidly distinct"). The Court has not established a similar detailed framework for courts to utilize when analyzing preemption by treaties. *See, e.g., United States v. Belmont*, 301 U.S. 324, 331, 81 L. Ed. 1134, 57 S. Ct. 758 (1937) (noting, without any analysis, that treaties trump conflicting state laws). The Court has stated, however, that this preemption framework should not be applied "mechanically" when construing whether a treaty or international agreement preempts a state law because "the nation-state, not subdivisions within one nation, is the focus of the [treaty] and the perspective of our treaty partners." *See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng*, 525 U.S. 155, 175, 142 L. Ed. 2d 576, 119 S. Ct. 662 (1999). In order to determine whether a treaty trumps state law, therefore, the court should assess the language of the treaty and "give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties." *Id.* at 167 (quoting *Air France v. Saks*, 470 U.S. 392, 399, 84 L. Ed. 2d 289, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985)). The court must "be governed by the text – solemnly adopted by the governments of many separate nations – whatever conclusions might be drawn from the intricate drafting history that [exists]." *Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.*, 490 U.S. 122, 134, 104 L. Ed. 2d 113, 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).

With these principles in mind, the court looks first to Article 14(b) for an expression of the treaty's intent. As previously noted, this provision bars the claims of signatory nations and their nationals arising out of Japan's

actions in the Second World War. *See In re World War II*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 944-45. To be sure, the signatory nations desired complete termination of all claims against Japan, but Article 14(b) has no effect on the claims of nationals from non-signatory nations. Hence, although from a perspective of 2001 it may seem anomalous for the United States to negotiate a treaty that bars the claims of its own nationals without a provision that forecloses resort to a judicial forum in the United States by nationals of non-signatory nations, Article 14(b) contains no express limitation against claims of non-signatory nationals. Little should be read into this omission, which most likely can be explained by the inconceivability a half century ago of such claims by non-signatory nationals being pursued in United States courts.

Other relevant provisions of the treaty suggest that the treaty does not address claims of non-signatory nationals. Specifically, article 4(a), which addressed Japan's post-war relationship with Korea, provides:

> The disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals * * * and their claims, including debts, against [Korea], and the disposition in Japan of property of [Korean] authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of [Korean] authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities.

Treaty at 3173. Similarly, with respect to China, article 26 provides:

> Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State * * * which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or

> substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty * * *.

Id. at 3190. These provisions suggest that the treaty contemplates resolution of war claims with Korea and China through agreements separate and distinct from the Treaty of Peace with Japan and separate agreements necessarily create the possibility that the terms for resolving those claims may differ from the terms of the treaty entered into by the Allied nations. The fact that the signatory nations encouraged such agreements does not show an intent to occupy the field of non-signatory nations' claims through the treaty. *See, e.g., Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 916 F.2d 903, 906-07 (3d Cir 1990) (refusing to find that an international free trade agreement preempted a state buy-American statute, in part, because the language in the agreement was "hortatory rather than mandatory"). Whether the agreements subsequently entered by Japan with Korea and China eliminated the claims of these non-signatory nations does not bear on whether the Treaty of Peace with Japan preempts claims of Chinese and Korean nationals. The court reads the language of articles 4(a) and 26 to suggest only that the signatory nations, including the federal government of the United States, did not intend the Treaty of Peace with Japan to control claims of individuals from non-signatory nations.

To the extent section 354.6 provides a cause of action to such individuals, therefore, it does not conflict with the expressed intent of the treaty. Accordingly, the treaty itself does not trump the California law in this respect.

B.

Simply because the claims of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs derived from section 354.6 are not preempted by the Treaty of Peace with Japan does not mean that they can go forward, however. Providing a cause of action for these individuals triggers significant constitutional questions. Section 354.6 is unconstitutional because it infringes on the exclusive foreign affairs power of the United States.

Relative to many of the federal government's powers, the contours of the foreign affairs power has been infrequently analyzed and even less frequently clarified. Nevertheless, the national government's exclusive authority to regulate the foreign affairs of the United States has long been recognized as a constitutional principle of broad scope. *See United States v Pink*, 315 U.S. 203, 233, 86 L. Ed. 796, 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 63, 85 L. Ed. 581, 61 S. Ct. 399 (1941); *Belmont*, 301 U.S. at 331; *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 318, 81 L. Ed. 255, 57 S. Ct. 216 (1936). "It follows that all state action, whether or not consistent with current foreign policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the conduct of American diplomacy is void as an unconstitutional infringement on an exclusively federal sphere of responsibility." *Tribe*, §§ 4-5 at 656.

This principle, which prohibits state action that unduly interferes with the federal government's authority over foreign affairs derives from both the text and structure of the Constitution. The Constitution allocates power for external affairs to the legislative and executive branches of the

national government and simultaneously prohibits the states from engaging in activities that might interfere with the national government's exercise of these powers. To be sure, there is no clause in the Constitution that explicitly grants a "foreign affairs power" to the federal government. *See* L. Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution* 14-15 (2d ed 1996) (hereinafter, Henkin). But a number of provisions, when read together, strongly imply that such authority was intended. *See* Harold G .Maier, *Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis*, 83 Am J Int'l L 832, 832 (1989) (hereinafter, Maier) ("Neither the Articles of Confederation nor the Constitution provided for a general foreign affairs power. Nonetheless, there was never any real question that the United States would act as a single nation in the world community.").

Specifically, the Constitution provides that Congress possesses the authority "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States," US Const art I, §§ 8, cl 1, "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," *id.*, cl. 3, and "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," *id.*, cl. 10. In addition, while Congress is granted the power "to declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," *id.*, cl. 11, the President is designated the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," *id.*, art. II, §§ 2, cl. 1. The President also is given the authority to "make Treaties" and "appoint Ambassadors" with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate," *id.*, cl. 2, and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," *id.*, §§3.

With respect to the states, the Constitution directs that "no State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" or, without the consent of Congress, "lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports" or "enter into any Agreement or Compact * * * with a foreign Power," or "engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." *Id.* §§1, cl. 10.

These and other constitutional provisions evidence an intent on the part of the framers to grant paramount authority for foreign affairs to the political branches of the federal government, thereby necessitating the exclusion of intrusive efforts on the part of the states in foreign relations. The Federalist Papers bolster this interpretation. *See Hines*, 312 U.S. at 64 n9 ("The importance of national power in all matters relating to foreign affairs and the inherent danger of state action in this field are clearly developed in [the] Federalist papers * * *."). For example, James Madison wrote: "This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations." The Federalist No 42, at 264 (C Rossiter ed 1961). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton argued, albeit with respect to the related but explicit foreign commerce power of the national government, that

> [t]he interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious

> impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.

The Federalist No 22, at 144-45 (C Rossiter ed 1961). And as noted in *Hines*, "Thomas Jefferson, who was not generally favorable to broad federal powers, expressed a similar view in 1787: 'My own general idea was, that the States should severally preserve their sovereignty in whatever concerns themselves alone, and that whatever may concern another State, or any foreign nation, should be made a part of the federal sovereignty.'" *Hines*, 312 U.S. at 64 n11 (quoting *Memoir, Correspondence and Miscellanies from the Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (1829), vol 2, p 230, letter to Mr Wythe).

The Supreme Court has long acknowledged the federal government's broad authority over foreign affairs. In 1937, for example, Justice Sutherland noted that complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states." *Belmont*, 301 U.S. at 331. Similarly, Justice Black observed a few years later that "our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference." *Hines*, 312 U.S. at 63. To be certain, the holdings of these and other decisions from the same time period were predominantly based on the supremacy of federal law; the Court determined that the state legislation at issue in these cases was preempted by existing federal law or international agreements. But the early observations contained in these cases regarding the national government's broad authority over foreign affairs

are instructive because they describe the principles upon which the Supreme Court later relied in *Zschernig v. Miller*, 389 U.S. 429, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683, 88 S. Ct. 664 (1968), to announce the foreign affairs doctrine that governs the case at bar.

In *Zschernig*, the Supreme Court observed that the Constitution entrusts "the field of foreign affairs * * * to the President and the Congress." *Id.* at 432 (citing *Hines*, 312 U.S. at 63). The Court concluded that, as a result, the Constitution itself excludes state intrusion on the federal government's authority over foreign affairs even when the federal branches have not acted. *Id.* at 432, 441; *see also Henkin* at 164. Pointing to the broad principle articulated in *Hines*, the Court stated that "even in the absence of a treaty [or other federal law], a State's policy may disturb foreign relations. * * * If there are to be such restraints, they must be provided by the Federal Government." *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 441. In short, the Court concluded that state statutes "must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy." *Id.* at 440.

Zschernig involved an Oregon probate statute that conditioned the inheritance rights of an alien not residing in the United States on his ability to prove that American heirs would have a reciprocal right to inherit estates in the foreign country and that he would receive payments from the Oregon estate "without confiscation, in whole or in part, by the governments of such foreign countries." *Id.* at 430. The Supreme Court noted that it had earlier refused to invalidate a similar statute enacted by California "on its face" because that statute "would have only 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.'" *Id.* at 432-33 (quoting *Clark v. Allen*, 331 U.S. 503, 517, 91 L. Ed. 1633, 67 S. Ct. 1431 (1947)). In *Zschernig*, however, the Court

assessed "the manner of [the Oregon statute's] application" and observed that the law had compelled state courts to "launch[ ] inquiries into the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign nations." 389 U.S. at 434. The Court noted, for example, that the statute triggered assessments of "the actual administration of foreign law" and "the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements." *Id.* at 435. In short, the statute "seemed to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own." *Id.* at 440. Looking at these effects of the Oregon statute, the Court concluded that it was unconstitutional because it "affected international relations in a persistent and subtle way," had a "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" and triggered "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.'" *Id.* at 434-35, 440.

Zschernig thus stands for the proposition that states may legislate with respect to traditional state concerns, such as inheritance and property rights, even if the legislation has international implications, but such conduct is unconstitutional when it has more than an "incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." *Id.* at 440. As the First Circuit recently stated, under *Zschernig* "there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed." *National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios*, 181 F.3d 38, 49-57 (1st Cir 1999), *aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 147 L. Ed. 2d 352, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000). Or, as the Third Circuit has summarized the doctrine, if a state law were to "involve[ ] the state in the actual conduct of foreign affairs[, the statute] is unconstitutional." *Trojan*, 916 F.2d at 913 (citing *Pink*, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796).

This doctrine makes sense because the nation as a whole is affected when state-driven foreign policy has an impact on other countries. *See* Lori A Martin, *The Legality of Nuclear Free Zones*, 55 U Chi L Rev 965, 993 (1988). Indeed, for that very reason states have inadequate incentive to consider the effects of their actions on foreign relations. *See id. Zschernig* thus enables the courts to ensure that the states have not overstepped the line at the risk of endangering the nation as a whole.

Before evaluating section 354.6 in this regard, the court rejects the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs' suggestion that *Zschernig* is no longer valid. To be sure, some commentators have suggested that the reach of the Court's holding in *Zschernig* should be limited. *See, e.g., Henkin* at 165 n**; Curtis A Bradley & Jack L Goldsmith, *Customary International Law: A Critique of the Modern Position*, 110 Harv L Rev 815, 865 (1997); Jack L Goldsmith, *Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism*, 83 Va L Rev 1617, 1698-1706 (1997); Peter J Spiro, *The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties*, 35 Va J Int'l L 121, 161-74 (1994); but see Tribe §§4-5 at 656-57; *Maier* at 832-33. But *Zschernig* has not been overruled, and thus the constitutional principles it enunciates remain the law. *See Natsios*, 181 F.3d at 59 ("There is simply no indication, in * * * any * * * post-*Zschernig* case, that *Zschernig* is not good law and is not binding on us."). California and all states enacting legislation touching upon foreign affairs are thus bound by the doctrines of *Zschernig* until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise. As the Ninth Circuit has noted on numerous occasions, "speculation" about the continuing vitality of Supreme Court precedent "does not permit us to ignore [such] controlling * * * authority." *United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda*, 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th

Cir 2001) (citing *Agostini v. Felton*, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 138 L. Ed. 2d 391, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (directing that lower courts should leave to the Supreme Court "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions") (citation omitted)); *see also Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright*, 226 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir 2000) (citing *Agostini* and noting same); *Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.*, 144 F.3d 1182, 1192 (9th Cir 1998) (same).

Indeed, on two recent occasions the Ninth Circuit has recognized the continuing vitality of *Zschernig*. *See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp of America v. Low*, 240 F.3d 739, 751-53 (9th Cir 2001); *Int'l Assoc. of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke*, 148 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir 1998), *rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Locke*, 529 U.S. 89, 146 L. Ed. 2d 69, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000). In *Tanker Owners*, the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that oil regulations promulgated by the state of Washington were unconstitutional under *Zschernig* because the litigant "failed to demonstrate that, even if those regulations [had] some extraterritorial impact, that impact [was] more than 'incidental or indirect.'" *Tanker Owners*, 148 F.3d 1069 (quoting *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 434). The decision affirms, therefore, that when a litigant makes a showing that the statute at issue triggers "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries,'" the statute is unconstitutional as an intrusion on the federal government's foreign affairs power. *See id.* (quoting *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 434).

Similarly, in *Gerling*, although the Ninth Circuit declined to apply *Zschernig* to California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA), Cal. Ins. Code §§§§13800-13807, *see Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 753, the court did not suggest that *Zschernig* is no longer valid.

Rather, the court concluded that the HVIRA did not trigger the concerns implicated by the statutes in *Zschernig* and cases applying its doctrine. *See id.* The court stated that it "hesitated to apply *Zschernig* to a facial challenge to state statutes involving 'foreign affairs' (a) but that mainly involved foreign commerce and (b) that [were] not directed at a particular country." *Id.* The court also suggested that it was hesitant to apply *Zschernig* because "there is no evidence that HVIRA would implicate the diplomatic concerns mentioned in *Zschernig*." *Id.* By implication, therefore, the Ninth Circuit would apply *Zschernig* to state statutes that do not regulate commerce, are directed at a particular country or implicate the diplomatic concerns present in *Zschernig*.

In addition, other courts have applied the principles of *Zschernig* to strike down state or local laws. *See, e.g.*, *Natsios*, 181 F.3d 38, 49-61 (finding that the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted the ability of Massachusetts and its agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies that did business with Burma (Myanmar), was unconstitutional, in part, as a "threat to [the] federal foreign affairs power"); *Tayyari v. New Mexico State University*, 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1376-79 (D NM 1980) (striking down a university's policy designed to "rid the campus of Iranian students" because it conflicted with a federal regulation and "frustrated the exercise of the federal government's authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States"); *Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson*, 115 Ill. 2d 221, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305-07, 104 Ill. Dec. 743 (Ill 1986) (invalidating an Illinois statute that excluded South Africa from a tax exemption as more than an "incidental" intrusion on the federal government's foreign affairs power); *New York Times Co v.*

City of New York Commission on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 969, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312 (NY 1977) (striking down a New York City antidiscrimination statute because it "interfered with the foreign policy authority of the Federal Government"); *Bethlehem Steel Corp v. Board of Commissioners*, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 227-29, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969) (invalidating a California Buy American statute because it had "more than 'some incidental effect in foreign countries' and * * * great potential for disruption * * *.").

The infrequency with which *Zschernig* has been applied over the years does not suggest a weakening in the doctrine. To the contrary, it shows that the federal government has affirmatively enacted legislation or international agreements in most areas of foreign relations that expressly preempt conflicting state and local legislation under the Constitution's Supremacy clause, thereby obviating the need for analysis under *Zschernig*. *See, e.g.*, *Crosby*, 530 U.S. 363, 147 L. Ed. 2d 352, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (affirming invalidity of the Massachusetts Burma law on preemption grounds). It also suggests that, despite several high profile examples of international involvement, state and local authorities tend to focus on state and local issues. *See* Howard N Fenton III, *The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions*, 13 Nw J Int'l L & Bus 563, 564 (1993). Indeed, most actions by states and municipalities that directly address foreign policy issues do not raise the type of diplomatic concerns expressed by the Court in *Zschernig*. For example, local authorities seeking to make international statements often enact non-binding resolutions or form sister-city relationships with foreign communities.

See id. Section 354.6 represents a much greater foray into the field of foreign affairs.

Turning to an analysis of section 354.6, the court reiterates that under *Zschernig*, California may legislate with respect to local concerns that touch upon foreign affairs, but only if its actions have just "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 433 (quoting *Clark*, 331 U.S. at 517). The court concludes that section 354.6, as applied to defendants here, clearly crosses this "forbidden line." *See Clark*, 331 U.S. at 517.

The court's conclusion is mandated by the following observations: (1) the terms of section 354.6 and its legislative history demonstrate a purpose to influence foreign affairs directly, (2) the statute targets particular countries, (3) the statute does not regulate an area that Congress has expressly delegated to states to regulate, (4) the statute establishes a judicial forum for negative commentary about the Japanese government and Japanese companies, (5) the Japanese government asserts that litigation of these claims could complicate and impede diplomatic relationships of the countries involved, and (6) the United States, through the State Department, contends that section 354.6 impermissibly intrudes upon the foreign affairs power of the federal government.

First, the language of section 354.6 and the contemporaneous comments of its creators demonstrate that the statute embraces a foreign policy purpose, namely, to provide a mechanism for individuals to obtain war-related reparations. By its terms, the statute purports to enable individuals from any country forced to labor during World War II by the Japanese government or Japanese companies "to recover compensation" for such labor. *See* Cal.

CCP §§354.6(b). Moreover, as the notes to the statute indicate, the legislature determined that the "victims of Nazi [and Japanese] persecution have been deprived of their entitlement to compensation [earned] during the Second World War." *Id.*, note §§1(b). Indeed, Governor Gray Davis stated shortly after signing the bill that the law would "help right a historic wrong which occurred over 50 years ago during World War II when men, women and children were forced into slave labor." *See* Henry Weinstein, *Bill Signed Bolstering Holocaust-Era Claims*, LA Times, July 29, 1999, at A3. The author of the measure, Senator Tom Hayden, similarly asserted at the time:

> [Section 354.6] sends a very powerful message from California to the U.S. government and the German government, who are in the midst of rather closed negotiations about a settlement. * * * If the international negotiators want to avoid very expensive litigation by survivors as well as very bad public relations for companies like Volkswagen and Ford, they ought to settle. * * * Otherwise, this law allows us to go ahead and take them to court.

Id. Since the statute purports to create a cause of action for compensation from companies related to "the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers," it cannot be doubted that the same message is intended for the Japanese government and Japanese corporations.

These issues and determinations which underlie section 354.6 are thus identical to the "uniquely federal" reparations concerns that were addressed by the United States while negotiating the Treaty of Peace with Japan. *See In re World War II*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 946; *see also Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 199, 230, 1 L.Ed. 568

(establishing that the war-related claims of individual citizens can only be brought by their government); *Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG*, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 273-74 (D NJ 1999) (noting same). By establishing California courts as an avenue for reparations, therefore, section 354.6 engages California in the uniquely federal foreign policy function of addressing claims for reparations that arise in the aftermath of a war.

Second, section 354.6 targets particular countries by allowing a cause of action against companies that transacted business in any of the areas occupied by "the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers." *See* Cal. CCP §§354.6. Because the statute singles out such a narrow set of countries – most notably, Germany and Japan – it suggests that California intended the statute to send an explicit foreign relations message, rather than simply to address some local concern.

As a contrast, in *Trojan* the Third Circuit upheld a Pennsylvania "Buy American" law, in part, because "the statute applied to steel from ***any*** foreign source, without respect to whether the country might be considered friend or foe." *Trojan*, 916 F.2d at 913 (emphasis added). By not singling out a particular country or set of countries, the Pennsylvania statute implicitly focused on a local concern (the local steel industry), as opposed to engaging in international relations directly with a particular country or set of countries.

The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs point out that the Ninth Circuit referred to this characteristic of the law in *Trojan* when assessing the applicability of *Zschernig* to the HVIRA, implying that this court should do the same with respect to section 354.6. *Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 752-53. As

discussed, the *Gerling* court was hesitant to apply *Zschernig*, in part, because the HVIRA was not directed at a particular country. *Id.* at 753. But, in this regard, section 354.6 is significantly different from the HVIRA. While section 354.6 is aimed at a few specific countries, the HVIRA applied to insurers from any country. *See* Cal. Ins, Code §§13804(a) ("Any insurer * * * that sold * * * insurance policies * * * to persons in Europe, which were in effect between 1920 and 1945 [must file certain information with the insurance commissioner].") (emphasis added). Thus, the *Gerling* court's reliance on this observation in *Trojan* to minimize the foreign affairs effect of the HVIRA suggests the opposite conclusion for section 354.6.

With respect to this point, therefore, section 354.6 is closer to the statute struck down by the Supreme Court in *Zschernig*. The Oregon statute at issue was generally applied only against residents of a narrow set of countries (those "established on a more authoritarian basis than our own"); section 354.6 similarly applies only against companies of a narrow set of countries. Indeed, section 354.6 targets an even smaller set of countries than the law at issue in *Zschernig*. The California law's focus on a few particular countries, therefore, further evidences an intrusion by the state on the field of foreign affairs.

Third, section 354.6 does not regulate an area that Congress has expressly delegated to the states. In fact, by establishing a mechanism for forced labor victims to obtain war reparations, the statute relates to a subject that has always been addressed at the federal level. To the contrary, the HVIRA regulates insurance companies, which, as the *Gerling* court noted, has been deemed by the Supreme Court to be "a local matter." *Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 744 (citing *FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n.*, 362 U.S. 293,

302, 80 S. Ct. 717, 4 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1960)). At bottom, therefore, the "HVIRA is a California insurance regulation of California insurance companies * * *." 240 F.3d at 746. The Ninth Circuit's hesitancy to apply *Zschernig* to a constitutional challenge of the HVIRA because the law regulated an area of commerce for which Congress had expressly delegated the regulatory power to the states is thus irrelevant to the court's analysis here. Accordingly, section 354.6 cannot be validated as a regulation of a local concern in the same manner as the HVIRA. The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs do not contend otherwise.

Fourth, because section 354.6 opens the door to lawsuits about the conduct of the Japanese government and Japanese companies during the Second World War, the primary dangers of the Oregon statute that concerned the Court in *Zschernig* are likewise triggered here. Specifically, such litigation cannot be carried to fruition without making "unavoidable judicial criticism" of the efforts of Japan and its war industry. *See Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 440. To be sure, the commentary would by necessity focus on the past, but, particularly given the fact that it would emanate from the official forum of American courts, Japan's current regime could not avoid being negatively implicated by association. It seems beyond doubt, therefore, that the statute has the potential to have an impact on foreign relations between the United States and Japan "in a persistent and subtle way." *See id.*

Fifth, and related to the court's fourth observation, the Japanese government has made clear that it is concerned about the effects of section 354.6 on Japan's relationship with the United States. *See* Views of the Government of Japan, United States SOI (Doc # 302), Exh 1. In a submission to this court by the Embassy of Japan,

the Japanese government points out that the claims of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs have already been settled or are in the process of being settled through diplomatic negotiations between Japan, China, and North and South Korea. *See id.* at 5. California's efforts to provide an alternative forum for these claims interferes with Japan's diplomatic efforts and credibility in this regard. As Japan states:

> Permitting plaintiff's claims will put the courts in the United States in an unwarranted place to inevitably affect relations between the countries concerned, including the bilateral settlement reached after highly political and sensitive negotiations. Such involvement of the courts in the United States could complicate and impede relationships between Japan and those countries as well as the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan. The Government of Japan is convinced that these issues should not be adjudicated in the courts in the United States.

Id. To be sure, the court recognizes that Japan has a financial interest in repressing any demands for further compensation against its nationals arising out of the war. But Japan's submission nevertheless serves as a reminder that the United States also has its own interest in maintaining normal diplomatic relations with Japan. The protests of the Japanese government thus demonstrate that section 354.6 has "great potential for [causing] disruption or embarrassment" here in the United States. *See Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 435.

Finally, the federal government, as represented by the State Department, agrees with defendants that section 354.6 impermissibly intrudes on the foreign affairs power

of the federal government. *See* United States SOI (Doc # 302) at 12-16. The State Department represents one of the two political branches with the exclusive authority to handle the country's foreign affairs, and thus it is in a good position (and certainly better position than this court) to determine if that power has been intruded upon. In this regard, the government asserts:

> By enacting the statute, California has created its own policy in a particular area of foreign relations – one which judges the activities of foreign governments and corporations during * * * World War II, and the treaties and agreements Japan and other nationals made in the wake of the war. If each state were free to impose burdens that diverge from the foreign policy interests of the nation as a whole as expressed by the President and to have its own foreign policy, it would * * * significantly diminish the President's "economic and diplomatic leverage" and, hence, his authority to negotiate agreements with foreign governments.

Id. at 16 (citation omitted). The court finds it notable that the Supreme Court concluded that application of the law at issue in *Zschernig* was unconstitutional even though the federal government had submitted an amicus curiae brief in which it stated that "the government does not * * * contend that the application of the * * * statute in the circumstances of this case unduly interferes with the United States' conduct of foreign relations." *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 434-35. Section 354.6, to the contrary, has triggered the opposite reaction from the federal government. Accordingly, the concerns of the State Department further persuade the court to conclude that an application of

section 354.6 to defendants here cannot pass constitutional muster.

The few arguments of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs in opposition to this conclusion are unpersuasive.

First, the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs make much of the distinction between facial and as applied challenges to the constitutionality of a statute. Specifically, they argue that *Zschernig*, which the Court framed as an as-applied analysis, cannot govern the present inquiry because defendants have challenged the validity of section 354.6 on its face. *See* Pl. Supp. Br. (Doc #323) at 6-7. But the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs are simply incorrect; defendants, in fact, challenge section 354.6 as it applies to them. *See* Def. Supp. Br. (Doc #336) at 1. As the Court established long ago, the proper method for adjudicating the constitutionality of a statute is for the affected parties to challenge the statute at issue as applied to them. *See United States v. Raines*, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 80 S. Ct. 519 (1960). In *Raines*, the Court made clear that "the very foundation of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional lies in the power and duty of those courts to decide cases and controversies properly before them." *Id.*; *see also United States v. Kurt*, 988 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir 1993) ("A defendant cannot claim a statute is unconstitutional in some of its reaches if the statute is constitutional as applied to him.") (citing *Raines*, 362 U.S. at 21-22); Richard H Fallon, Jr., *As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing*, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1324 (2000) (concluding that "there is no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as-applied, litigation. Rather, all challenges to statutes arise when a particular litigant claims that a particular statute cannot be applied against her.").

To be sure, both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have cited this distinction as a factor influencing their analyses under the foreign affairs doctrine. *See Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 433 (distinguishing *Clark*, in which the Court had refused to strike down a similar California statute, as addressing a challenge to the statute on its face); *Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 752 (noting that the HVIRA was challenged on its face). But given the posture of the challenge to section 354.6 brought by defendants, the court is not persuaded by the efforts of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs to cloud the analysis here.

The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs also contend that because defendants are businesses, as opposed to foreign governments, section 354.6 does not implicate *Zschernig's* foreign affairs doctrine. *See* Pl. Supp. Br. (Doc #323) at 8. But such a contention does not square with their complaints, in which the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs emphasize that the conduct of the Japanese companies during the war was condoned and controlled by the Japanese government. *See, e.g., Sung* Compl., P 10 ("The Japanese government set up programs whereby Japanese companies (including defendants) could use civilian internees as slaves or forced laborers."); *Oh* Compl., PP 65, 67 ("In August 1936, Japanese Army General Minami Jiro was appointed Governor-General of Korea. Under his control private Japanese companies, including the Defendants, expanded those industries in Korea critical to Japan's war-making ability. * * * Japan enacted laws applicable to Korea forcing Koreans to labor in certain industries."). The Japanese government, as opposed to just these private defendants, is clearly implicated by the claims asserted under section 354.6 by the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs.

Even if these cases could somehow be characterized as claims between private parties, *Zschernig* clearly instructs that an application of state legislation that has more than "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries" is invalid. *See Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added). Whether section 354.6 is applied to businesses or the Japanese government, the statute certainly has an effect in Japan.

Finally, the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs also suggest that since Congress has not addressed the subject matter here – forced labor compensation claims against Japanese companies – then there is no federal policy or legislation with which section 354.6 may conflict. *See* Pl. Supp. Br. (Doc #323) at 8. To be sure, this argument would be relevant if the court were analyzing whether section 354.6 violated the federal government's foreign commerce authority. *See Gerling*, 240 F.3d at 743-51. As already discussed, however, the foreign affairs doctrine prohibits state and local intrusion into the field of foreign relations regardless whether a conflicting federal law or policy exists. *See Tribe*, §§4-5 at 656 ("All state action, whether or not consistent with current federal foreign policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the conduct of American diplomacy is void * * *."). It is the intrusion itself, which could inhibit the federal government's ability to "deal with those problems," that makes the application of such legislation unconstitutional. *See Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 441. The federal government's actual policy, therefore, is irrelevant to the court's analysis.

Based on the foregoing observations, the court concludes that applying section 354.6 to defendants will "affect[ ] international relations in a persistent and subtle

way," have a "great potential for disruption or embarrassment" in the United States and trigger "more than some incidental or indirect effect" in Japan. *See Zschernig* at 434-35, 440. As a result, California's attempt to provide a cause of action to the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs against defendants is an unconstitutional intrusion on the exclusive foreign affairs power of the federal government.

III.

In light of the court's conclusion that the application of section 354.6 to defendants is unconstitutional, the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs may not rely on the California statute to pursue their claims against defendants. The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs contend, however, that they allege claims that arise under other statutes as well, namely the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 USC §§1350, and various California laws. The court addresses these claims now.

A.

The court turns first to the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs' purported claims under the ATCA. Although no reference is made to the ATCA in any of the seven complaints, the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs place extensive reliance on the statute and the few decisions interpreting it to oppose defendants' motions to dismiss.

The ATCA, originally enacted by the 1st Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that

> [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,

> committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.

28 USC §§1350. In the Ninth Circuit, section 1350 provides both federal jurisdiction and a substantive right of action for certain violations of customary international law. *In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation*, 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-76 (9th Cir 1994) (Marcos II); *see also Alvarez-Machain v. United States*, 107 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir 1997). In order to state a claim under the ATCA, a plaintiff must allege (1) a claim by an alien, (2) asserting a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations (i e, international law). *See Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (CD Cal 2000). To be actionable under section 1350, an alleged violation must be of an international norm that is "specific, universal and obligatory." *See Marcos II*, 25 F.3d at 1475 (citing *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir 1980); *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (DC Cir 1984)).

Defendants do not challenge that the elements for a claim under section 1350 have been satisfied here. With respect to the first two elements, most of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs reside outside of the United States and the type of actions that defendants are alleged to have committed during the Second World War inflicted personal injuries that sound in tort. Regarding the third element, two of the seven complaints allege that the defendants forced the plaintiffs to labor without compensation in violation of their rights under international law. *See Kim* Compl., ¶¶76-79, 81; *Choe* Compl., ¶81.

Whether requiring individuals to engage in forced and slave labor meets the "specific, universal and obligatory

standard" required to violate the law of nations has not been specifically addressed by the Ninth Circuit. Cf. *Marcos II*, 25 F.3d at 1475 (finding that official torture violates the law of nations). To be sure, the Ninth Circuit has noted in passing that slavery violates a *jus cogens* norm. *United States v. Matta-Ballesteros*, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n5 (9th Cir 1995) (citing *Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina*, 965 F.2d 699, 714-15 (9th Cir 1992)). Such norms are "nonderogable and peremptory, enjoy the highest status within customary international law, are binding on all nations, and can not be preempted by treaty." *Id.* (citation omitted). It remains unclear, however, whether all *jus cogens* norms meet the "specific, universal and obligatory standard" required to be actionable under section 1350.

Courts faced with making this determination may be guided by judicial decisions enforcing the law of nations, the work of jurists and the general usage and practice of nations. *Martinez v. City of Los Angeles*, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir 1998) (citing *Siderman*, 965 F.2d at 714-15); *see also United States v. Smith*, 5 Wheat. 153, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61, 5 L. Ed. 57 (1820). In this regard, a district court in New Jersey addressing forced labor claims under the ATCA against Ford Motor Company recently concluded that "the use of unpaid, forced labor during World War II violated clearly established norms of international law." *Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.*, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D NJ 1999). As that court reasoned, this conclusion is supported by the following: (1) the Nuremberg Tribunals held that enslavement and deportation of civilian populations during the war constituted a crime against humanity in violation of international law, id (citing R Jackson, The Nuremberg Case xiv-xv (1971)); (2) the Nuremberg Principle IV(b) provides

that the "deportation to slave labor * * * of civilian populations of or in occupied territory" constitutes both a "war crime" and a "crime against humanity," *id.* (quoting Nuremberg Charter, annexed to the London Agreement on War Criminals, Aug 8, 1945, art 6, 59 Stat 1544, 82 UNTS 279); and (3) several American and German jurists have stated that conduct related to slave labor violates international law, id at 440-41 (citing *Handel v. Artukovic*, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 n2 (CD Cal 1985); *Kadic v. Karadzic*, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir 1996); *Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany*, 307 U.S. App. D.C. 102, 26 F.3d 1166, 1180 (DC Cir 1994) (Wald, J, dissenting); *Siderman*, 965 F.2d at 715; *Tel-Oren*, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J, concurring); LG [District Court of Germany] Bremen, 1 0 2889/90 at 7 (1998) (FRG); *Krakauer v. Federal Republic of Germany*, LG [District Court of Germany] Bonn, 1 0 134792, at 21 (1997) (FRG), *rev'd on other grounds*, OLG [Court of Appeals] Cologne, 7 U 222/97 (1998) (FRG)).

Given the Ninth Circuit's comment in *Matta-Ballesteros*, 71 F.3d at 764 n5, that slavery constitutes a violation of *jus cogens*, this court is inclined to agree with the *Iwanowa* court's conclusion that forced labor violates the law of nations. Indeed, it seems beyond doubt that the forced labor practices of defendants during the Second World War violated traditional international law. But such conduct took place over 50 years ago. To the extent the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs have asserted claims under the ATCA for conduct taking place during World War II, the court concludes that the claims must be dismissed because they are time-barred.

Although the ATCA itself does not contain a statute of limitations, when a cause of action under federal civil law does not have a directly applicable limitations period, the

Supreme Court has instructed that the court should not assume that no time limit for the cause of action was intended. *DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters*, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476, 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983). Instead, the court must "borrow" the most suitable limitations period from some other source, traditionally, the law of the forum state. *Id.*; *see also* Wright & Miller, 19 *Federal Practice and Procedure* §§4519 at 595 (West Publishing Co 1996). Since "[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies," however, the Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that statutes of limitation are to be borrowed from state law. *Reed v. United Transportation Union*, 488 U.S. 319, 102 L. Ed. 2d 665, 109 S. Ct. 621 (1989) (quoting *Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. EEOC*, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 53 L. Ed. 2d 402, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977)). Specifically, the court should not borrow the state limitations period "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." *Id.* (quoting *DelCostello*, 462 U.S. at 172).

With these principles in mind, the court must identify the closest analogies to the ATCA from both state and federal law and determine which one presents the best analogy. *Forti v. Suarez-Mason*, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1547 (ND Cal 1987); *see also Iwanowa*, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 462-63 (citing *Forti*); *Xuncax v. Gramajo*, 886 F. Supp. 162, 190-93 (D Mass 1995) (same). The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs

have brought their claims under the ATCA in an effort to obtain compensation from defendants for the damages caused by requiring them to engage in forced and slave labor during the Second World War. This effort closely resembles a personal injury suit, such as for false imprisonment, and thus the most analogous state laws are those providing personal injury causes of action for intentional torts. In California, such tort actions have a one year statute of limitations. *See* Cal. Civil Code §§340(3).

Locating the closest federal statute is a relatively straightforward task. In 1991, Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) as a statutory note to the ATCA. *See* 28 USC §§1350, notes. The TVPA provides that any "individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation * * * subjects an individual to torture * * * [or] extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages * * *." *Id.*, note §§ 2(a). Given the similarity between forced labor and torture – both of which, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit considers to be violations of *jus cogens* norms – combined with Congress' decision to incorporate the TVPA into the notes of the ATCA, the court concludes that the TVPA serves as the closest federal statute to the ATCA. The TVPA provides a ten year limitations period. 28 USC §§1350, note §§ 2(c).

In light of the fact that the TVPA is directed at conduct committed in foreign nations that violates customary international law (torture and extrajudicial killing), much like a cause of action under the ATCA would address, the court concludes that the TVPA is a much better analogy than state law. Indeed, the courts that have evaluated what limitations period should apply under the ATCA since the TVPA was enacted have reached the same

conclusion. *See, e.g., Iwanowa*, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 462; *Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah*, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1195-96 (SD NY 1996); *Xuncax*, 886 F. Supp. at 192-93. Accordingly, the court concludes that the TVPA's ten year statute of limitations applies to the claims of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs.

Federal law determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run. *Tworivers v. Lewis*, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir 1999). Under federal law, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." *Id.* Under this standard, the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs were aware of their injuries no later than when the war ended in 1945. These cases were initiated, however, in 1999 and 2000, over 50 years later and well outside the ten year limitations period.

Intertwined in the analysis of the timeliness of an action, of course, is whether the applicable statute of limitations has been tolled. When borrowing the limitations period from another federal statute, federal, rather than state, tolling doctrines apply. *See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co.*, 846 F.2d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir 1988) (citing *Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.*, 421 U.S. 454, 466, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 95 S. Ct. 1716 (1975)); *see also* Wright & Miller, 19 *Federal Practice and Procedure* §§4519 at 627-33 (West Publishing Co 1996). As the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, the Senate Report on the TVPA states that the ten-year limitations period is subject to equitable tolling. *Hilao v. Estate of Marcos*, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir 1996) (Marcos III) (citing S Rep No 249, 102d Cong, 1st Sess, at 11 (1991)). Such tolling may be triggered if the defendant has engaged in wrongful conduct, or extraordinary circumstances occurred outside of the plaintiff's

control, which prevented the plaintiff from asserting his claim during the limitations period. Id. At bottom, however, "one who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence." *Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown*, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 80 L. Ed. 2d 196, 104 S. Ct. 1723 (1984); *see also Lehman v. United States*, 154 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir 1998), *cert denied*, 526 U.S. 1040, 143 L. Ed. 2d 500, 119 S. Ct. 1336 (1999) ("Equitable tolling * * * is not available to avoid the consequences of one's own negligence.").

None of the allegations in the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs' complaints suggest that they could not have attempted to bring these claims sooner. To be sure, the Ninth Circuit only formally recognized a right of action under the ATCA in 1994. *See Marcos II*, 25 F.3d at 1475. But the statute has been in force since the 18th century and several courts found it to provide a cause of action much earlier than the Ninth Circuit. *See, e.g., Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift*, 195 F. Supp 857, 865 (D Md 1961) ("The wrongful acts were therefore committed in violation of the law of nations. And since they caused direct and special injury to the plaintiff, he may bring an action in tort therefor."); *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir 1980); *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (DC Cir 1984); *Forti v. Suarez-Mason*, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (ND Cal 1987).

The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs do not assert reasons why their claims could not have been brought under the ATCA within ten years of the war's end. Their reference to the Japanese government's alleged suppression of similar claims brought by Korean forced laborers in Japan shortly after the war does not explain why the same

claims could not have been alleged in a United States court. *See* Pl. Opp. Br. (Doc #254) at 26 n44. Moreover, to the extent the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs contend that they were not aware of the opportunity to bring these claims in the United States, "mere ignorance of the cause of action does not, in itself, toll the statute." *Volk, LA v. DA Davidson & Co*, 816 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir 1987).

The court concludes, therefore, that the ten year limitations period on the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs' international law claims under the ATCA has not tolled. Accordingly, to the extent such claims could have been asserted against defendants for their forced labor practices during the Second World War, they are barred by the statute of limitations.

B.

As previously noted, the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs also seek compensation and restitution under other California state laws. Specifically, among the seven complaints the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs allege the following state law claims: (1) false imprisonment; (2) assault and battery; (3) conversion; (4) unjust enrichment and quantum merit; (5) constructive trust; (6) accounting; (7) the Unfair Competition Act (UCA), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§§§17200 *et seq*; and (8) violations of Article 1 of the California Constitution and Penal Code §§181, which prohibit involuntary servitude. To the extent the conduct of defendants during the Second World War would have been actionable under any of these California laws, they are also barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

It has long been established that a federal court addressing state law claims generally "utilizes its own

state's statute of limitations." *Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co.*, 520 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir 1975); *see also* Restatement Second, Conflict of Laws §§ 142. Because the forced labor underlying these claims occurred in China and Japan, a conflict of law question arises for which the court must look to the laws of the forum state, including its choice of law rules, to determine which statutes of limitations to apply. *See Guaranty Trust Co. of NY v. York*, 326 U.S. 99, 109-10, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945); *Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc.*, 686 F.2d 736, 737-38 (9th Cir 1982). California employs a "governmental interest" approach to choice of law questions, essentially requiring an analysis regarding the potential conflict between the statute of limitations in California and those applicable in China and Japan and, if a conflict exists, an assessment of the competing interests of the forums. *See In re Yagman*, 796 F.2d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir 1982). Such analysis is not necessary here, however, because the statutes of limitations from all three forums are significantly shorter than the age of these claims.

Under California law, the longest applicable statute of limitations, which relates to the UCA, is just four years. *See* Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§17208. All of the other state law claims asserted by the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs trigger a limitations period under California law between one to three years from the date the claims accrued. *See* Cal. CCP §§§§338, 339, 340. The Civil Code of Japan provides that claims lapse if not exercised within ten years. *See* The Civil Code of Japan, art 167 at FA 29 (Exhibits in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Doc #212), Exh Z). Under the law of China, the longest applicable statute of limitations is two years for civil suits. *See* Civil Law of

China, arts 135-37 (Exhibits in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Doc #212), Exh AA).

The Korean and Chinese plaintiffs do not contend that these statutes of limitations have been tolled. In fact, they appear to concede the futility of these state law claims by arguing exclusively that their claims are valid under section 354.6 and the ATCA. In support of this assessment, the court notes that the people of the state of California, through the office of the Attorney General, states that "absent [section 354.6, the plaintiffs] would be without a remedy * * *." Amicus Curiae Brief of the People of the State of California (Doc #101) at 1. Further buttressing this conclusion is the fact that district courts in Japan addressing similar claims have uniformly dismissed such actions, in part, because the applicable statutes of limitations have run. *See* Appeal to International Labour Organization Regarding Violation of Convention No 29 by Japan During Wartime (Pl. Appendix (Doc #14), Exh I) at 3.

To the extent the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs' complaints are based on these California statutes, therefore, the court concludes that they are time-barred.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings are GRANTED with respect to the actions involving the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs. The clerk shall enter judgment in the above-captioned cases, terminate all motions and close the files.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 17, 2001

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

IN RE: WORLD WAR II ERA JAPANESE FORCED LABOR LITIGATION,

This Document Relates To:
Resus v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et. al., ND Cal. No. 00-3313;
Llanza v. Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc., et. al.,
ND Cal. No. 00-3240;
Saldajeno v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd., et. al.,
ND Cal. No. 00-2960;
Santo Domingo v. Ishihara, ND Cal. No. 00-3828

Master File No. MDL-1347

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

The Honorable Vaughn R. Walker

164 F. Supp. 2d 1153; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14641

September 17, 2001

ORDER NO. 9

In these consolidated actions, plaintiffs from various countries seek damages and other remedies from Japanese corporations for their forced labor during World War II. The four matters in the above caption represent the classes of Filipino plaintiffs. On September 21, 2000, the court dismissed the claims of plaintiffs who were United States or Allied soldiers in the war based on the court's conclusion that the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan constitutes a waiver of such claims. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation*, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942 (ND Cal 2000) (Order No 4). Motions to dismiss brought by plaintiffs who were not members of the armed forces of the United States or its allies were not addressed by the order and remain pending with the court. The four matters involving Filipino plaintiffs were transferred to this court after the initial hearing on defendants' motions

to dismiss. As a result, defendants now move to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings in the actions involving Filipino plaintiffs.

I.

The Filipino plaintiffs assert essentially the same claims as the other plaintiffs in these actions. Most notably, they seek compensation under California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 354.6, a law permitting an action by "any person who was a member of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, or prisoner-of-war [of the same regimes] * * * [to] recover compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim * * * from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed * * *." Cal CCP §§ 354.6. The Filipino plaintiffs also assert claims under California tort and common law, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, unjust enrichment, constructive trust and unfair business practices prohibited by California Bus & Prof Code §§ 17200. One of the Filipino plaintiffs also asserts violations of the "law of nations."

Defendants argue that the claims of the four Filipino actions are barred by the Treaty of Peace with Japan for the same reasons the claims of the Allied POWs are barred. As noted in Order No 4, the treaty was signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, by the representatives of the United States and 47 other Allied powers and Japan. Treaty of Peace with Japan, [1952] 3 UST 3169, TIAS No 2490 (1951) (hereinafter, Treaty). The waiver provision in the treaty is Article 14(b). See id at 3183. In essence, that provision broadly waives "all" reparations

and "other claims" of the "nationals" of Allied powers "arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals during the course of the prosecution of the war." Id. Defendants argue that the Philippines was an "Allied Power," and thus the claims of any of its nationals are barred. The key issue for the court to address, therefore, is whether the Philippines is an "Allied power" subject to the provisions of the treaty.

Article 25 of the treaty defines "Allied Powers" for the purposes of the treaty. *Id.* at 3190. In relevant part, that article provides that "the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty." *Id.* The Philippines was an official signatory of the treaty. *Id.* at 3304. Article 23, which directs each signatory to ratify the treaty, specifically names the Republic of the Philippines. *Id.* at 3189. Indeed, the Philippines sent six representatives to the treaty negotiations to sign on behalf of the country: Carlos P Romulo, J M Elizalde, Vicente Francisco, Diosdado Macapagal, Emiliano T Tirona and V G Sinco. *Id.* The Philippines ratified the treaty on July 23, 1956, and deposited the ratification with the United States pursuant to Article 24 of the treaty. *See* M J Bowman and D J Harris, *Multilateral Treaties Index and Status* at 172 (Butterworths 1984) (Def Req for Judicial Notice (Doc # 200), Exh B). The treaty thus became effective in the Philippines on July 23, 1956. *Id.*

The Filipino plaintiffs do not dispute any of these facts. In fact, a professor submitting a declaration in support of their opposition explicitly states that "Article 14(b) is to be read as a waiver by the Phillippines [sic]

with respect to the claims of Filipino nationals 'arising out of any action taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war.'" Magallona Decl (Doc #249), ¶3.

In sum, because the Philippines is specifically named in Article 23 and the country both signed and ratified the treaty, under Article 25 the Philippines is an Allied power for purposes of the treaty. Treaty at 3190. The court finds, therefore, that for the reasons discussed in Order No 4, the Treaty of Peace with Japan bars the claims of the Filipino plaintiffs.

II.

In an effort to avoid the preclusive effect of the treaty, the Filipino plaintiffs put forth several unpersuasive arguments, several of which were likewise asserted by the Allied plaintiffs but rejected in Order No 4. In their first and most prominent argument, the Filipino plaintiffs assert that their claims do not arise out of conduct taken "in the prosecution of the war." Pl Opp Br (Doc #247) at 4-8. As the court noted in Order No 4, "it is particularly far-fetched to attempt to distinguish between the conduct of Imperial Japan during the Second World War and the major industry that was the engine of its war machine." *In re World War II*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948. The Filipino plaintiffs are asking the court to make that distinction.

The Filipino plaintiffs argue that their complaints are different from those in the Allied matters. Specifically, they contend that no facts are alleged which would permit the court to infer that defendants' conduct in the Philippines was taken in the course of the prosecution of the war. Pl. Opp. Br. (Doc #247) at 5. The court has reviewed

the four Filipino complaints and finds this argument to be seriously disingenuous.

Three of the four complaints are filled with allegations equating the actions of defendants with those of Japan's efforts to prosecute the war. For example, the *Llanza* complaint asserts that "the defendants, in collaboration and conspiracy with the Empire of Japan, developed plan [sic], scheme [sic] and/or common enterprises, through and by which the defendants enabled the Empire of Japan to conduct and execute the entire operations of World War II." *Llanza* compl, ¶64. The same complaint then asserts that "the Japanese government established programs whereby the Japanese companies could use the Filipino, and other allied civilians and POWs as slave or forced laborers * * * 'toward the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War.'" *Id.*, ¶72 (quoting the Japanese Prisoners of War Bureau). Similarly, the *Resus* complaint alleges that a "Japanese military government de facto ruled the [Philippines] until it was liberated in February 1945 * * * [and] appropriated ownership of non-Japanese owned industry and production which, in turn, commissioned or entrusted them to private Japanese companies including the defendants * * * [who] forced Filipinos to work as slave and forced laborers." *Resus* compl, ¶¶104-05 (emphasis in original). The *Saldajeno* complaint asserts that "one of Japan's major purposes * * * in occupying [the Philippines] was to exploit the * * * large deposits of copper, coal, manganese and iron – all resources that Japan badly needed for its wartime efforts." *Saldajeno* compl, ¶37.

The Filipino plaintiffs ignore these allegations and, instead, hang their argument on the *Santo Domingo* complaint only. That particular action was initiated after the court issued Order No 4. Consequently, the plaintiffs

in that matter have artfully attempted to plead around the Article 14(b) bar. The complaint alleges that "one of Defendants' * * * goals from 1941-1945 was to exploit the natural resources in the area, especially mining resources, for their self-interest, profit, and financial gain, and not for the prosecution of the war." *Santo Domingo* compl, ¶27. Assuming that defendants' intent was not to prosecute the war by operating their businesses with the help of forced labor, however, does not establish that Japan's intent in "transacting business" with such defendants was not to help ***Japan*** prosecute the war. *See id*, ¶39. As defendants correctly point out, the treaty unambiguously waives all Allied claims "arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals ***in the course of*** the prosecution of the war" regardless whether defendants sought to prosecute the war or simply sought financial gain. *See* Treaty at 3183 (emphasis added). Indeed, the fact that the *Santo Domingo* plaintiffs assert a claim under California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 354.6 demonstrates that they seek compensation for injuries arising in the course of Japan's prosecution of the war. As stated above, it would be a stretch to attempt to distinguish between the conduct of Japan during the war and the companies that supported its war machine. Overall, therefore, the allegations of the Filipino complaints demonstrate that their actions are within the scope of the treaty's waiver.

The Filipino plaintiffs also put forth several arguments that, at bottom, contend waiver of their claims renders the treaty unconstitutional under Filipino constitutional law and invalid under the fundamental norms of international law. *See* Pl Opp Br (Doc #247) at 9-14. The court previously rejected similar arguments by the Allied plaintiffs. As stated in Order No 4, these arguments are

"contrary to the well-settled principle that the government may lawfully exercise its 'sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries.'" *In re World War II*, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 948 (quoting *Dames & Moore v. Regan*, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981); citing *Neri v. United States*, 204 F.2d 867, 868-69 (2d Cir 1953) (enforcing treaty waiver of reparations claims)). Whether waiver of the Filipino plaintiffs' claims violates the constitutional law of the Philippines (as opposed to American constitutional law) is beside the point. Treaties made under the authority of the United States, such as the Treaty of Peace with Japan, are "the supreme Law of the Land." US Const, Art VI. For challenges to such treaties brought in American courts, therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether the treaty complies with American law, not the law of another nation. As the Supreme Court concluded long ago:

> The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States. It is their duty to interpret it and administer it according to its terms. And it would be impossible for the executive department of the government to conduct our foreign relations with any advantage to the country, and fulfil the duties which the Constitution has imposed upon it, if every court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether the person who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the power, by its constitution and laws, to make the engagements into which he entered.

Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657, 14 L. Ed. 1090 (1853). Hence, the laws of the Philippines are not relevant for the

court's analysis of a treaty made under the authority of the United States. *See id.*

The Filipino plaintiffs also argue that the waiver provision does not apply to them because the reparations agreement between Japan and the Philippines only releases Japan from claims to the extent of its payment of reparations. Pl Opp Br (Doc #247) at 18-19. Applying the terms of the reparations agreement to trump the waiver provision of the treaty strains logic and simply contradicts the unambiguous language of the reparations agreement. Specifically, the agreement releases Japan "from its reparations obligation" to the extent of Japan's payments under the agreement. *See* Reparations Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines, Article 6 (Def Req for Judicial Notice (Doc #200), Exh C at 4). Hence, the passage cited by the Filipino plaintiffs in Article 6 merely releases Japan from its reparations obligations as they are paid. *Id* ("By and upon making a payment * * * Japan * * * shall be released from its reparations obligation to the extent of * * * such * * * payment."). The waiver provision in the treaty thus still applies.

Finally, the Filipino plaintiffs assert that the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 USC §§1350, provides the court with jurisdiction to hear the claims of the Filipino plaintiffs. See Pl Opp Br (Doc #247) at 19-20. To be sure, the act provides district courts with "original jurisdiction" over claims by aliens for torts "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 USC §§1350. But the court has already determined that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists for claims, such as these, that are based on the federal common law of foreign policy and relations. *In re World War II*, 114

F. Supp. 2d at 943-44. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the act also creates a cause of action for "violations of specific, universal and obligatory" norms under international law does not alter matters. *See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation*, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir 1994) (citation omitted). The treaty precludes the claims of the Filipino plaintiffs regardless of the authority under which these claims are brought. Accordingly, the ATCA may enable this court to hear the Filipino plaintiffs' claims, but it does not eliminate the preclusive effect of the treaty.

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings are GRANTED with respect to the actions involving Filipino plaintiffs. The clerk shall enter judgment in the above-captioned cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:
September 17, 2001.

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

IN RE: WORLD WAR II ERA JAPANESE FORCED LABOR LITIGATION,

This Document Relates To:
Alfano v. Mitsubishi Corp, CD Cal. No. 00-3174;
Corre v. Mitsui & Co., CD Cal. No. 00-999;
Eneriz v. Mitsui & Co., CD Cal. No. 00-1455;
Heimbuch, et. al. v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., ND Cal. No. 00-0064;
Hutchison v. Mitsubishi Materials Corp., CD Cal. No. 00-2796;
King v. Nippon Steel Corp., ND Cal. No. 99-5042;
Levenberg v. Nippon Sharyo, Ltd., ND Cal. No. 99-1554;
Levenberg v. Nippon Sharyo, Ltd., ND Cal. No. 99-4737;
Poole v. Nippon Steel Corp., CD Cal. No. 00-0189;
Price v. Mitsubishi Corp., CD Cal. No. 00-5484;
Solis v. Nippon Steel Corp., CD Cal. No. 00-0188;
Titherington v. Japan Energy Corp., CD Cal. No. 00-4383;
Wheeler v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., CD Cal. No. 00-2057

Master File No. MDL-1347

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

The Honorable Vaughn R. Walker

114 F. Supp. 2d 939; 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13984

September 21, 2000

ORDER NO. 4

On December 23, 1941, after mounting a brave resistance against an overwhelming foe, the small American garrison on Wake Island in the South Pacific surrendered to Imperial Japanese forces. James King, a former United States Marine, was among the troops and civilians taken prisoner by the invaders. He was ultimately shipped to Kyushu, Japan, where he spent the remainder of the war

toiling by day as a slave laborer in a steel factory and enduring maltreatment in a prison camp by night. When captured, King was 20 years old, 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed 167 pounds. At the conclusion of the war, he weighed 98 pounds.

James King is one of the plaintiffs in these actions against Japanese corporations for forced labor in World War II; his experience, and the undisputed injustice he suffered, are representative. King and the other plaintiffs seek judicial redress for this injustice.

I.

These actions are before the court for consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to June 5, 2000, and June 15, 2000, orders of transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. On August 17, 2000, the court heard oral argument on plaintiffs' motions for remand to state court and defendants' motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings.

This order addresses, first, all pending motions for remand. For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that notwithstanding plaintiffs' attempts to plead only state law claims, removal jurisdiction exists because these actions raise substantial questions of federal law by implicating the federal common law of foreign relations.

Second, the court addresses the preclusive effect of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan on a subset of the actions before the court, namely, those brought by plaintiffs who were United States or allied soldiers in World War II captured by Japanese forces and held as prisoners of war.

The court concludes that the 1951 treaty constitutes a waiver of such claims.

This order does not address the pending motions to dismiss in cases brought by plaintiffs who were not members of the armed forces of the United States or its allies. Since these plaintiffs are not citizens of countries that are signatories of the 1951 treaty, their claims raise a host of issues not presented by the Allied POW cases and, therefore, require further consideration in further proceedings.

II.

Defendants may remove to federal court "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 28 USC §§1441(a). "The propriety of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in federal court." *Chicago v. International College of Surgeons*, 522 U.S. 156, 163, 139 L. Ed. 2d 525, 118 S. Ct. 523 (1997).

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases "arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 USC §§1331. For purposes of removal, federal question jurisdiction exists "only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." *Caterpillar Inc v Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987). Since a defense is not part of a plaintiff's properly pleaded statement of his claim, a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense. *Rivet v Regions Bank of La*, 522 U.S. 470, 475, 139 L. Ed. 2d 912, 118 S. Ct. 921 (1998).

Defendants' assertion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan as a defense to plaintiffs' state law causes of action does not, therefore, confer federal jurisdiction. Recognizing this, defendants rely on a line of cases committing to federal common law questions implicating the foreign relations of the United States.

In *Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino*, 376 U.S. 398, 425, 11 L. Ed. 2d 804, 84 S. Ct. 923 (1964), a case in which federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the Supreme Court held that development and application of the act of state doctrine was a matter of federal common law, notwithstanding the general rule of *Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938), that federal courts apply state substantive law in diversity cases. The court reasoned that because the doctrine concerned matters of comity between nations, "the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature." 376 U.S. at 424. Although the applicable state law mirrored federal decisions, the Court was "constrained to make it clear that an issue [involving] our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law." *Id.* at 425.

Under *Banco Nacional*, federal common law governs matters concerning the foreign relations of the United States. *See Texas Indus, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.*, 451 U.S. 630, 641, 68 L. Ed. 2d 500, 101 S. Ct. 2061 (1981). "In these instances, our federal system does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law, either because the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or because the * * * international nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate for state law to control." *Id.*

If an examination of the complaint shows that the plaintiff's claims necessarily require determinations that will directly and significantly affect United States foreign relations, a plaintiff's state law claims should be removed. *Republic of Philippines v. Marcos*, 806 F.2d 344, 352 (2d Cir 1986). This doctrine has been extended to disputes between private parties that implicate the "vital economic and sovereign interests" of the nation where the parties' dispute arose. *Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.*, 113 F.3d 540, 543 n8 (5th Cir 1997).

The court concludes that the complaints in the instant cases, on their face, implicate the federal common law of foreign relations and, as such, give rise to federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' claims arise out of world war and are enmeshed with the momentous policy choices that arose in the war's aftermath. The cases implicate the uniquely federal interests of the United States to make peace and enter treaties with foreign nations. As the United States has argued as amicus curiae, these cases carry potential to unsettle half a century of diplomacy.

After a thorough analysis, Judge Baird in the Central District of California denied remand in one of the cases now before the undersigned pursuant to the multidistrict litigation transfer order. *Poole v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, No 00-0189 (CD Cal March 17, 2000). The court agrees with the analysis and the conclusion in that case.[1] n1 Judge

[1] In another related case in which remand was granted, *Jeong Onoda Cement Co, Ltd*, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7985 (CD Cal May 18, 2000) the court did not consider the federal common law of foreign relation as a basis for federal jurisdiction.

Baird held: "This case, on its face, presents substantial issues of federal common law dealing with foreign policy and relations. * * * As such, plaintiffs may not evade this Court's jurisdiction by cloaking their complaints in terms of state law." The motions for remand are DENIED.

III.

In addressing the motions to dismiss, the court refers again to a complaint that is representative of the actions by United States and Allied POWs, *King v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, No 99-5042.

As noted at the outset of this order, plaintiff King seeks redress for wrongs inflicted by his captors half a century ago. In count one of the complaint, he asserts a claim under California Code of Civil Procedure §§354.6, a new law that permits an action by a "prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers" to "recover compensation for labor performed as a Second World War slave labor victim * * * from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed * * *." Cal Code Civ Pro §§354.6. Count two is an unjust enrichment claim in which plaintiff seeks disgorgement and restitution of economic benefits derived from his labor. In count three, plaintiff seeks damages in tort for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and unlawful imprisonment. Count four alleges that defendant's failure to reveal its prior exploitation of prisoner labor to present-day customers in California and elsewhere constitutes an unfair business practice under California Business and Professions Code §§17204.

Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing:

(1) plaintiff's claims are barred by the Treaty of Peace with Japan; (2) plaintiff's claims raise nonjusticiable political questions; (3) the peace treaty, the War Claims Act of 1948 and the federal government's plenary authority over foreign affairs combine to preempt plaintiff's claims and (4) because the complaint alleges injuries caused by the Japanese government, plaintiff's claims are barred by the act of state doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

These arguments, and King's countervailing positions, arise in all of the cases before the court brought on behalf of Allied POWs against Japanese corporations. The court need not address all of them. For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

A.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the proper means to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint after an answer has been filed. Depending on the procedural posture of the individual case, some defendants have filed motions pursuant to FRCP 12(c) and others have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b). The distinction in the present context is not important. In the Ninth Circuit, the standard by which the district court must determine Rule 12(c) motions is the same as the standard for the more familiar motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): "A district court will render a judgment on the pleadings when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings [and by evidence of which the court takes judicial notice] that no material issue of fact

remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." *Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co v. Walbrook Ins. Co.*, 132 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir 1997) (citations omitted).

B.

The Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, by the representatives of the United States and 47 other Allied powers and Japan. Treaty of Peace with Japan, [1952] 3 UST 3169, TIAS No 2490 (1951). President Truman, with the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the treaty and it became effective April 28, 1952. *Id.*

Article 14 provides the terms of Japanese payment "for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war." *Id.* at Art 14(a). For present purposes, the salient features of the agreement are: (1) a grant of authority of Allied powers to seize Japanese property within their jurisdiction at the time of the treaty's effective date; (2) an obligation of Japan to assist in the rebuilding of territory occupied by Japanese forces during the war and (3) waiver of all "other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war * * *." *Id.* at Art 14(a)-(b) (emphasis added).

It is the waiver provision that defendants argue bars plaintiffs' present claims. In its entirety, the provision reads:

> b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of

> any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims if the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Id. at Art 14(b).

On its face, the treaty waives "all" reparations and "other claims" of the "nationals" of Allied powers "arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals during the course of the prosecution of the war." The language of this waiver is strikingly broad, and contains no conditional language or limitations, save for the opening clause referring to the provisions of the treaty. The interests of Allied prisoners of war are addressed in Article 16, which provides for transfer of Japanese assets in neutral or enemy jurisdictions to the International Committee of the Red Cross for distribution to former prisoners and their families. *Id.* at Art 16. The treaty specifically exempts from reparations, furthermore, those Japanese assets resulting from "the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to September 2, 1945." *Id.* at Art. 14(a)(2)(II)(iv).

To avoid the preclusive effect of the treaty, plaintiffs advance an interpretation of Article 14(b) that is strained and, ultimately, unconvincing. Although the argument has several shades, it comes down to this: the signatories of the treaty did not understand the Allied waiver to apply to prisoner of war claims because the provision did not expressly identify such claims, in contrast to the corresponding Japanese waiver provision of Article 19. Article 19(b) states that the Japanese waiver includes "any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war

and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers * * *."

That the treaty is more specific in Article 19 does not change the plain meaning of the language of Article 14. If the language of Article 14 were ambiguous, plaintiffs' expressio unius argument would have more force. But plaintiffs cannot identify any ambiguity in the language of Article 14. To do so would be to inject hidden meaning into straightforward text.

The treaty by its terms adopts a comprehensive and exclusive settlement plan for war-related economic injuries which, in its wholesale waiver of prospective claims, is not unique. *See*, for example, *Neri v. United States*, 204 F.2d 867 (2d Cir 1953) (claim barred by broad waiver provision in Treaty of Peace with Italy). The waiver provision of Article 14(b) is plainly broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs' claims in the present litigation.

C.

The court does not find the treaty language ambiguous, and therefore its analysis need go no further. *Chan v. Korean Airlines*, 490 U.S. 122, 134, 104 L. Ed. 2d 113, 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989) (if text of treaty is clear, courts "have no power to insert an amendment."). To the extent that Articles 19(b) raises any uncertainty, however, the court "may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties." *Air France v. Saks*, 470 U.S. 392, 396, 84 L. Ed. 2d 289, 105 S. Ct. 1338 (1985). These authorities are voluminous and therefore of doubtful utility due to the potential for misleading selective citation. Counsel for both sides have proved themselves skilled

in scouring these documents for support of their positions, and that both sides have succeeded to a certain degree underscores the questionable value of such resort to drafting history. Nevertheless, the court has conducted its own review of the historical materials, and concludes that they reinforce the conclusion that the Treaty of Peace with Japan was intended to bar claims such as those advanced by plaintiffs in this litigation.

The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the agreement was to settle the reparations issue once and for all. As the statement of the chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well understood that leaving open the possibility of future claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace:

> Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception.
>
> On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering. * * *
>
> On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. * * *
>
> Under these circumstances, if the treaty validated, or kept contingently alive, monetary reparations claims against Japan, her ordinary commercial credit would vanish, the incentive of her people would be destroyed and they would sink into a misery of body and spirit that would make them easy prey to exploitation. * * *

> There would be bitter competition [among the Allies] for the largest possible percentage of an illusory pot of gold.

See US Dept of State, Record of Proceedings of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan 82-83 (1951) (Def Req for Judicial Notice, Exh I).

The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for reparations should be sharply limited was informed by the experience of six years of United States-led occupation of Japan. During the occupation the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the region, General Douglas MacArthur, confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with the task of managing the economic affairs of the vanquished nation and with a view to reparations payments. *See* SCAP, Reparations: Development of Policy and Directives (1947). It soon became clear that Japan's financial condition would render any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At the end of 1948, MacArthur expressed the view that "the use of reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a viable economy in Japan should be combated with all possible means" and "recommended that the reparations issue be settled finally and without delay." Memorandum from General Headquarters of SCAP to Department of the Army (Dec. 14, 1948) at P 8 (Def Req for Judicial Notice, Exh E).

That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only from the negotiations history but also from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending approval of the treaty by the Senate. The committee noted, for example:

> Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy of * * * the United States * * *.

Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, S Rep No 82-2, 82d Cong, 2d Sess 12 (1952) (Def Req for Judicial Notice, Exh F). The committee recognized that the treaty provisions "do not give a direct right of return to individual claimants except in the case of those having property in Japan," *id.* at 13, and endorsed the position of the State Department that "United States nationals, whose claims are not covered by the treaty provisions * * * must look for relief to the Congress of the United States," *id.* at 14.

Indeed, the treaty went into effect against the backdrop of congressional response to the need for compensation for former prisoners of war, in which many, if not all, of the plaintiffs in the present cases participated. *See* War Claims Act of 1948, 50 USC §§ 2001-2017p (establishing War Claims Commission and assigning top priority to claims of former prisoners of war).

Were the text of the treaty to leave any doubt that it waived claims such as those advanced by plaintiffs in these cases, the history of the Allied experience in postwar Japan, the drafting history of the treaty and the ratification debate would resolve it in favor of a finding of waiver.

D.

As one might expect, considering the acknowledged inadequacy of compensation for victims of the Japanese regime provided under the treaty, the issue of additional reparations has arisen repeatedly since the adoption of that agreement some 50 years ago. This is all the more understandable in light of the vigor with which the Japanese economy has rebounded from the abyss.

The court finds it significant, as further support for the conclusion that the treaty bars plaintiffs' claims, that the United States, through State Department officials, has stood firmly by the principle of finality embodied in the treaty. This position was expressed in recent congressional testimony by Ronald J Bettauer, deputy legal advisor, as follows:

> The 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan settles all war-related claims of the U.S. and its nationals, and precludes the possibility of taking legal action in United States domestic courts to obtain additional compensation for war victims from Japan or its nationals – including Japanese commercial enterprises.

POW Survivors of the Bataan Death March, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 28, 2000) (statement of Ronald J Bettauer, United States Department of State) (Def Req for Judicial Notice, Exh P).

In another recent example, in response to a letter from Senator Orrin Hatch expressing "disappointment" with the "fifty-five year old injustice imposed on our military forces held as prisoners of war in Japan" and urging the Secretary of State to take action, a State Department representative wrote:

> The Treaty of Peace with Japan has, over the past five decades, served to sustain U.S. security interests in Asia and to support peace and stability in the region. We strongly believe that the U.S. must honor its international agreements, including the [treaty]. There is, in our view, no justification for the U.S. to attempt to reopen the question of international commitments and obligations under the 1951 Treaty in order now to seek a more favorable settlement of the issue of Japanese compensation.
>
> This explanation obviously offers no consolation to the victims of Japanese wartime aggression. Regrettably, however, it was impossible when the Treaty was negotiated – and it remains impossible today, 50 years later – to compensate fully for the suffering visited upon the victims of the war * * * .

Letter of Jan 18, 2000, from US Dept of State to The Hon Orrin Hatch at 2.

The conclusion that the 1951 treaty constitutes a waiver of the instant claims, as stated above and argued in the brief of the United States as amicus curiae in this case, carries significant weight. *See Kolovrat v. Oregon*, 366 U.S. 187, 194, 6 L. Ed. 2d 218, 81 S. Ct. 922 (1961) ("While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight."); *Sullivan v. Kidd*, 254 U.S. 433, 442, 41 S. Ct. 158, 65 L. Ed. 344 (1921) ("The construction placed upon the treaty before us and consistently adhered to by the Executive Department of the Government, charged with the supervision of our foreign relations, should be given much weight."). The government's

position also comports entirely with the court's own analysis of the treaty and its history.

Plaintiffs raise several additional arguments that bear only brief mention. First is the characterization of these claims as not arising out of the "prosecution of the war," as that phrase is used in the treaty. Plaintiffs attempt to cast their claims as involving controversies between private parties.

It is particularly far-fetched to attempt to distinguish between the conduct of Imperial Japan during the Second World War and the major industry that was the engine of its war machine. The lack of any sustainable distinction is apparent from the complaints in these cases. For example, the *King* complaint alleges that a class of war prisoners were forced to work "in support of the Japanese war effort," Compl. ¶56, and pursuant to a directive from the Japanese government that the " 'labor and technical skill' " of prisoners of war " 'be fully utilized for the replenishment of production, and contribution rendered toward the prosecution of the Greater East Asiatic War,' " *id.* at ¶30. Furthermore, the complaint asserts that plaintiff worked in a factory "where motor armatures were manufactured for the war effort." *Id.* at ¶35. These allegations quite clearly bring this action within the scope of the treaty's waiver of all claims "arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war." Treaty at Art 14(b).

Plaintiffs also argue that waiver of plaintiffs' claims renders the treaty unconstitutional and invalid under international law. This position is contrary to the well-settled principle that the government may lawfully exercise its "sovereign authority to settle the claims of its

nationals against foreign countries." *Dames & Moore v. Regan*, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981); *see also Neri*, 204 F.2d at 868-69 (enforcing treaty waiver of reparations claims).

Finally, plaintiffs assert that subsequent settlements between Japan and other treaty signatories on more favorable terms than those set forth in the treaty should "revive" plaintiff's claims under Article 26, which provides in relevant part:

> Should Japan make a * * * war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Treaty at Art 26. Without deciding whether the evidence plaintiff cites of other agreements implicates Article 26, the court finds that that provision confers rights ***only*** upon the "parties to the present treaty," *i.e.*, the government signatories. The question of enforcing Article 26 is thus for the United States, not the plaintiffs, to decide.

IV.

The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world services the debt.

The motions to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings are GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants in the above-captioned cases.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

TAIHEIYO CEMENT CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT, Respondent; JAE WON JEONG, Real Party in Interest.

S113759

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

66 P.3d 1231; 2003 Cal. LEXIS 2794; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3746

(As corrected nunc pro tunc May 1, 2003)

April 30, 2003

NOTICE:

En Banc
Requests for judicial notice granted.
Applications for stay and petition for review GRANTED.

George Chief Justice
Kennard Associate Justice
Baxter Associate Justice
Werdegar Associate Justice
Chin Associate Justice
Brown Associate Justice
Moreno Associate Justice

TAIHEIYO CEMENT CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. JAE WON JEONG, Real Party in Interest.

B155736

COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION EIGHT

105 Cal. App. 4th 398; 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451; 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 57; 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Service 515; 2003 Daily Journal DAR 589

January 15, 2003

COUNSEL:

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O'Melveny & Myers and John F. Niblock; McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen and David M. Balabanian; Morrison & Foerster, Lloyd Aubry and Arne D. Wagner; Pillsbury Winthrop and Barbara Croutch; Bingham Dana and Matthew Digby; Bingham McCutchen and Matthew Digby; Sullivan & Cromwell and Robert A. Sacks for Mitsubishi Materials Corp., Mitsubishi Materials U.S.A. Corp., Mitsui & Co., Ltd., Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc., Mitsubishi International Corp., Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd., IHI, Inc., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America,

Inc., Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd., Mitsui Mining U.S.A., Inc., Nippon Steel Corporation, Nippon Steel U.S.A., Inc., Nippon Steel Trading Co., Ltd., and Nippon Steel Trading America, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

John S. Gordon, United States Attorney; Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; James G. Hergen and Lara A. Ballard, United States Department of State; Mark Stern, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier and Kathleen Kane, United States Department of Justice, for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Fleishman & Fisher, Barry A. Fisher, David Grosz; Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Morris A. Ratner, Bill Lann Lee, Scott P. Nealy; Blumenthal & Markham and David R. Markham; Law Offices of Haewon Shin and Haewon Shin; Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Michael D. Hausfeld, Agnieszka M. Fryszman; Kenneth T. Haan & Associates and Kenneth T. Haan; Lim, Ruger & Kim, Christopher Kim and Lisa J. Yang for Real Party in Interest Jae Won Jeong.

Strumwasser & Woocher and Fredric D. Woocher; Jack Goldsmith and Erwin Chemerinsky for the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, the Korean-American Federation of Los Angeles, the Korean American Coalition, and the Korean American Chamber of Commerce of Los Angeles as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Schonbrun, DeSimone, Seplow, Harris & Hoffman and Paul L. Hoffman for the Honorable John L. Burton, Herbert J. Wesson, Jr., Tom Hayden, Adam B. Schiff, Gil Cedillo, Wilma Chan, Dr. Judy Chu, Mike Honda, Carol Liu, and George Nakano, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General for the State of California, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Louis Verdugo, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Z. Ysrael, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Phyllis Cheng, Deputy Attorney General, for Attorney General Bill Lockyer as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

OPINION:

BOLAND, J. – –

INTRODUCTION

Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6[1] allows certain individuals who were "slave labor" or "forced labor" victims during World War II (WWII) to recover compensation for unpaid labor and personal injuries suffered during that time period. In this case, we decide whether an international treaty preempts section 354.6 and whether the statute is unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringes upon the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs. We also decide whether section 354.6 is unconstitutional because it violates due process by allowing claims that arose long ago outside California. We hold the statute is neither preempted nor unconstitutional. Rather, it validly extends the applicable statute of limitations that would otherwise bar claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries suffered by slave or forced labor victims.

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jae Won Jeong sued to recover compensation for unpaid labor and personal injuries suffered while enslaved in a labor camp during WWII. Jeong, who is now a United States citizen and California resident, claims he was a Korean national during WWII. Refusing to join the Japanese military, Jeong was taken to a slave labor camp in Korea operated by a Japanese cement company. Along with other Korean nationals, Jeong was subjected to physical and mental torture and forced to perform hard physical labor without compensation, all to benefit the Japanese war effort.[2]

Onoda Cement Co., Ltd. is the Japanese entity that operated the company where Jeong was forced to work. Jeong sued Onoda, Taiheiyo Cement Corporation (the Japanese entity that succeeded Onoda by merger), and three of Taiheiyo's subsidiaries, all of which are referred to as "Taiheiyo."[3] Jeong alleged causes of action for (1) compensation under section 354.6, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) injuries in tort, including battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful imprisonment, and (4) unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.

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[2] Jeong alleges he represents a class of plaintiffs in the United States who were forced to perform labor for the defendants between 1929 and 1945. A class has yet to be certified.

[3] The Taiheiyo subsidiaries are (1) Taiheiyo Cement U.S.A., (2) California Portland Cement Company, and (3) Lone Star Northwest, Inc. Each subsidiary is alleged as a California corporation. Lone Star is now known as Glacier Northwest, Inc., a Washington corporation.

Taiheiyo moved for judgment on the pleadings contending, among other grounds, that Jeong's claims were barred by the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951 Treaty) and the 1965 Agreement between Japan and Korea. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) the 1951 Treaty did not apply to Korean nationals like Jeong because Korea was not a signatory to the treaty, (2) the 1965 Agreement between Japan and Korea did not preempt state law or bar Jeong's claims, and (3) no other federal law expressly or impliedly preempted section 354.6.

After the trial court denied Taiheiyo's motion, a federal district court decided a similar case brought under section 354.6 and concluded the statute was unconstitutional under the foreign affairs doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court in *Zschernig v. Miller (1968) 389 U.S. 429, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683, 88 S. Ct. 664* (*Zschernig*). The district court ruled section 354.6 interfered with the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs and was unconstitutional. (See *In re: World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor (N.D. Cal. 2001) 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173* (*Forced Labor Litigation*).) As a result of the district court's decision, Taiheiyo filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting the same constitutional argument. In addition, Taiheiyo argued section 354.6 violated due process by reaching claims that arose in a foreign country over 50 years ago.

The trial court again denied Taiheiyo's motion. It disagreed with the federal court's application of *Zschernig* and concluded section 354.6 had no direct impact on foreign relations. The trial court also ruled section 354.6 did not violate due process, but rather legitimately extended statute of limitations that would otherwise bar

claims by slave or forced labor victims. This petition followed.

BASIS FOR WRIT REVIEW

In most cases, a review of rulings on pleadings is restricted to an appeal from a final judgment unless circumstances are "of such grave nature or of such significant legal impact that [the court is] compelled to intervene through the issuance of an extraordinary writ." (*Babb v. Superior Court* (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 851, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 479 P.2d 379.)

We agreed to review this case at the pleading stage because the constitutionality of section 354.6 represents a legal issue of widespread interest and significant legal importance. (See *Brandt v. Superior Court* (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 816, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211, 693 P.2d 796; *Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court* (1989) 209 Cal. App. 3d 1266, 1269-1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 66.) In addition, because numerous cases asserting claims under section 354.6 are currently pending in the superior court and no California appellate court has yet ruled on the validity of this statute, we concluded writ review was warranted and authorized numerous amici curiae to present briefs in support of and in opposition to the petition.

Because this case involves pure questions of law, we are not bound by the trial court's decision. We therefore review it de novo, mindful that Jeong's factual allegations are assumed true. (*People v. Kennedy* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 288, 292, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203; *Baughman v. State of California* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182, 187, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82.)

DISCUSSION

A. *Section 354.6 and Taiheiyo's Contentions*

The California Legislature enacted section 354.6 in 1999 as an emergency measure to extend the statute of limitations for a defined class of claims relating to forced or slave labor performed prior to and during WWII. (S.B. 1245.) The statute allows any WWII "slave labor victim" or "forced labor victim," or their heirs, to "bring an action to recover compensation for labor performed as a . . . slave labor victim or . . . forced labor victim from any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed. . . . " (§ 354.6, subd. (b).) The statute provides that California courts have jurisdiction over such actions. (*Ibid.*)[4] Section 354.6 was enacted because "California has

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[4] A WWII "slave labor victim" is defined as "any person taken from a concentration camp or ghetto or diverted from transportation to a concentration camp or from a ghetto to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers." (§ 354.6, subd. (a)(1).)

A WWII "forced labor victim" is defined as "any person who was a member of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, or prisoner-of-war of the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, forced to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers." (§ 354.6, subd. (a)(2).)

"Compensation" means "the present value of wages and benefits that individuals should have been paid and damages for injuries sustained in connection with the labor performed. . . . " (§ 354.6, subd. (a)(3).)

Other portions of the statute allow slave or forced labor victims to sue the entity or successor in interest for whom labor was performed

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a moral and public policy interest in assuring that its residents and citizens are given a reasonable opportunity to claim their entitlement to compensation for forced or slave labor performed prior to and during the Second World War." (S.B. 1245, §1(c).)

Section 354.6, subdivision (c), provides that "any action brought under this section shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations, if the action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010." In declaring its specific intent, the Legislature added, "To the extent that the statute of limitations applicable to claims for compensation is extended by this act, that extension of the limitations period is intended to be applied retroactively, irrespective of whether the claims were otherwise barred by any applicable statute of limitations under any other provision of law prior to the enactment of this act." (S.B. 1245, § 1(d).)

Taiheiyo and amici curiae in support of the petition make four basic contentions concerning the invalidity of section 354.6. First, the 1951 Treaty either expressly or impliedly preempts section 354.6 because it demonstrates the policy of the federal government concerning WWII claims of Korean nationals like Jeong. Second, section 354.6 is unconstitutional under *Zschernig* because it

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"either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate" and authorize interest on "the value of services at the time they were performed, compounded annually to date of full payment without diminution for wartime or postwar currency devaluation." (§ 354.6, subds. (a)(3) & (b).) The parties make only passing reference to these provisions in their written submissions to this court. Consequently, we do not address them.

usurps the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs. Third, section 354.6 violates due process by allowing claims that arose a half-century ago outside California. And fourth, Jeong's claims present nonjusticiable political questions. As we will explain, we reject these arguments.

B. *Preemption and the 1951 Treaty*

1. *Express Preemption*

Express preemption, as the term suggests, requires an affirmative declaration by Congress that federal law prohibits state regulation. (*Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts* (1985) 471 U.S. 724, 738, 85 L. Ed. 2d 728, 105 S. Ct. 2380; *Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.* (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516-518, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407, 112 S. Ct. 2608; see also *Tafflin v. Levitt* (1990) 493 U.S. 455, 466, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887, 110 S. Ct. 792 [it is presumed Congress ordinarily does not intend to displace existing state authority].)

The U.S. Constitution mandates that treaties made "under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land," thus overriding any conflicting state law. (U.S. Const., art. VI; see *Missouri v. Holland* (1920) 252 U.S. 416, 432, 64 L. Ed. 641, 40 S. Ct. 382, 11 A.L.R. 984, 18 Ohio L. Rep. 61; *United States v. Belmont* (1937) 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. Ed. 1134, 57 S. Ct. 758; *Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.* (1996) 516 U.S. 217, 226, 133 L. Ed. 2d 596, 116 S. Ct. 629.) In determining whether a treaty overrides state law, "it is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties." (*Air*

France v. Saks (1985) 470 U.S. 392, 399, 84 L. Ed. 2d 289, 105 S. Ct. 1338.)

The 1951 Treaty "was signed at San Francisco . . . by the representatives of the United States and 47 other Allied powers and Japan. [Citation]. President Truman, with the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the treaty and it became effective April 28, 1952. [Citation.] . . . [P] [HN10] The salient features of the agreement are: (1) a grant of authority of Allied powers to seize Japanese property within their jurisdiction at the time of the treaty's effective date; (2) an obligation of Japan to assist in the rebuilding of territory occupied by Japanese forces during the war[,] and (3) waiver of all 'other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war. . . . ' [Citation.]" (*In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor* (N.D.Cal. 2000) 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 944-945.) Neither Korea nor China were signatories to the 1951 Treaty. (*Forced Labor Litigation*, *supra*, 164 F. Supp. 2d at pp. 1167-1168.)

Taiheiyo and the United States as amicus curiae argue the waiver provision of Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty expressly preempts Korean nationals like Jeong from asserting claims under section 354.6. The provision reads: "(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation." (Treaty of Peace With Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3183, T.I.A.S. No. 2490.)

Nothing in this or any other provision of the 1951 Treaty expressly preempts or bars claims by Korean nationals against Japanese corporations for unpaid labor or personal injuries suffered for slave or forced labor during WWII. To the contrary, the treaty recognized the waiver provision of Article 14 was to have no effect on the claims of non-signatory nations.

The 1951 Treaty did not address claims between Korean and Japanese nationals because the Allied Powers had no authority to bind Korea, which was not a signatory nation to the Treaty. The 1951 Treaty, however, provides that claims between Korean and Japanese nationals were to be the subject of separate arrangements between the two countries. Specifically, Article 4(a), which addressed Japan's post-war relationship with Korea, provides that "the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals . . . and their claims, including debts, against [Korea] . . . , and the disposition in Japan of property of [Korean] authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of [Korean] authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities." (1951 Treaty, *supra*, 3 U.S.T. at p. 3173.)

Korea benefited from Article 4(a)'s requirement that Japan enter into future negotiations concerning the resolution of war claims.[5] However, neither Japan nor

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[5] In June 1965, Japan and the Republic of Korea entered into an agreement concerning war claims. (See Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, June 22, 2965, 8473 U.N.T.S. 258.) Taiheiyo does not contend in its petition that the

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Korea was required to implement any specific resolution. Indeed, Korea was under no obligation to even negotiate with Japan concerning the settlement of war claims. Further, another treaty provision required Japan, as part of any future arrangements with non-signatory nations, to provide them "the same or substantially the same terms" as to the signatory nations. However, even that obligation, binding only on Japan, expired after three years.[6]

In sum, the 1951 Treaty did not bar future claims by individuals of non-signatory nations and does not expressly preempt section 354.6. We therefore agree with the conclusions of *Forced Labor Litigation* that Article 4(a) "suggests that the treaty contemplates resolution of war claims with Korea . . . through agreements separate and distinct from the [1951 Treaty] and separate agreements necessarily create the possibility that the terms for resolving those claims may differ from the terms of the treaty entered into by the Allied nations. The fact that the signatory nations encouraged such agreements does not show an intent to occupy the field of non-signatory nations' claims through the treaty. . . . Whether the agreements subsequently entered by Japan with Korea . . . eliminated

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1965 Treaty expressly preempts Jeong's claims under section 354.6. Rather, Taiheiyo and the United States contend the treaty, as incorporated by reference into the 1951 Treaty, demonstrated the U.S. Congress' overall purpose and intent to preempt the field of war-related claims. We address this implied preemption argument below.

[6] Article 26 provides, in relevant part: "Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State . . . which is not a signatory to the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty." (1951 Treaty, *supra*, 3 U.S.T. at p. 3190.)

the claims of [this] non-signatory nation[ ] does not bear on whether the [1951 Treaty] preempts claims of . . . Korean nationals. The court reads the language of article[ ] 4(a) . . . to suggest only that the signatory nations, including the federal government of the United States, did not intend the [1951 Treaty] to control claims of individuals from non-signatory nations." (*Forced Labor* Litigation, *supra*, 164 F. Supp. 2d at pp. 1167-1168.).[7]

2. *Implied Preemption*

Taiheiyo and the United States further argue that even if the 1951 Treaty does not expressly preempt section 354.6, it is implicitly preempted because the treaty establishes federal policy with respect to the war-related claims of Korean nationals. This contention likewise is without merit.

Federal law "implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively [citation]

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[7] Not only do Articles 4(a) and 14(b) demonstrate an intent that the treaty did not bind non-signatory nations such as Korea and China, but the waiver provisions are not as broad as Taiheiyo and amici curiae contend. Article 14(b) waives claims arising out of actions "taken in the course of the prosecution of the war." As one commentator suggests, it is reasonable to interpret this clause to exclude actions taken by private Japanese companies for profit as not being actions taken in the "course of the prosecution of the war." (See Bazyler, *The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective (2002)* 20 Berkeley J. Int'l Law, 21-22 [citing *Kawakita v. United States* (1952) 343 U.S. 717, 727-728, 96 L. Ed. 1249, 72 S. Ct. 950, where the Supreme Court concluded Japanese companies doing business during the war should be viewed as nothing more than private, profit-making ventures].)

or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law." (*Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick* (1995) 514 U.S. 280, 287, 131 L. Ed. 2d 385, 115 S. Ct. 1483.) The Supreme Court has found implied pre-emption "where it is 'impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements' [citation], or where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" (*Ibid.*) "Pre-emption of a whole field . . . will be inferred where the field is one in which 'the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'" (*Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs.* (1985) 471 U.S. 707, 713, 85 L. Ed. 2d 714, 105 S. Ct. 2371; see also *Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.* (1988) 487 U.S. 500, 507, 101 L. Ed. 2d 442, 108 S. Ct. 2510.)

Nothing in Article 14(b) or any other provision of the 1951 Treaty signals the United States' intent to occupy the entire field of claims of non-signatory nationals against Japanese corporations for unpaid labor or personal injuries suffered for slave or forced labor during WWII. The United States' waiver of claims by its nationals in Article 14(b) applies only to persons who were nationals of the United States at the time. (See *Dames & Moore v. Regan* (1981) 453 U.S. 654, 679-680, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918, 101 S. Ct. 2972; *Haven v. Polska* (7th Cir. 2000) 215 F.3d 727, 734.) The United States had no power to waive the claims of nationals from foreign countries and made no provision, either in the 1951 Treaty or in subsequent federal law, to prevent claims from future United States citizens who were nationals of non-signatory nations at the time of the 1951 Treaty.

The fact that the 1951 Treaty called upon Japan to enter into future negotiations with Korea does not evidence an intent to foreclose claims by individuals of nonsignatory nations against Japanese nationals, either in United States courts or elsewhere. Other than encouraging Japan to enter into negotiations with Korea, the Allied Powers, including the United States, had no power or control over the outcome of such negotiations. The Allied Powers must have understood the possibility that the negotiations could fail to produce an agreement between the two countries concerning war claims, and that Korean nationals would be compelled to assert their own individual claims against Japanese nationals.

As a United States citizen, Jeong has a constitutional right of access to the courts of this state in an attempt to redress his individual grievances. (See *Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim* (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 647-648, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620; *California Teachers Assn. v. State of California* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327, 338-339, 975 P.2d 622, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425.) That fundamental right of citizenship may not be foreclosed upon a claim of implied preemption unless the language of the 1951 Treaty indicates a clear intent to exclusively occupy the field of Korean claims arising out of WWII. Such clarity is lacking in this case. The 1951 Treaty did not address claims by Korean nationals against Japanese entities conducting business in the United States for unpaid labor and personal injuries suffered during WWII. Nothing in the 1951 Treaty evidences an intent to occupy the field of claims by Korean nationals against Japanese nationals. In short, the fact that section 354.6 allows pre-existing claims to proceed in California courts by retroactively extending the applicable statute of limitations does not implicate the 1951 Treaty.

As the court in *Forced Labor Litigation* commented, "Although from a perspective of 2001 it may seem anomalous for the United States to negotiate a treaty that bars the claims of its own nationals without a provision that forecloses resort to a judicial forum in the United States by nationals of non-signatory nations, Article 14(b) contains no express limitation against claims of non-signatory nationals. Little should be read into this omission, which most likely can be explained by the inconceivability a half century ago of such claims by non-signatory nationals being pursued in United States courts." (*Forced Labor Litigation, supra*, 164 F. Supp. 2d at p. 1167.) We hold the 1951 Treaty does not implicitly preempt section 354.6.

C. *Section 354.6 and the Zschernig Doctrine*

Taiheiyo and amicus curiae next argue that, even without consideration of the 1951 Treaty, section 354.6 is unconstitutional in its application because it impermissibly intrudes on the exclusive foreign affairs power of the United States as expressed in *Zschernig*. We disagree.

1. *The Zschernig Doctrine*

Zschernig articulated the "dormant foreign relations preemption" doctrine, which holds the federal government has exclusive power in the field of foreign relations even in the absence of any federal law or treaty. (*Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low* (9th Cir. 2001) 240 F.3d 739, 751, fn. 9 (*Gerling Global*); *National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios* (1st Cir. 1999) 181 F.3d 38, 58-59,

fn. 14.) In *Zschernig*, the Supreme Court held, "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress" is unlawful if the state law "has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems." (Zschernig, *supra*, 389 U.S. at pp. 432, 441.) States may enact laws affecting local concerns that touch upon foreign affairs, but only if their actions have "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign nations." (*Id.* 389 U.S. at p. 433.)

At issue in *Zschernig* was an Oregon statute providing that a nonresident alien's probate claim to property of Oregon decedents would escheat to the state unless the alien could show the laws of his or her country allowed inheritance of Oregon estates "without confiscation." (*Zschernig*, *supra*, 389 U.S. at p. 430.) Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas concluded, "It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way. The practice of state courts in withholding remittances to legatees residing in Communist countries or in preventing them from assigning them is notorious. [Footnote omitted.] The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy. [Citation.] Where those laws conflict with a treaty, they must bow to the superior federal policy. [Citation.] Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb foreign relations." (*Id.* 389 U.S. at pp. 440-441.)

Zschernig distinguished *Clark v. Allen* (1947) 331 U.S. 503, 91 L. Ed. 1633, 67 S. Ct. 1431 (*Clark*), which twenty years earlier upheld a similar California probate law. In

Clark, a California statute provided non-resident aliens could not inherit under a will unless United States citizens were entitled to take under the laws of the foreign country on the same terms as its citizens. Again writing for the Court, Justice Douglas responded to the claim that the California statute "is an extension of state power into the field of foreign affairs, which is exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the Federal Government." (*Id.* at p. 516.) Noting local law determined rights of succession of property and the California statute was neither preempted by "different or conflicting arrangements" at the federal level or treaties with another country, Justice Douglas concluded the statute did not impermissibly intrude into the field of foreign affairs. (*Id.* at p. 517.) He observed, "What California has done will have some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line." (*Ibid.*)

The distinction between *Clark* and *Zschernig* hinged on the procedural posture of the case before the *Zschernig* court. The record in *Zschernig* contained evidence that, in the administration of statutes similar to the one in Oregon, the probate courts of various states had launched broad and inappropriate inquiries into the structure of foreign nations. The inquiries included (1) whether aliens under their laws had enforceable rights, (2) whether the "rights" were merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of government officials, (3) whether the representations of consuls, ambassadors and other representatives of foreign nations were credible and made in good faith, and (4) whether any element of confiscation was present in the actual administration of the particular foreign system of law. (*Zschernig*, *supra*, 389 U.S. at pp.

433-434.) Because the inquires resulted in unavoidable criticism of other nations and posed a potential risk of disruption and embarrassment in the international arena, the Supreme Court concluded the Oregon statute had more than an incidental or indirect effect in foreign nations. "That kind of state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations . . . [,]" said Justice Douglas, "is not sanctioned by *Clark v. Allen.*" (*Id.* 389 U.S. at p. 436.)

Under *Clark* and *Zschernig*, a statute will be invalidated if its application involves a state making inappropriate inquiries and criticisms regarding the operations of foreign governments so that the statute has "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.'" (*Zschernig, supra*, 389 U.S. at p. 434; see also *Gerling Global, supra*, 240 F.3d at p. 752-753; *Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Com. of PA* (3rd Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 903, 913 (*Trojan Technologies*); *Marootian v. New York Life Ins. Co.* (C.D.Cal. Nov. 28, 2001, No. 99-12073) 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 22274 (*Marootian*); see also *Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore* (Md. 1989) 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720, 746 [where the Maryland appellate court noted, "In explaining the distinction between *Clark v. Allen* and *Zschernig v. Miller*, courts and commentators have focused on the extensive judicial scrutiny and criticism of foreign governments to which the Court referred in the *Zschernig* opinion"].)[8]

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[8] *Zschernig* remains the only case where the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute because it violated the foreign affairs power. (See *Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.* (1994) 512 U.S. 298, 328, 129 L. Ed. 2d 244, 114 S. Ct. 2268 [where the Supreme Court

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2. *Cases Applying Zschernig*

In *Trojan Technologies*, the Third Circuit rejected a foreign affairs challenge by a Canadian corporation concerning a Pennsylvania "Buy American" law. The statute required suppliers who contracted with a public agency on a public works project to provide American-made products. (*Trojan Technologies*, *supra*, 916 F.2d at p. 904.) The court held the statute exhibited none of the risks identified in *Zschernig*. The statute did not provide an opportunity for state administrative officials or judges to comment on the nature of foreign regimes. The statute applied to products from any foreign source, without singling out any particular country. The record did not indicate the statute was selectively applied according to foreign policy attitudes of Pennsylvania officials. Finally, Congress was aware of various "Buy American" statutes, but took no action to preempt them through federal legislation. (*Id.* 916 F.2d at pp. 913-914.)

In *Gerling Global*, the Ninth Circuit held California's Holocaust Victim's Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) did not violate the foreign affairs doctrine under *Zschernig*. (*Gerling Global*, *supra*, 240 F.3d at pp. 741-742.) The HVIRA required California insurers who sold policies in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to file information about the policies with the state insurance commissioner. (See *Ins. Code, § 13804*, subd. (a).) The court held *Zschernig* did not apply to the HVIRA because the plaintiffs were businesses not foreign governments, the HVIRA did not

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made clear that in the absence of controlling federal law, courts have no authority to identify the foreign relations affects of a state law and weight them against the competing legitimate interests of states].)

refer to any particular country, and no evidence revealed the HVIRA would be applied in a manner that implicated the diplomatic concerns articulated in *Zschernig*. (*Gerling Global*, *supra*, 240 F.3d at p. 753.)

Over 30 years ago, in *Estate of Horman* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 485 P.2d 785, the California Supreme Court applied the same foreign affairs analysis used in *Trojan Technologies* and *Gerling Global* in rejecting a challenge under *Zschernig*. In that case, a number of citizens of the Soviet Union were heirs to a California estate. The heirs challenged the constitutionality of Probate Code section 1026, which placed a five-year time limit upon non-resident aliens to claim interests in estates. The Court held, "Probate Code, section 1026 does not involve the state in any inquiry into foreign law, administration of foreign law, credibility of foreign governmental officials or any other matter condemned by *Zschernig*. All that is required by Probate Code, section 1026 is the computation of five years from the date of death of the decedent. The same time period applies to all nonresident aliens alike, regardless of their country of residence, its law or its policies." (*Id.* at p. 80.)

The court concluded the statute could not "be characterized as having a 'direct impact upon foreign relations,' nor is it likely to 'adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with' foreign relations. At most, its effect upon foreign relations is 'incidental or indirect,' and it does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the exclusive and plenary power of the federal government to deal with foreign affairs." (*Estate of Horman*, *supra*, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 80-81, citing *Zschernig*, *supra*, 389 U.S. 429; see also *Amarel v. Connell* (1988) 202 Cal. App. 3d 137, 145-146,

248 Cal. Rptr. 276 [claims asserted under California anti-competition statutes do not impermissibly intrude into foreign affairs]; but see *Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners* (1969) 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 228, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 [concluding California's "Buy American" statute had more than an incidental effect on foreign relations because it did impact current trade relations with foreign countries].)

Most recently, a federal district court addressed a *Zchernig* foreign affairs challenge to California's Armenian Genocide Victims Insurance Act. (See *Marootian, supra,* 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 22274.) The statute provides that an Armenian Genocide victim, or victim's heirs and beneficiaries, may file a legal claim in California courts to recover benefits under any insurance policy issued or in effect between 1875 and 1923. (§ 354.4.)[9] Similar to

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[9] Section 354.4 defines "Armenian Genocide victim" as "any person of Armenian or other ancestry living in the Ottoman Empire during the period of 1915 to 1923, inclusive, who died, was deported, or escaped to avoid persecution during that period." (§ 354.4, subd. (a)(1).) The statute further provides, in relevant part: "(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Armenian Genocide victim, or heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, who resides in this state and has a claim arising out of an insurance policy or policies purchased or in effect in Europe or Asia between 1875 and 1923 from an insurer described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), may bring a legal action or may continue a pending legal action to recover on that claim in any court of competent jurisdiction in this state, which court shall be deemed the proper forum for that action until its completion or resolution. [¶] (c) Any action, including any pending action brought by an Armenian Genocide victim or the heir or beneficiary of an Armenian Genocide victim, whether a resident or nonresident of this state, seeking benefits under the insurance policies issued or in effect between 1875 and 1923 shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the

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section 354.6, section 354.4 allows for venue in California courts, extends the statute of limitations on claims to 2010, and provides for retroactive application. (See § 354.4, subd. (c) and S.B. 1915, § 1(d).) The defendant insurer argued the statute was unconstitutional because "'it adopts an official position on an extremely sensitive foreign affairs issue.'" (*Marootian*, *supra*, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 22274 at p. 32.)

Concluding the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Gerling Global* was applicable to section 354.4, the court stated, "Section 354.4, which simply provides venue in the California courts for the disputed . . . insurance claims, does not require the type of wide-ranging government inquiry into a foreign government's practices which the Supreme Court found objectionable in *Zschernig*. As in *Gerling Global*, none of the parties here is a foreign government, nor owned by a foreign government; [footnote omitted] they are simply an insurance carrier and the beneficiaries under its policies of insurance. Also, like the plaintiffs in *Gerling Global*, [the defendant] is an insurance company that does business in California and is, or is related to, companies that issued the insurance policies at issue herein." (*Marootian*, *supra*, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 22274 at p. 36.)

3. *Application of Zschernig to this Case*

We conclude the above decisions are applicable to section 354.6. We disagree that section 354.6 creates a

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applicable statute of limitation, provided the action is filed on or before December 31, 2010."

cause of action where none previously existed and interferes with the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs. Instead, we view section 354.6 as essentially a procedural statute designed to allow venue in California courts. Section 354.6 retroactively extends the statute of limitations applicable to claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries against private entities. This conclusion is based upon the following analysis.

First, we discern no improper foreign policy purpose underlying the enactment of section 354.6. The Legislature's purpose in enacting section 354.6 was to assure that "[California] residents and citizens are given a reasonable opportunity to claim their entitlement to compensation for forced or slave labor performed prior to and during the Second World War." (S.B. 1245, § 1(c).) The declared purpose behind the section is to protect the rights of residents by retroactively extending the statute of limitations applicable to pre-existing claims and allowing venue in California courts. Not only do states have broad police powers to protect its [sic] residents in such a manner, but establishing a statute of limitations is a state prerogative. (See, e.g., *De Canas v. Bica* (1976) 424 U.S. 351, 356, 47 L. Ed. 2d 43, 96 S. Ct. 933 [states have broad authority under their police powers to protect their residents]; *Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman* (1988) 486 U.S. 717, 722, 100 L. Ed. 2d 743, 108 S. Ct. 2117 (*Sun Oil*) [the procedural rules of state courts, such as statute of limitations, are matters within a state's interest concerning which it may legislate]; see also *People v. Frazer* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 737, 758, 768, 982 P.2d 180, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 312 [statutes of limitations are an "optional form of legislative grace" and as "instruments of public policy" have never been viewed as

conferring any fundamental rights rooted in the Constitution].)[10]

We reject the contention that section 354.6 was enacted for an improper foreign policy purpose because it is directed toward a specific foreign country. The statute allows recovery of uncompensated labor performed for "the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under the control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers." (§ 354.6, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(2).) Section 354.6 is not aimed solely at Japanese and German companies. Any company that conducted business in "any of the areas occupied by or under the control of the Nazi regime or its allies and sympathizers" may be sued under the statute. That would include American, British, French and other companies. By its terms, section 354.6 does not target a specific foreign country nor implicate any foreign policy between the United States and Japan. (See *Gerling Global, supra*, 240 F.3d at p. 753 [*Zschernig* not applicable

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[10] Taiheiyo and the United States cite a Los Angeles Times article quoting the legislative author of section 354.6 as indicative of its legislative purpose. Unofficial comments by a single legislative sponsor shed no light on the true intent of the enactment. (See *California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist.* (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699-700, 170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856 [the use of a single senator's statements to determine legislative intent violates well-established principals of statutory construction, even where the senator actually authored the bill in controversy]; *Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors* (1984) 157 Cal. App. 3d 1122, 1134, 203 Cal. Rptr. 886 [judiciary is reluctant to rely on statements by individual members of the Legislature as an expression of the intent of the entire body].)

to HVIRA, which was aimed at insurers issuing policies to persons "in Europe"].)

Second, section 354.6 does not involve the type of wide-ranging government scrutiny or criticism of a foreign government's practices that the Supreme Court found objectionable in *Zschernig*. The statute does not require a state court to inquire into current policy of a foreign nation or the structure of its government. In addition, the statute does not make any statement concerning or criticize the current or past foreign policies of any country. It specifically applies to pre-existing monetary claims against private companies, not to foreign governments.

Third, section 354.6 does not have more than "an incidental or indirect effect" on the federal government's current or future relations with any foreign country, such as Japan or Korea, because the statute applies retroactively, not prospectively, to claims against private companies. By allowing the initiation of actions on expired claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries suffered by workers enslaved by private companies during *WWII,* section 354.6 does not provide a forum to criticize Japan's current policies or practices. The litigation of such claims, at least in Jeong's case, will require evidence of his imprisonment in Korea, the conditions he endured, the type of labor he performed, the length of time he performed it at Onoda's camp, and the injuries suffered during his imprisonment. However, other than the unique circumstance that the events occurred over 50 years ago, the evidence required at trial will be similar to proof required in any civil case seeking restitution or quasi-contractual recovery for unjust enrichment, false imprisonment, or assault and battery.

There is no basis to conclude that the litigation of slave and forced labor claims will necessarily involve California courts in any criticism of Japan's present governmental structure or foreign policy. The potential that affiliates or subsidiaries of Japanese companies conducting business in California can be held liable for unpaid labor or personal injuries suffered in the past may displease those entities. It may even displease the Japanese government. However, this possible result does not implicate the impermissible governmental inquiries or criticisms the Supreme Court found objectionable in *Zschernig*. (See *Patrickson v. Dole Food Company* (9th Cir. 2001) 251 F.3d 795, 803-804 [courts cannot tailor their decisions to accommodate the displeasure of non-party foreign governments].) As Justice Douglas commented, "What California has done will have some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line." (*Clark*, *supra*, 331 U.S. at p. 517.)

In sum, section 354.6 permits actions for unpaid labor and personal injuries arising out of events that occurred during WWII. The statute permits the pre-existing claims by retroactively extending the limitations period applicable to the claims. Contrary to the arguments asserted by Taiheiyo and the United States, the fact that the claims arose during WWII does not automatically implicate the foreign affairs doctrine. Neither Taiheiyo nor the United States has cited any foreign affairs disruption that has resulted, or is likely to result, from actions brought under section 354.6.

4. *Distinguishable Case Law*

Taiheiyo and amici curiae cite numerous cases which have invalidated state laws under *Zschernig*. They argue these cases are applicable because the state laws were similar to section 354.6. The cases, however, are distinguishable.

In *Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County* (S.D.Fla. 2000) 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, ordinances were enacted requiring persons seeking to contract with Miami-Dade County to sign affidavits stating they did not transact business with Cuba or Cuban nationals. The ordinances were passed in response to an international incident that occurred in the Florida Straits where Cuban jet fighters shot down four pilots who were members of a humanitarian organization. In partially granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the court concluded the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that the ordinances were unconstitutional under *Zschernig* because "the stated purpose of the [law] is to protest and condemn Cuba's totalitarian regime . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [and] designed to specifically impact and affect the affairs of a foreign country." (*Id.* at p. 1180.)

In *National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, supra,* 181 F.3d 38, a Massachusetts law was enacted restricting the ability of state agencies to purchase goods from companies doing business in Burma. The court held the law had a significant, direct effect on a foreign government and therefore inappropriately interfered with the federal foreign affairs power under *Zschernig*. The court arrived at this conclusion because the design and intent of the law demonstrated displeasure for Burma's human rights

policies, thereby affecting that country's affairs. (*Id.* at p. 53.)

In *Tayyari v. New Mexico State University* (D.N.M. 1980) 495 F. Supp. 1365, New Mexico State University passed a motion "designed to rid the campus of Iranian students." (*Id.* at p. 1367.) The motion sought to retaliate against Iran, which held American hostages at the time, by refusing to enroll Iranian students until the release of the hostages. The court invalidated the motion as imposing an impermissible burden on the federal government's power to regulate immigration and conduct foreign affairs because the "motion [was] directed at one nation, Iran. [The] purpose was to make a political statement about the hostage situation in Iran and to retaliate against Iranian nationals here." (*Id.* at pp. 1379-1380.)

In each case, the state law was invalidated because it was designed to influence a current policy of a foreign government that was considered offensive and had the potential to adversely affect trade or diplomatic relations with a foreign country. By contrast, section 354.6 is restricted to the past conduct of private companies. The statute does not permit the assertion of claims against Japan or any other country. It does not attempt to affect foreign trade or influence the policies of any foreign government.

The sole purpose of section 354.6 is to extend the statute of limitations for common law claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries arising out of slave or forced labor. Not only is this a permissible state function, but there is no reason to believe the adjudication of the claims will interfere with the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs. Any effect the adjudication of

claims under section 354.6 may have on foreign nations is merely incidental and indirect.[11]

D. *Due Process*

Taiheiyo contends section 354.6 violates its right to due process. Citing *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts* (1985) 472 U.S. 797, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (*Shutts*) and *Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher* (11th Cir. 2001) 267 F.3d 1228, Taiheiyo argues "California has no power to reach across the seas and into the long distant past to legislate civil penalties for parties who had no contemporaneous connection with California." This contention not only mischaracterizes section 354.6, but ignores well-established precedent that a state has the legislative jurisdiction to control the remedies available in its courts.

In *Shutts*, the Supreme Court held the U.S. Constitution limits a forum state's application of its substantive law to the claims of nonresident plaintiffs in a nationwide class action. In order to constitutionally apply its substantive law to the claims of nonresident class members, the forum state must have " 'significant contact or significant

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[11] Other cases cited by Taiheiyo and amici curiae are similarly distinguishable. (See *Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson* (1986) 115 Ill. 2d 221, 236, 104 Ill. Dec. 743, 503 N.E.2d 300 [regulation exempting all gold and silver coins from taxation except the Krugerrand held invalid because it was designed to express disapproval of South Africa's apartheid policy]; *New York Times Co. v. City of New York Com'n* (1977) 41 N.Y.2d 345, 352, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312, 361 N.E.2d 963 [city prohibition on advertising job opportunities in South Africa held impermissible because its purpose was to impose an economic boycott aimed at South Africa's apartheid policy].)

aggregation of contacts' to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts 'creating state interests,' in order to ensure that the choice of [the forum state's] law is not arbitrary or unfair. [Citation.]" (*Shutts, supra*, 472 U.S. at pp. 821-822.) Because in *Shutts* the forum state lacked interest in claims unrelated to that state asserted by nonresidents, the Court concluded the application of that state's law to every claim in the case was sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits. (*Ibid.*)

Shutts is inapplicable because section 354.6 is essentially a procedural statue designed to extend the applicable statute of limitations and allow venue in California courts. Thus, it must be evaluated under the standards the Supreme Court articulated in *Sun Oil, supra*, 486 U.S. 717. (See *Marootian, supra*, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 22274 at p. 36 [concluding section 354.4 (the Armenian Genocide Victims Insurance Act) is a procedural statute establishing venue in California, does not implicate due process, and should be evaluated under *Sun Oil*].)

In *Sun Oil*, Kansas courts applied a longer Kansas statute of limitations to claims by residents of other states concerning property located in those states and governed by the laws of those states. The Supreme Court characterized the Kansas statute of limitations as a procedural rule and concluded: "This Court has long and repeatedly held that the Constitution does not bar application of the forum State's statute of limitations to claims that in their substance are and must be governed by the law of a different State. . . . [¶] Since the procedural rules of its courts are surely matters on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own procedural rules

to actions litigated in its courts." (*Sun Oil, supra*, 486 U.S. at p. 722.)

In rejecting defendant's due process challenge, the Court added: "A State's interest in regulating the workload of its courts and determining when a claim is too stale to be adjudicated certainly suffices to give it legislative jurisdiction to control the remedies available in its courts by imposing statutes of limitations. Moreover, petitioner could in no way have been unfairly surprised by the application to it of a rule that is as old as the Republic. There is, in short, nothing in Kansas's action here that is 'arbitrary or unfair,' [citation] and the due process challenge is entirely without substance." (*Sun Oil, supra*, 486 U.S. at p. 730.)

Section 354.6, which is placed in the Code of Civil Procedure title dealing with statute of limitations, extends the limitations period applicable to claims of slave and forced labor victims for unpaid labor and personal injuries. It further specifies that their claims may be filed and adjudicated in California courts. The statute neither specifies the essential elements of the claims nor mandates the application of California substantive law. It is, in essence, a procedural statute. Contrary to Taiheiyo's assertions, section 354.6 does not create a new cause of action where none previously existed. The claims of victims like Jeong for unpaid labor and personal injuries existed prior to section 354.6's enactment and would have been viable common law claims under California law, both when they arose and today, had they not been time-barred. (See, e.g., *Philpott v. Superior Court* (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512, 517, 36 P.2d 635 and *McCall v. Superior Court* (1934) 1 Cal.2d 527, 531, 36 P.2d 642 [recognizing right to restitution or quasi-contractual recovery based upon unjust

enrichment]; *Pulvermacher v. Los Angeles Co-ordinating Com.* (1943) 61 Cal. App. 2d 704, 143 P.2d 974 and *Trube v. Katz* (1923) 60 Cal.App. 474, 213 P. 264 [allowing claims for false imprisonment and assault].)[12]

Consistent with *Sun Oil*, by enacting section 354.6, the Legislature has assessed the workload of California courts and decided that public policy mandated a consideration of slave and forced labor claims like Jeong's, despite the length of time that had elapsed since the occurrence of events underlying those claims. (See *Marootian, supra*, 2001 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 22274 at p. 36.)

Just as *Shutts* is inapplicable, so is *Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, supra*, 267 F.3d 1228. In that case, the Florida insurance commissioner issued subpoenas to Florida insurers asking for information about their German affiliates' issuance of policies to Holocaust victims. The Eleventh Circuit addressed the narrow issue of whether Florida's Holocaust Victims Insurance Act (Act) could, consistent with due process, form the basis for issuance of the subpoenas. The Act required Florida insurers to file extensive information concerning Holocaust-era policies with the commissioner and authorized penalties for failing to do so. The court held the Act could not form the basis for issuance of the subpoenas because it pertained to and sought "to regulate . . . a subject matter – the German affiliates' payment or

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[12] We do not decide whether California substantive law should apply to the claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries asserted in this case. We conclude only that section 354.6 may validly be applied to revive and retroactively extend the statute of limitations applicable to such claims.

non-payment of Holocaust-era policy claims – with no jurisdictionally-significant relationship to Florida." (*Id.* at p. 1238.)

By contrast, section 354.6 does not seek to substantively regulate by requiring extensive reporting information to any agency, nor does it provide penalties for failing to do so. Rather, section 354.6 is essentially a procedural statute that permits slave and forced labor victims to adjudicate their claims in California courts. The claims existed prior to the enactment of the statute.

Finally, the fact that section 354.6 extends the applicable statute of limitations retroactively does not violate due process. The retroactive application of a statute is proper as long as the Legislature intended to apply it retroactively, is not an ex post facto law, and does not deprive a person of a vested right without due process of law or impair the obligation of a contract. (*In re Marriage of Buol* (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 756, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31, 705 P.2d 354.) No assertion is made that section 354.6 is an ex post facto law, deprives Taiheiyo of a vested right, or impairs the obligation of a contract.

Section 354.6 is similar to statutes that revive the prosecution of otherwise time-barred criminal offenses. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 803, subds. (f), (g), (h).) Penal Code section 803, subdivision (g), for example, expressly "revived" the prosecution of certain sexual crimes against children in which the three- or six-year statute of limitations expired. In *People v. Frazer, supra*, 21 Cal.4th 737, the Supreme Court upheld the statute against a challenge it violated due process by retroactively reviving a dead cause of action. The Court discussed *Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson* (1945) 325 U.S. 304, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 65

S. Ct. 1137, where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld retroactive changes in the applicable limitations period which were detrimental to the defense. The Court concluded, "The holding of *Chase* – that no constitutionally protected interest arises once a statute of limitations has run, and that such protection can be retroactively withdrawn consistent with due process – has been reaffirmed by the high court in subsequent cases. [Citations.] . . . [¶] We see no meaningful basis on which to distinguish the six-year period [in this case] from the statute of limitations discussed in *Chase*. . . . That this case involves a criminal, rather than a civil, statute of limitations is not such a persuasive distinction. No provision of the United States Constitution explicitly confers upon criminal defendants a 'right to repose' by virtue of the length of time between commission of the crime and commencement of the prosecution. . . . [¶] Criminal statutes of limitation are no less an act of 'policy' or 'grace' than their counterparts in civil cases. [Citation.]" (*People v. Frazer, supra*, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 768-770.)

Because the Legislature made clear in enacting section 354.6 that the applicable statute of limitations for slave labor and forced labor claims should be extended retroactively, we conclude retroactivity is proper and does not violate constitutional protections. (See § 354.6, subd. (c); S.B.1245, § 1(d).)

E. *Political Question Doctrine*

Taiheiyo lastly contends lawsuits under section 354.6 raise non-justiciable political questions because they present claims for war reparations, which the Constitution exclusively reserved for the federal government. Taiheiyo

argues the federal government dealt with the issue of Japanese war reparations through the 1951 Treaty and, as a result, California courts may not revisit or subvert this political resolution. We reject this contention.[13]

The "political question doctrine" requires courts to defer to the other branches of government operating within their spheres of authority. (*Schabarum v. California Legislature* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1213-1214, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745.) The doctrine "compels dismissal of a lawsuit when complete deference to the role of the legislative or executive branch is required and there is nothing upon which a court can adjudicate without impermissibly intruding upon the authority of another branch of government." (*Ibid.*)

Contrary to Taiheiyo's broad assertion that "questions involving interference with foreign relations are quintessential 'political questions,'" the Supreme Court has cautioned against such sweeping statements. (See *Baker v. Carr* (1962) 369 U.S. 186, 211, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 82 S. Ct. 691; *Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc.* (1986) 478 U.S. 221, 229-230, 92 L. Ed. 2d 166, 106 S. Ct. 2860.) In *Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., supra,* the United States agreed not to certify Japan was

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[13] Jeong contends Taiheiyo's political question argument is not properly before the court because that argument was raised only in Taiheiyo's initial motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court denied and from which Taiheiyo did not seek appellate review. The order to show cause limited our review to the trial court's denial of Taiheiyo's second motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which the political question argument was not raised. We nonetheless address it because it is an issue of law that was fully briefed and argued by the parties.

in violation of an international whaling treaty. Conservation groups sued to force the Department of Commerce to certify Japan was in violation of the treaty. The district court granted the requested relief.

The Supreme Court rejected the contention asserted by the Japanese petitioners that the political question doctrine barred resolution of the case by the courts. The Court said, "*Baker* carefully pointed out that not every matter touching on politics is a political question. . . . The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch. . . . [¶] As *Baker* plainly held, however, the courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements, and it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts. . . . Under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones. We conclude, therefore, that the present cases present a justiciable controversy. . . . " (*Id.* 478 U.S. at pp. 229-230.) Other cases are in accord. (See *Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro* (2d Cir. 1998) 937 F.2d 44, 49 [political question doctrine did not bar suit against PLO for seizure, beating, and killing of passenger]; *Kadic v. Karadzic* (2d Cir. 1995) 70 F.3d 232, 248-250 [political question doctrine did not bar private tort claims under Alien Tort Act against self-proclaimed president of the unrecognized Bosnian-Serb republic of Srpska for systematic human rights atrocities].)

Courts confronted with actions under section 354.6 are not presented with non-justiciable political questions. Section 354.6 is essentially a procedural statute that revives stale tort and quasi-contract claims for unpaid labor and personal injuries and permits venue in California courts. The Legislature assessed the workload of California courts and determined that public policy mandates a consideration of slave and forced labor claims, despite the length of time that elapsed since the occurrences giving rise to the claims. Not only is the Legislature empowered to enact such laws in an attempt to redress the injuries of its residents, but the adjudication of similar claims is a traditional judicial function courts are called upon to address on a daily basis. Evaluating evidence concerning whether a person suffered personal injuries, was falsely imprisoned, and forced to work without pay is clearly a fact-finding function granted to the judicial branch of government. The performance of that role does not involve addressing political questions or usurp the governmental functions of the legislative and executive branches.

Furthermore, contrary to Taiheiyo's contention that there are no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" which California courts may apply to claims under section 354.6, standards do in fact exist. As another court concluded, "because the common law of tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court can easily rely, this case does not require the court to render a decision in the absence of 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards.'" (*Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, supra*, 937 F.2d at p. 49.)

In sum, Taiheiyo and amici curiae have not cited to any ongoing negotiations by the United States that

address claims such as Jeong's. There is no indication that actions brought under section 354.6 will impermissibly intrude upon the authority or interest of another branch of government.

F. *Conclusion*

By enacting section 354.6, the California Legislature has determined that public policy mandates a judicial consideration of slave and forced labor claims despite the length of time that has elapsed since the occurrence of events underlying those claims. The Legislature has accomplished this policy by retroactively extending the limitations period for narrowly defined categories of pre-existing claims in order to permit the redress of injuries of California residents. This legislative enactment was an appropriate exercise of the state's sovereign powers. We therefore conclude section 354.6 is valid because (1) no federal treaty or other law preempts it, (2) the enactment poses at most merely an incidental or indirect effect on foreign countries, (3) the statute does not violate constitutional due process, and (4) the claims it allows do not present non-justiciable political questions.

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is denied, the order to show cause is discharged, and the stay of trial court proceedings previously issued is dissolved. Jeong is awarded his costs.

BOLAND, J.

We concur:
COOPER, P.J.
RUBIN, J.

02-1784

(2) (5)

Supreme Court, U.S.
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Nos. 02-1773, 02-1778

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DO GEUN OH, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

VS.

MITSUI & CO., LTD., ET AL.,

Respondents.

ZHENHUAN MA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

VS.

KAJIMA CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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Question Presented

Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that a 1999 California statute purporting to create a private right of action on behalf of "Second World War forced labor victim[s]" is preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine as recently explicated by this Court's decision in *American Insurance Association v. Garamendi*, where the United States' foreign policy – exemplified in its drafting, negotiation and ratification of the multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169 – has already resolved the war and all war-related claims as a matter of United States law, including consigning such claims by Korean and Chinese nationals to diplomatic resolution.

Rule 29.6 Corporate Disclosure Statement

Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. is a Japanese public company and is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. has no parent company, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. IHI, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.

Kajima Construction Services, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima International, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima USA, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima Corporation, a Japanese corporation. Kajima Corporation has no parent company, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Kajima Development Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima Real Estate Development, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima USA, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima Corporation.

Kajima Engineering and Construction, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima Corporation.

Kajima International, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima USA, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima Corporation.

Kajima USA, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Kajima Corporation.

Mitsubishi Corporation is a public company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of the outstanding stock of Mitsubishi Corporation. Mitsubishi International Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. is a Japanese public company and is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No

publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Mitsubishi Materials Corporation has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Mitsubishi Materials U.S.A. Corporation's parent corporation is Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, and no other publicly held company owns 10% or more of Mitsubishi Material U.S.A. Corporation's stock.

Mitsui & Co., Ltd. is a public company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of the outstanding stock of Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsui & Co., Ltd.

Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. has no parent corporation, and no publicly traded company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd. is a Japanese public company and is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Mitsui Mining U.S.A., Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd.

Nippon Steel Corporation is a Japanese public company, listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Nippon Steel U.S.A., Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nippon Steel Corporation.

Paceco Corp.'s parent corporation is Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., and Mitsui & Co., Ltd. owns over 10% of its stock.

Showa Denko America, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Showa Denko K.K. Showa Denko K.K. is a Japanese public company, listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No

publicly held company owns more than 10% or more of Showa Denko K.K.'s stock.

Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd. is a Japanese public company and is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Sumitomo Heavy Industries (U.S.A.), Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DO GUEN OH, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

MITSUI & CO., LTD., ET AL.,

Respondents.

ZHENHUAN MA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

KAJIMA CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

This Court should deny the *Oh* and *Ma* petitions for a writ of certiorari.[1] The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly holds that a California statute creating a cause of action for conduct of Japanese nationals in Asia during World War II is preempted

[1] Two certiorari petitions were filed by petitioners in seven cases. Petition 02-1773 (*Oh*) includes *Kim v. Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Indus., Ltd., et al.* (01-17197); *Sin v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.* (01-17203); *Choe v. Nippon Steel Corp., et al.* (01-17211); and *Oh, et al., v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd., et al.* (01-17251). Petition 02-1778 (*Ma*) includes *Ma v. Kajima Corp., et al.* (01-17201); *Sung v. Mitsubishi Corp., et al.* (01-17207); and *Su, et al., v. Mitsubishi Corp., et al.* (01-17243).

by the core federal power to make and resolve war, which the United States "already exercised" when it "resolve[d] the war, including claims arising out of it," in the multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169 ("Allied Treaty" or "Treaty"). *See* Appendix to Petition for Certiorari of the *Oh* petitioners ("*Oh* Pet. App.") at 24a, 27a. The Ninth Circuit's ruling is supported by the *amicus curiae* position of the United States below.[2]

The *Oh* and *Ma* petitions rely on a decision of a different Ninth Circuit panel, which this Court reversed in *American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003) just three weeks after the petitions were filed. *Garamendi* held another World War II-related California statute to be preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine by virtue of Executive agreements aimed at resolving claims arising out of World War II in Europe.

Here the federal interest – the exercise of the war powers through a peace treaty – is even stronger than in *Garamendi*, and is in direct conflict with the state statute, whose only purpose is "to redress wrongs committed in the course of the Second World War." *Oh* Pet. App. at 23a. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in distinguishing its own earlier decision, which was subsequently reversed in *Garamendi*, these factors make this a clear case for foreign affairs preemption. No conflict exists among the U.S. Courts of Appeal or state courts of last resort with respect to the foreign affairs preemption issue raised by the petitions.

The statute, section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, is also invalid for other reasons not reached by the Ninth Circuit. Among these are California's lack of legislative jurisdiction to create a cause of action for events

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[2] The Brief for *Amicus Curiae* the United States of America, filed with the Ninth Circuit on June 6, 2002, appears at respondents' Appendix F.

that occurred beyond its borders, on behalf of persons such as petitioners who, at the time of the events, were all foreign nationals having no ties to California or the United States. Petitioners had no right to sue in U.S. courts a half century ago and they have none now. The petitions should be denied.

Opinions Below

The pertinent opinion of the Court of Appeals is that reported at 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003) and not, as the *Oh* petition asserts, the amended and superseded opinion reported at 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003). *Oh* Pet. at 1. The version of the opinion attached to the *Oh* petition is, however, the correct one.

Pertinent Constitutional Provisions, Treaties and Statutes

Constitution of the United States

> The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .
>
> He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; . . . .

U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cls. 1, 2.

> The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the common Defense . . .;
>
> To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;

> To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
>
> To raise and support Armies . . .;
>
> To provide and maintain a Navy;
>
> To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . .

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 10-14.

> No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . .
>
> No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with . . . a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3.

Treaties

The Allied Treaty appears at respondents' Appendix A.

The Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Cooperation, Japan-Republic of Korea, June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 258 ("Japan-Korea Treaty"), appears at respondents' Appendix B.

The Treaty of Peace Between China and Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 38 U.N.T.S. 1858 ("Japan-ROC Treaty"), appears at respondents' Appendix C.

The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, Sept. 29,

1972 ("Joint Communiqué"), appears at respondents' Appendix D.

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People's Republic of China, Aug. 18, 1978 ("Japan-PRC Treaty"), appears at respondents' Appendix E.

Statutes

Section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is set forth in full in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. *See Oh* Pet. App. at 10a-12a.

Statement of the Case

Petitioners and the classes they claim to represent[3] were all foreign nationals and nonresidents of the United States at all relevant times.[4] All rely on section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1999, which creates a cause of action for persons allegedly forced to labor during World War II by, or in areas occupied by, "the Nazi

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[3] No class has been certified; putative class members allegedly number in the "thousands" or "hundreds of thousands." ER 7 (*Kim* Complaint); ER 39 (*Choe* Complaint); ER 94; (*Sin* Complaint); ER 120 (*Oh* Complaint); ER 75 (*Sung* Complaint); ER 151 (*Su* Complaint); ER 245 (*Ma* Complaint).

"ER" refers to the Excerpts of Record filed jointly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by the *Oh* and *Ma* groups of petitioners. "SER" refers to the Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed jointly in the Ninth Circuit in the *Oh* and *Ma* cases by respondents.

[4] Although the *Oh* petitioners generally are referred to as "Koreans" in this brief, they actually were subjects of Japan at all relevant times; Japan annexed Korea in 1910, and Korea became independent only after World War II. ER 11 (*Kim* Complaint); ER 43 (*Choe* Complaint); ER 123 (*Oh* Complaint). The *Ma* petitioners were Chinese nationals at all relevant times. ER 68-69 (*Sung* Complaint); ER 143-45 (*Su* Complaint); ER 237-39 (*Ma* Complaint).

regime or its allies," which, petitioners allege, include Japan.[5]

A. Background

Because petitioners' claims are bound up in the prosecution and conclusion of World War II in Asia, it is essential (as the courts below recognized) to understand the foreign policy that the United States formulated, incorporated into the Treaty and persuaded 47 other Allied Nations to adopt. Of special importance are the Treaty's requirements that claims of Korean nationals be resolved, not by litigation, but through "special arrangements" between the governments of Japan and Korea, art. 4(a) (which eventuated in the Japan-Korea treaty), and that Japan conclude treaties with Korea and China on "substantially the same terms" as the Allied Treaty, including the latter's resolution of war-related claims, art. 26 (which eventuated, in the case of China, in the Japan-ROC Treaty, the Joint Communiqué and the Japan-PRC Treaty). *See* App. A at 3a, 19a-20a.

The United States viewed a "free, prosperous and democratic Japan" as "an important stabilizing influence in the Far East" in the face of "mount[ing] international tensions" in that region. SER 545-46 (S. Exec. Rep. No. 82-2). Convinced that peace would be jeopardized "if the treaty validated, or kept contingently alive, monetary reparation claims against Japan," the United States convinced its Allies that "it is our duty not to dwell on the past, but to turn our eyes toward the future." SER 304, 309 (Record of Proceedings of the Conference for the Conclusion

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[5] Respondents are Japanese companies and certain of their contemporary U.S. subsidiaries. The latter are sued not for their own acts, but for the alleged acts of their Japanese parents – in most cases for acts of purported *predecessors* of their parents. *See, e.g.*, ER 36 (*Choe* Complaint); ER 118 (*Oh* Complaint); ER 71 (*Sung* Complaint); ER 147-48 (*Su* Complaint); ER 239-40 (*Ma* Complaint).

and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951) ("Proceedings")).

The Treaty's reparations provisions were premised on the recognition that it "would have been a short sighted policy and would certainly have laid the foundation of a lasting resentment" to leave Japan and its nationals open to future war-related claims. SER 311 (Proceedings). Consistent with the well-settled principle that "*reparations for war losses is a . . . matter to be settled between governments*" and "it is the . . . *responsibility of each government to provide such compensation for persons under its protection as that government deems fair and equitable* . . . out of reparations that may be received from Japan or from other sources," SER 556 (S. Exec. Rep. No. 82-2), the United States negotiated and crafted a Treaty that conclusively provided for resolution of all war-related claims.[6]

Allied signatories of the Treaty were accorded specified reparations and waived all further claims of their own and their nationals against Japan and its nationals (and vice versa). App. A at 10a-17a (arts. 14-19); *see generally* Brief of Respondents in Opposition to the petitions for a writ of certiorari filed in *Tenney, et al., v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.* (02-1776) and *Saldajeno, et al., v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha Ltd., et al.* (02-1784) ("Signatory Brief"). The funds to pay these reparations came principally from assets of Japanese businesses and individuals located in Allied and neutral nations. App. A at 10a-15a (arts. 14(a), 16); *see generally* Signatory Brief.

Although Korea could not sign the Treaty "because [it] was never at war with Japan," the Treaty "in many ways, treat[ed] Korea like an Allied Power," "obtain[ing] for Korea Japan's formal recognition of Korea's independence, and

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[6] Emphasis in quotations is added throughout this brief, unless otherwise specified.

Japan's consent to the vesting in the Republic of Korea, of the very considerable Japanese property in Korea," and placing Korea "on a parity with the Allied powers as regards . . . commercial arrangements." SER 305 (Proceedings).

Because of disagreement among the Allies as to which "China" should sign the Treaty – Nationalist or Communist – neither did. SER 305 (Proceedings). Nevertheless, "[t]he Treaty preserve[d], in full, the rights of China as one of the Allied Victors," by, *inter alia*, awarding China all Japanese property in Chinese territory. *Id.* at SER 306. At the same time, the United States insisted that China's nonparticipation not defeat the policy of achieving final resolution of all war claims; "it would . . . be *wrong, cruel and stupid to penalize Japan* because there is civil war in China and international disagreement regarding China." *Id.* at SER 305.

While acknowledging that nonsignatory nations, particularly Korea and China, had suffered enormously from "Japanese aggression," SER 304, 305 (Proceedings), the United States concluded that requiring reparations from Japan "in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their nationals" would be "contrary to the basic purposes and policy of the free nations, the Allied Powers, *and the United States in particular*." SER 555 (S. Exec. Rep. No. 82-2). Peace "would be impossible if the Treaty kept alive the right[s] of the [injured countries] to demand monetary reparations payments." SER 424 (Memo, Sec'y of State to President, Aug. 7, 1951). Accordingly, article 26 of the Treaty obligated Japan to conclude separate treaties with Korea and China "on the same or substantially the same terms" as the Allied Treaty, SER 289-90, including the latter's reparations provisions. *See* App. A at 10a-13a (art. 14); *see generally* Signatory Brief. Article 4(a) also directed that "claims. . . of [Korea] and [its] residents against Japan and its nationals, *shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and*

[Korea]," App. A at 3a, thus mandating that Korean nationals' claims "be resolved through inter-governmental agreements rather than litigation." App. F at 54a.

Faithful to the Allied Treaty, Japan negotiated the Korea-Japan Treaty and, consistent with U.S. foreign policy, three agreements with China: one with the Republic of China (the Japan-ROC Treaty) and, later, two with the People's Republic of China (the Joint Communiqué and the Japan-PRC Treaty). As discussed in sections I.B.2. and II.B. *infra*, these treaties also address reparations and independently preclude adjudication of petitioners' claims.

B. Petitioners' Allegations

Petitioners admittedly have never had any contact with California, except for a handful who emigrated after World War II. None of the conduct underlying their claims occurred in California, or even in the United States. Petitioners allege that their forced labor was in furtherance of the Japanese war effort.[7] Several of the complaints' details attest to the Japanese Government's deep involvement in the forced labor regime, *e.g.*, through laws and government directives requiring companies to use forced labor to achieve Japan's war aims,[8] and through the use of police and other government agencies to dragoon forced laborers.[9] Some

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[7] *See, e.g.*, ER 34 ("To assist *in the war effort* the Japanese government directed that Korean Nationals be forcibly deported and put to work by Japanese industry."); *see also* ER 36 ¶ 10, 52 ¶ 60; ER 2, 4; ER 67; ER 93; ER 123; ER 142; ER 235-36.

[8] *See, e.g.*, ER 43-44 ("National General Mobilization Law directed . . . authorities to 'draft Imperial subjects and make them serve the purposes of general mobilization.'"); ER 12 ("[T]he Japanese Cabinet . . . prescribed . . . numbers of Koreans . . . deported for forced and slave labor and detailed allocations [of laborers] to particular industries.").

[9] *See, e.g.*, ER 98 ("[Plaintiff] was raided by a policeman and an officer of the [regional] office while asleep in [his] home, . . . handcuffed [,] . . . taken to a gathering place . . . , and was transported to Japan forcibly."); ER 12 ("Japanese Welfare Ministry issued a directive

(continued ...)

complaints allege that respondents' predecessors "turned over" petitioners' wages to the Japanese Government, which never remitted the money to petitioners.[10]

C. Proceedings in the District Court

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated petitioners' cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, along with 21 others based on section 354.6. SER 16-23, 265-67, 578. That court dismissed all 28 cases, holding section 354.6 unconstitutional "because it infringes on the exclusive foreign affairs power of the United States."[11] *Oh* Pet. App. at 52a, 73a.

The District Court had the benefit of a Statement of Interest of the United States, explaining the Treaty's negotiating and legislative history, U.S. foreign policy underlying it, and the Treaty's status as the cornerstone of U.S. Far Eastern policy over the last half century. The court was also provided with a *Note Verbale* from the Government of Japan to the United States. Both governments explained that section 354.6 would frustrate the operation of the Treaty – which contemplated resolution of all war claims by "state-to-state negotiations" – and would "jeopardize relations between the United States and Japan and Japan and its Asian neighbors." SER 517, 520 (U.S. Statement of Interest); *see* SER 525 (*Note Verbale*).

(... continued)
that confirmed that the forcible deportation of Koreans was systematic and calculated.").

[10] *See* ER 10; ER 42; ER 97.

[11] The District Court also ruled that petitioners' other claims were all time-barred. *Oh* Pet. App. at 82a, 84a. That ruling, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, *id.* at 32a-35a, is not challenged in the certiorari petitions.

D. The Court of Appeals Decision

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgments in all 28 consolidated cases.[12] Like the District Court, the Ninth Circuit had the benefit of the views of the United States, which supplemented its Statement of Interest with an *amicus curiae* brief and presented oral argument on the Treaty and U.S. foreign policy issues.

In its analysis, the panel expressly distinguished an earlier decision of a different panel – later reversed by this Court in *Garamendi* – in *Gerling Global Reins. Corp. v. Low*, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001). *Low* involved another World War II statute enacted by California, the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, Cal. Ins. Code §§ 13800-13807 ("HVIRA"). HVIRA, unlike Section 354.6, did not create a private right of action; rather, it required insurers doing business in California to provide disclosure about policies sold to persons in Europe, which were in effect between 1920 and 1945. The panel deciding the present cases recognized that the basis for preemption is much stronger for section 354.6 than for HVIRA. While section 354.6 has no purpose except "to provide a monetary remedy for decades-old wartime wrongs," *Oh* Pet. App. at 31a, HVIRA was a "forward-looking regulatory statute" that "merely" required disclosure and at least purported to safeguard contemporary consumer interests. *Id.*

In assessing where the line between federal and state power is to be drawn in the context of a law to remedy war-related injuries, the Ninth Circuit considered that, of the eleven clauses of the Constitution dealing with the foreign affairs powers of the President and Congress, seven

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[12] In addition, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of *Deutsch* v. *Turner Corp.*, No. CV 00-4405 SVW (AJWX), 2000 WL 33957691 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2000), which alleged World War II wrongs by German, not Japanese corporations. No certiorari petition was filed in *Deutsch*.

enumerate war powers, including "settling war." *Oh* Pet. App. at 21a. Conversely, "[m]ost of the Constitution's express limitations on States' foreign affairs powers also concern war." *Id.* The court found that the power "to resolve war, including the power to establish the procedure for resolving war claims" is "part of the inner core" of the "foreign relations power that is denied to the states." *Oh* Pet. App. at 20a-21a. It also noted that the state statute struck down by this Court in *Zschernig v. Miller*, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), although not by its terms war-related, "was seen by a Court operating at the height of the Cold War as a potential provocation to foreign powers." *Oh* Pet. App. at 21a-22a.

The Ninth Circuit went on to note that the federal government had "already exercised its own exclusive authority to resolve" World War II, "including claims arising out of it," by the ratification of the Allied Treaty. *Oh* Pet. App. at 24a, 27a. As the parties agreed, that resolution neither created "a private right of action against Japan or its nationals" nor authorized "states of the United States to create such a right." *Oh* Pet. App. at 27a. Because section 354.6 would "modify" that resolution, the court held that the statute was preempted. *Oh* Pet. App. at 27a-28a & n.14. This holding did not depend on the nationality of any particular plaintiff who might invoke section 354.6 in a U.S. court; accordingly, it was "immaterial" that petitioners were citizens of nations that did not sign the Treaty. *Oh* Pet. App. at 28a n.14.

Petitioners requested rehearing and rehearing en banc, which were unanimously denied on March 6, 2003. No active judge requested a vote on rehearing en banc, although two of the *Low* panel members are active judges. *Oh* Pet. App. at 41a. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held issuance of its mandate pending this Court's decision in *Garamendi*.

After this Court decided *Garamendi* on June 23, 2003, the *Ma* petitioners asked the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its

decision. The Ninth Circuit denied the request for reconsideration and issued its mandate on July 30, 2003.

Argument

I. Because the Ninth Circuit's Decision Accords with *Garamendi*, the Petitions Should Be Denied

The Ninth Circuit's decision is fully consistent with *Garamendi* – indeed, had the Ninth Circuit not invalidated section 354.6, *Garamendi* would require reversal. Preemption is required under either, or both, preemption theories discussed in *Garamendi* – the "field" theory *Garamendi* identified as the basis of the majority opinion in *Zschernig* and the "conflict" theory of Justice Harlan's *Zschernig* concurrence. *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2388-89. As *Garamendi* explained, under the "field" approach, *all* "state action with more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the law, and hence *without any showing of conflict*." *Id.* at 2388 (citing *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 441; *Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); *United States v. Belmont*, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); and *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 316-19 (1936)). "Conflict" preemption requires an actual conflict between state law and a federal foreign policy interest. *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2389.

Garamendi found it unnecessary to make a "categorical choice" between the two theories; there was a "sufficiently clear conflict" between the federal policy and state law in that case to result in preemption. *Id.* at 2389-90. The Court further observed that no such choice may be necessary in other cases, or, indeed ever, for the two theories "can be seen as complementary." *Id.* at 2389 n.11. Thus, "field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine" where a state "take[s] a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility," while "it might make good sense to require a

conflict" where "a state has acted within" its "'traditional competence,' but in a way that affects foreign relations." *Id.* (quoting *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

The Ninth Circuit also did not explicitly choose one preemption theory, nor did it need to.[13] As shown below, either theory could apply here and, under either analysis, section 354.6 is invalid.

A. As Applied to Respondents, Section 354.6 Is Preempted Under the "Field" Theory Described in *Garamendi*

1. This Case Presents Precisely the Circumstances That Make Field Preemption "the [A]ppropriate [D]octrine" Under *Garamendi*

Garamendi teaches that field preemption may be "the appropriate doctrine" where a state acts in the area "of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility." 123 S. Ct. at 2389 n.11. Here California has fashioned its own war reparations cause of action and can make no "serious claim" that it is addressing a "traditional state responsibility" – not even one with the "tangential relation to present-day" regulatory objectives asserted (albeit unsuccessfully) to justify the statute struck down in *Garamendi*. *Id.* at 2394.[14]

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[13] This Court has previously held that the "categories of preemption are not 'rigidly distinct.'" *Crosby* v. *Nat'l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 373 n.6 (2000) (quoting *English* v. *Gen. Elec. Co.*, 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990)). "Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation." *English*, 496 U.S. at 79 n.5.

[14] In seeking rehearing of *Garamendi*, even California has stressed that "HVIRA is simply a disclosure statute that does not force the payment of any claim" and that the conduct that prompted it is the "*present* refusal of companies to disclose," *Am. Ins. Ass'n* v. *Garamendi*,

(continued ...)

As the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized, section 354.6 permits suit "*only*" by "'*Second World War* slave labor victims'" and "'*Second World War* forced labor victims.'" *Oh* Pet. App. at 23a (quoting § 354.6(b)). The "wrong-doers under the statute" – "'the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers, or enterprises transacting business in any of the areas occupied by or under control of the Nazi regime or its allies or sympathizers'" – were, "by definition, wartime enemies of the United States," or at least "were operating in enemy territory . . . with the consent and for the benefit of our wartime enemy." *Id.* (quoting § 354.6(a)(1), (2)). By enacting section 354.6, California plainly sought "to create its own resolution to a major issue arising out of the war – a remedy for wartime acts that California's legislature believed had never been fairly resolved." *Id.*

Since this country's founding, the law has been clear: resolution of war claims is for the federal government to address through treaties or other state-to-state agreements. *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 199, 229-30 (1796) (compensation for losses sustained "during [a] war . . . [may] only be provided for by the treaty of peace" because "a treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war . . . , [and a]ll violences, injuries or damages sustained by the government or people of either [belligerent] during the war, are buried in oblivion . . . by the very treaty of peace"); *see also Stewart v. Kahn*, 78 U.S. 493, 506-07 (1870) (states cannot interfere with federal war- and peace-making powers, which include the power to "remedy the evils which have arisen from [war's] rise and progress"). This principle is grounded, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, in the Constitution's textual

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(... continued)
No. 02-722, Pet. Reh. at 7 – wholly unlike section 354.6. *See also Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2397 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that "statutory provisions enabling the litigation of Holocaust era insurance claims" were "not at issue" there).

commitment of war powers to the federal government, while withholding them from the states.[15]

The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the "power to establish the procedure for resolving war claims" is "part of the inner core" of the "foreign relations power that is denied to the states," *Oh* Pet. App. at 20a-21a, seems to anticipate *Garamendi's* observation that "[v]indicating victims injured by acts and omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is . . . within the traditional subject matter of foreign policy in which the national, not state, interests are overriding." *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2390. Thus California's attempt to provide its own war reparations law is surely subject to preemption under *Garamendi.*

2. Field Preemption Is Particularly Appropriate Where, as Here, the Federal Government Has Exercised Its Treaty Powers

Under the field preemption theory of the *Zschernig* majority opinion, state action may be preempted "*even absent any affirmative federal activity*" in the field. *Garamendi,* 123 S. Ct. at 2388; *see also Zschernig,* 389 U.S. at 441 (preemption found in the "*absence of* a treaty," statute or executive agreement). Here, unlike *Zschernig*, there has been intense federal activity in the very area of foreign affairs in which the California statute purports to operate. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, "the United States has *already exercised* its own exclusive authority to resolve the war, including claims arising out of it." *Oh* Pet. App. at 24a, 27a.

The fact that the United States' exercise of its foreign affairs authority culminated in the Treaty – as opposed to some other "affirmative federal activity" – provides additional support for finding preemption here. Whatever

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[15] *See also* The Federalist No. 3 ("[N]ot only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate *and settle them amicably.*").

may be said regarding executive agreements or other exercises of foreign affairs powers, the federal treaty power "enjoy[s] . . . textual detail" in the Constitution. *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2386; *see* U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Indeed, the power to make treaties is expressly *denied* to the states. *Id.* art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Furthermore, federal law embodied in a treaty reflects the consensus of Congress and the Executive regarding foreign policy. *Cf. Crosby*, 530 U.S. at 375 (noting that "'[w]hen the President acts [in foreign affairs] pursuant to an . . . authorization from Congress, his authority is at its maximum'") (quoting *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)); *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2400 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's reliance on *Crosby* because "*Crosby* was a *statutory* preemption case"). Here, both the Executive and Congress have acted to occupy the field of war reparations against Japan, through a longstanding policy embodied in the Treaty, leaving California no possible ambit to enact section 354.6.

B. Particularly As Applied to Respondents, Section 354.6 Is Equally Preempted Under the "Conflict" Theory Described in *Garamendi*

Even if section 354.6 could somehow be viewed as addressing issues "within areas of . . . traditional state responsibility," so as to warrant application of the "conflict" preemption standard articulated in *Garamendi*, the California statute would still be preempted if applied to respondents. As articulated in *Garamendi,* the "clarity or substantiality" of a conflict "var[ies] with the strength or the traditional importance of the state concern asserted," *id.* at 2389 n.11, and, as appropriate, "the strength of the federal foreign policy interest." *Id.* Here, California's interest is extraordinarily weak, the conflict is acute, and the federal interest is overwhelming.

1. The State's Interest Is Nonexistent

California's interest in enacting section 354.6 is considerably weaker than it was even with respect to HVIRA, because here the statute possesses neither a state regulatory purpose nor any colorable claim to having been authorized by federal legislation. *Cf. Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2393 (discussing California's argument that Congress authorized laws like HVIRA in the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act); *see also supra* n.14. Moreover, section 354.6 shares with HVIRA the fatal flaw that the conduct California seeks to govern – namely, conduct by Japan and Japanese nationals towards Korean and Chinese nationals in Asia during World War II – is wholly divorced from California. *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2393 (citing *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts*, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) and *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague*, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)); *see infra* section II.A.

Even more attenuated than its interest in *enacting* section 354.6 is California's interest in having the statute *applied* in these cases. At best, California might have an interest in the welfare of Korean and Chinese nationals who moved to the state *after* World War II, but *Garamendi* explicitly held that this factor should be accorded "'little or no significance.'" *Id.* (quoting *Shutts*, 472 U.S. at 820). Furthermore, as a matter of fact, only a few of the hundreds of thousands of putative class members in these cases have claimed California residency. ER 3 (*Kim* Complaint); ER 68 (*Sung* Complaint). Thus *no* cognizable state interest is at stake in these cases.

2. The Conflict with the Allied Treaty

Given the lack of state interest, only a minimal conflict is required for "conflict" preemption to exist under *Garamendi*. *Id.* at 2389 (strength of state interest determines "how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state

law preempted"). In this case, though, the conflict is clear and direct.

"The Treaty reflects the United States government's foreign policy determination that all war-related claims against Japan and its nationals – including private claims and including the claims of those whose governments were not party to the Treaty – should be resolved by *government-to-government agreement rather than litigation.*" App. F at 42a-43a, 49a, 54a.[16] This approach is in harmony with well-settled international and U.S. legal principles. *See, e.g., Ware*, 3 U.S. at 229 (Chase, J.).

With respect to Korea, U.S. law and policy is codified in article 4(a) of the Treaty, which commits the Korean petitioners' claims to resolution through "special arrangements" between Japan and Korea and leaves no room for any other U.S. law remedy. App. A at 3a. Article 26 of the Treaty obligated Japan to conclude separate treaties with China as well as Korea "on the same or substantially the same terms" as the Allied Treaty, including the latter's claims resolution provisions. App. A at 19a-20a. Private lawsuits in U.S. courts under California (or even federal) law are, of course, the antithesis of the diplomatic resolution mandated by the Treaty. *See* App. F at 53a-55a ("The Treaty of Peace . . . provides that the claims of Korea and China, and those of their nationals, will be resolved through inter-governmental agreements rather than through litigation."). Japan shares this view. SER 525 (Japan's *Note Verbale*) ("[T]hese issues should not be adjudicated in the courts in the United States."). Allowing claims to proceed in U.S. courts would therefore "undermine[] the intended purpose and 'natural effect'" of the Treaty. *See Crosby*, 530 U.S. at

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[16] "[T]he meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." *Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano*, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982).

373 (finding conflict preemption); App. F at 49a-50a (noting the "conflict[]" between section 354.6 and the Treaty), 55a (stating that Korean and Chinese plaintiffs "may not, consistent with the United States' policy adopted in the Treaty, pursue their claims in the courts of the United States.").

Very recently, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Treaty foreclosed war-related claims by Korean and Chinese nationals in U.S. courts. In *Joo v. Japan*, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the court considered whether the commercial exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act could be applied retroactively to World War II events; the court concluded that it could not, in part because "the [Allied] Treaty manifests the parties' intent to resolve matters arising from World War II *without involving the courts of the United States* (or of any signatory nation)." *Id.* at 684-85. The court found that the Treaty "expressed a clear [U.S.] policy of resolving the claims of Korean and Chinese nationals through government-to-government negotiation." *Id.* at 685.[17] Indeed, as evidence of such subsequent negotiations, the *Joo* court cited the Japan-Korea Treaty and the Japan-ROC Treaty. *Id.*; *see also* App. B and App. C.

The certiorari petitions never mention the Treaty provisions directed to resolution of war claims among Japan, Korea and China, confining their treatment of the Treaty to stating that Korea and China were not signatories. The issue, however, is not whether Korea or China were signatories; it is that the Treaty "establish[es] the law of *the United States*

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[17] The court pointed to article 14 of the Treaty, which reciprocally waived all claims of Allied and Japanese nationals, and noted that "it would be odd indeed for the United States, on the one hand, to waive all claims of its nationals against Japan and, on the other hand, to allow non-[signatory] nationals to proceed against Japan in its courts." *Joo*, 332 F.3d at 685.

with respect to the war-related claims of Korean and Chinese nationals." App. F at 54a. That law – mandating resolution through diplomacy – binds U.S. courts, including state courts and state legislatures; no other or additional remedy can be supplied under United States law.

One result of the diplomacy mandated by the Treaty was the Japan-Korea Treaty, which is "part and parcel of the framework created by the United States in 1951." SER 512 (U.S. Statement of Interest). That treaty *independently* precludes adjudication of petitioners' claims, for through it Japan paid Korea a half billion dollars in grants and loans, App. B at 21a-22a (art. I), and the parties "*settled completely and finally*" the "problem concerning property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties *and their nationals*" as well as "claims between the Contracting Parties *and their nationals*" (including juridical persons), App. B at 23a (art. II, ¶ 1). The claims resolved "include[d]" – but are not restricted to – "those provided for in" article 4 of the Allied Treaty – *i.e.*, reparations – and "claims that . . . Korean natural persons have against . . . *Japanese nationals* such as . . . *claims by Koreans against Japanese . . . corporations*." SER 370 (Agreed Minutes ¶ 2(g)); SER 320-22 (Republic of Korea, White Paper on Korea-Japan Talks (1965)); SER 346-47 (Outline of the "Eight Items" – Claims Made by Korea Against Japan).

Other products of the Treaty are the Japan-ROC and Japan-PRC treaties and the Joint Communiqué, which, separately and together, reciprocally settled all war claims of Japanese and Chinese nationals. In negotiating and signing these treaties, Japan complied not only with its obligations under the Allied Treaty, but with the admonition of the United States that Japan "pursue foreign policies in Asia which were generally compatible with those of the United States, particularly in relation to China." SER 376-77. The Japan-ROC Treaty literally incorporated by reference the "relevant provisions" of the Allied Treaty as the rule by

which "any problem" between the signatories resulting from "the existence of a state of war" "*shall be settled*" (unless the Japan-ROC Treaty, or its supplementary documents, provided otherwise). App. C at 29a (art. XI). Having concluded a treaty with the only government of China recognized by the United States – the ROC – Japan reasonably took the position that its treaty with the ROC resolved all war claims involving China. Nevertheless, in 1972, Japan responded to the United States' recognition of the PRC by opening negotiations to "normalize" its own relations with the PRC, SER 409-410, an "opening to China" that led to the Joint Communiqué in which Japan and the PRC agreed to language, carefully drafted as a political compromise to preserve the dignity of both sides, whereby the PRC declared "that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples," the PRC "*renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.*" App. D at 33a (art. 5). The Japan-PRC Treaty, App. E, incorporated and reaffirmed the terms of the Joint Communiqué. Thus the fruit of the Allied Treaty's resolution of petitioners' claims via diplomacy resulted in other, nonjudicial resolutions of those claims under the laws of petitioners' own countries.[18]

3. The Overwhelming Federal Foreign Policy Interest

The resolution of World War II-era reparations claims against Japanese companies is an "area of uniquely federal interest" for all of the reasons discussed above with respect to the appropriateness of a "field" preemption analysis. *Garamendi,* 123 S. Ct. at 2389 n.11; *Boyle v. United Techs.*

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[18] As noted above, however, petitioners would be unable to proceed in U.S. courts even if the agreements between Japan and Korea and Japan and China permitted lawsuits. U.S. courts are bound by "the law of the United States," which mandates a nonjudicial resolution of "the war-related claims of Korean and Chinese nationals." App. F. at 54a.

Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1987). The Ninth Circuit carefully and correctly assessed this overwhelming federal interest, which provides a further reason that the balance of factors leads inexorably to preemption in these cases, even under a "conflict" theory analysis.

C. *Garamendi* Expressly Rejected Many of Petitioners' Specific Attacks on the Decision Below

In addition to validating the Ninth Circuit's foreign affairs preemption analysis, *Garamendi* addressed and rejected several of petitioners' arguments based on their (incorrect) assumption that *Low* was decided correctly. Both petitions insist that foreign affairs preemption does not apply to suits against "private" parties. *Oh* Pet. at 2, 16, 18, 20; *Ma* Pet. at 18 and 21. *Garamendi*, however, flatly rejected any "distinction" between companies and governments of "formerly belligerent states." 123 S. Ct. at 2387. Observing that "untangling government policy from private initiative during war time is often so hard that diplomatic action settling claims against private parties may well be just as essential in the aftermath of hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign governments," this Court found that the attempted distinction simply "does not matter". *Id.* What was true in *Garamendi* is doubly so here, where petitioners have *alleged* that the *Japanese government* ordered their forced labor. *See, e.g.*, ER 34 (*Choe* complaint); ER 97, 98-99 (*Sin* complaint); ER 123-24 (*Oh* complaint). Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, the only suits permitted by section 354.6 are against "'enterprises'" that, "if not themselves our wartime enemies, were operating in enemy territory and presumably – no party disputes this – with the consent and for the benefit of our wartime enemy." *Oh* Pet. App. at 23a (quoting § 354.6(a)(1), (2)).

The *Oh* petitioners also make the odd argument that section 354.6 is not subject to preemption because it does "not focus on any single country." *Oh* Pet. at 17. Not only

is their premise wrong – the statute focuses solely on conduct of the "Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers," while ignoring forced labor practices of other countries or eras, § 354.6(a)(1), (2) – but also the reach of HVIRA was even broader. As the *Oh* petitioners concede, HVIRA did not "target any particular country," *Oh* Pet. at 14-15, yet its wider scope posed no obstacle to the application of foreign affairs preemption in *Garamendi*.

Petitioners also incorrectly characterize section 354.6 as purely a statute of limitations, implying that it cannot therefore interfere with foreign affairs. *Oh* Pet. at 2, 6-7; *Ma* Pet. at 22-25. Once again, the premise is wrong. As the Ninth Circuit found, and as discussed in section II.A.3. *infra*, section 354.6 is *not* merely a limitations statute. But, even if it were, petitioners cite no authority differentiating between limitations and substantive statutes in a foreign affairs analysis, and, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, neither logic nor policy permits such a distinction. *See Oh* Pet. App. at 14a ("Whether substantive or procedural," section 354.6 creates a "new rule [that] profoundly alters the likelihood that" Second World War reparations "actions will succeed.").

Just as misguided is petitioners' argument that section 354.6 does not "implicate *current* foreign policy." *Oh* Pet. at 16, 21; *Ma* Pet. at 21. The Allied Treaty, although signed some 50 years ago, is current law in the United States and Japan. As the United States advised the lower courts, it remains the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Far East and is as much an expression of U.S. and Japanese foreign policy today as it was in 1951. SER 505 (U.S. Statement of Interest). Section 354.6 therefore *does* affect ongoing foreign relations – indeed, the United States and Japan agree that the law threatens to "jeopardiz[e] relations between the United States and Japan and Japan and its Asian neighbors." SER 520 (U.S. Statement of Interest); *see* SER 525 (*Note Verbale*).

Petitioners' contention that the Ninth Circuit applied a "rigid rule" so broad that it would preclude numerous suits that other courts have allowed to go forward, *Oh* Pet. at 22-28; *Ma* Pet. at 19-22, misrepresents both the Ninth Circuit's decision and the suits that other courts have entertained. Contrary to petitioners' assertions that the Ninth Circuit's holding precludes any state cause of action "*somehow relate[d] to war*," *Oh* Pet. at i, *see also Oh* Pet. at 25-27, that arose "before or during a time of war" *see, e.g.*, *Ma* Pet. at i, *see also Ma* Pet. at 12, 14, 18-19 and 21, the decision contains neither words nor reasoning that remotely could yield such a result.

The Ninth Circuit's holding, in fact, is narrow: "section 354.6 is impermissible because it intrudes on the federal government's exclusive power to *make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims*." *Oh* Pet. App. at 23a. This holding is further limited by the court's explicit reliance on the fact that the federal government "has *already exercised*" its authority to resolve the war it waged. *Oh* Pet. App. at 24a. Of the cases that petitioners allege are in conflict with the Ninth Circuit's opinion, none involves the core federal power to resolve, through a treaty or otherwise, a war waged by the United States or a state-created cause of action devoted to war reparations. Thus there is *no* contradiction between the Ninth Circuit's holding and the cases petitioners cite. *Oh* Pet. at 25-27; *Ma* Pet. at 20-21.

II. Alternative Grounds for Dismissal Make Grant of Certiorari Inappropriate

Preemption is only one of many grounds for dismissing petitioners' claims. Respondents briefly bring a few of these to the Court's attention both to inform the decision on the petitions and to request that, should review on the issue of foreign affairs preemption be granted, these grounds also be considered as a basis for affirmance.

A. Applying California Law Would Violate Due Process

One of the issues on which certiorari was granted in *Garamendi* was whether HVIRA exceeded California's "legislative jurisdiction" under the Due Process Clause, given the tenuous connection between California and the issuance of insurance policies in Europe decades ago. *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2385 n.7. While the Court did not reach the issue in *Garamendi, id.*, in this case there can be no doubt that the Due Process Clause forbids California to apply its law to the conduct of Japan and Japanese nationals toward Koreans and Chinese in Asia during World War II.

1. Due Process Requires Significant Contacts Between California and the Conduct It Regulates

As *Garamendi* explained, "the general standards for evaluating a State's claim to apply its forum law to a particular controversy or transaction" may be found in this Court's opinions in *Shutts* and *Allstate*. 123 S. Ct. at 2393. Those standards make it unconstitutional to apply the law of a "State [that] has only an insignificant contact with the parties *and the occurrence or transaction*." *Allstate*, 449 U.S. at 310-11 (plurality); *id.* at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting); *see also Shutts*, 472 U.S. at 822 (state "may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within them"). In *Shutts*, for example, this Court held that Kansas law could not constitutionally govern claims of non-Kansas petitioners against a non-Kansas respondent regarding non-Kansas leases, even though respondent "own[ed] property and conduct[ed] substantial business in the State" and "hundreds of Kansas plaintiffs were [also] affected" by the challenged conduct. *Id.*, 472 U.S. at 818-22.

A state may apply its law only if it has "'a *significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts*, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.'" *Shutts*, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting

Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312-13); *accord Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt*, 123 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2003). In determining whether "application of [forum law is] sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits," the "expectation of the parties [is] an important element." *Shutts*, 472 U.S. at 822.

Here, the conduct at issue is wholly unconnected to California. *None* of the petitioners had any relationship with California at the time of the alleged conduct, and almost none does even now. Neither petitioners nor respondents, at the time of the events, could "reasonably have anticipated that their actions would later be judged" by California law. *Allstate*, 449 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus section 354.6, as applied, exceeds California's legislative jurisdiction.

2. The Presence Today of Some Petitioners and Respondents in California Does Not Satisfy Due Process

Nor is the absence of any "significant contact" between California and these cases cured because a few petitioners may have become California residents in the sixty years since their claims arose. "'Even if a plaintiff evidences his desire for forum law by moving to the forum,'" this Court has "'generally accorded such a move little or no significance.'" *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2393 (quoting *Shutts*, 472 U.S. 820); *see also Allstate*, 449 U.S. at 319 (plurality) ("[A] postoccurrence change of residence to the forum State [is] insufficient" in and of itself to confer power on the forum State to choose its law.) *cited in Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2393.

No more pertinent is the amenability of some respondents to personal jurisdiction in California.[19] "[W]hile a State

[19] Petitioners assert claims under section 354.6 against U.S. subsidiaries that came into being long after World War II, and therefore (continued ...)

may . . . assume jurisdiction over the claims of [parties] whose principal contacts are with other States, it *may not use this assumption of jurisdiction as an added weight in the scale when considering the permissible constitutional limits on choice of substantive law.*" *Shutts*, 472 U.S. at 819, 821.

3. Calling the Statute "Procedural" Does Not Cure the Due Process Violation

Both petitioners and the California Attorney General admitted in the District Court that section 354.6 is not just a statute of limitations that extends the time within which claims under existing law can be filed, but creates a new cause of action – which petitioners in fact sued upon – and without which, they also admit by their arguments in this Court, they would have no claim at all. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief Regarding the Constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure Section 354.6, filed Mar. 1, 2001, at 2, 3; *Amicus Curiae* Brief of the Attorney General of the State of California, filed Aug. 8, 2000, at 4. Now, however, these parties, hoping to evade the rule of *Shutts*, have altered their position, contending that the statute is only a "procedural" statute of limitations. *See, e.g., Oh* Pet. at 2, 6-7; *Ma* Pet. at 22-25.

Even if these parties were free to change position – and they were not, *see, e.g., Helfand v. Gerson,* 105 F.3d 530, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1996) – their revised argument is both wrong and irrelevant. It is wrong because, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the statute "explicitly creates a cause of action by providing that certain individuals 'may bring an

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(... continued)
had no involvement whatsoever in any of the alleged forced labor. The further due process violation that would result from applying the statute to such entities provides yet another basis for affirming the court of appeals. *See Gerling Global Reins. Corp.* v. *Nelson*, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2000), *aff'd, Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of Am.* v. *Gallagher*, 267 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001).

action' for certain wrongs." *Oh* Pet. App. at 12a (quoting § 354.6(b) and citing *Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md.*, 535 U.S. 635, 644 (2002) (statute providing party "may bring an action" "reads like the conferral of a private right of action")). Further, the limitations period of section 354.6(c) applies only to "action[s] *brought* under *this section*," *i.e.*, actions maintained under section 354.6 itself.[20] Thus it cannot be just a statute of limitations, for it would not have any claim to limit. Petitioners' assertion of claims directly based on section 354.6 also confirms its substantive nature. ER 24 (*Kim)*; ER 56 (*Choe*); ER 80 (*Sung*); ER 103 (*Sin*); ER 126 (*Oh*); ER 153 (*Su*); ER 254 (*Ma*).

The argument is irrelevant because, even if section 354.6 *were* merely a statute of limitations that revived other California claims, subjecting respondents to liability for those claims would itself violate due process, for the reasons discussed in part, II.A.1. *supra*. It would also run afoul of the constitutional prohibition on retroactive legislation. *See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.*, 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994); *cf. Stogner v. California,* 123 S. Ct. 2446 (2003) (a law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to revive a previously time-barred criminal prosecution). The Ninth Circuit, although not deciding the retroactivity issue, recognized that "[s]uch a revival of liability – even civil

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[20] The *Ma* petition alludes to a supposed conflict between the Ninth Circuit's decision and the California Court of Appeal decision in *Taiheiyo Cement Co. v. Superior Court (Jeong)* on the issue of whether section 354.6 creates a cause of action. *See Ma* Pet. at 1, 15-16 (arguing that the "embarrassing conflict" between *Taiheiyo* and *Deutsch* adds "some urgency to the need for this Court's review"). As petitioners acknowledge, however (*id.* at 1), the decision in *Taiheiyo* has been superseded by the California Supreme Court's grant of review. *See Taiheiyo Cement Co. v. Superior Court (Jeong)*, 66 P.3d 1231 (Cal. 2003), and Cal. Rule of Court 976(c).

liability – is troubling and raises serious due process questions." *Oh* Pet. App. at 14a.

B. Petitioners' Claims Are Precluded by Japan's Treaties with Korea and China

As discussed briefly *supra* pp. 21-22, the bilateral treaties Japan entered into with Korea and China, in obedience to the Allied Treaty and consistent with U.S. foreign policy, all contain provisions effectively settling and barring all war-related claims of Korean and Chinese nationals. The Japan-Korea Treaty's waiver of claims provision has also been implemented through domestic legislation in both countries. SER 30, 45-71 (Declaration of Akira Kotera, Professor of International Law at the University of Tokyo); SER 76-77 (Declaration of Yuji Iwasawa, Professor of International Law at the University of Tokyo).

C. Petitioners' Claims Are Nonjusticiable

As discussed briefly above, the negotiations culminating in the Allied Treaty accommodated diverse policies and interests of both signatory and nonsignatory states, including Korea and China. Petitioners ask this Court to set aside these policies and political compromises, the fruits of which remain the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in Asia, and to put the courts of California in the business of deciding war claims – an inherently political, nonjudicial realm. This course is foreclosed by the political question doctrine.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) identified six indicia of nonjusticiable, political questions; if even *one* is present, a case must be dismissed. 369 U.S. at 217. All six *Baker* indicia are present here. Matters of war and peace, including resolution of war claims, are foreign affairs issues "constitutionally committed" to the political branches, and the actions of those branches in negotiating and adopting the Treaty framework required numerous "policy determination[s]" that are entitled to "respect" and

"unquestioning adherence." *See id.* Not only would it create a "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements" for a court to revisit these long-resolved political issues – as the United States urged below – courts simply lack the ability to perform the type of political calculus involved in resolving war claims. *See id.* The Treaty framework consists of "reparations agreements which the United States and other World War II combatants (whose blood and treasure brought the war of conquest . . . to an end) forged in the crucible of a devastated post-war [world] and in the crucible of the Cold War" – agreements "which the court does not have the judicial power" to refashion, even had they the necessary wisdom. *Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG*, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 282 (D.N.J. 1999).

Conclusion

The Court should deny the petitions outright. The foreign affairs analysis of the decision below accords with, and the judgment is compelled by, *Garamendi.* Should this Court nevertheless choose to consider the foreign affairs doctrine issues raised by petitioners, it should also certify for review respondents' alternative grounds for dismissal of the complaints.

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Dated: August 4, 2003

APPENDICES

Appendix A

TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN
Sept. 8, 1951
San Francisco, California

Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Appendix A

CHAPTER I

PEACE

Article 1

(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.

(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

CHAPTER II

TERRITORY

Article 2

(a) Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

Article 3

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Article 4

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.

(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connecting Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

CHAPTER III

SECURITY

Article 5

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

Article 6

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.

(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Article 7

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify

Appendix A

Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall continue in force or by revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

Article 8

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on September 1, 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of July 20, 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of

Appendix A

January 20, 1930 and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated 17 May 1930, the Convention of January 20, 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

Article 9

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Article 10

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Article 11

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised

except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

Article 12

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty

(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests - such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), participating in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-

nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

Article 13

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges

than those exercised by any such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

CHAPTER V

CLAIMS AND PROPERTY

Article 14

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they

shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

(a) Japan and Japanese nationals,

(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and

(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals, which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belong to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in subparagraph (I) above:

(i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;

(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and

consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;

(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;

(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to September 2, 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in subparagraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers,

other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Article 15

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned, Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between December 7, 1941 and September 2, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf of the owner or by his Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on December 7, 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation will be made on terms not less favorable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on July 13, 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective September 1, 1949, No. 12 effective January 28, 1950, and No. 9 effective February 1, 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within the time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on December 7, 1941, in respect

to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from December 7, 1941, until the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of six months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

Article 16

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14(a)2(II)(ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no

application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.

Article 17

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7 December 1941 and such coming into force, in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

Article 18

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the

Appendix A

Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or re-presented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

Article 19

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between September 1, 1939, and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include

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Japanese claims specifically recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since September 2, 1945.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before September 1, 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after September 2, 1945. Such renunciation shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty.

(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Article 20

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

Article 21

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

Appendix A

CHAPTER VI

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 22

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated October 15, 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

CHAPTER VII

FINAL CLAUSES

Article 23

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force of each State

which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Governments of Japan and the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

Article 24

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23.

Article 25

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

Article 26

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which

previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Article 27

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof.

Appendix B

AGREEMENT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS CONCERNING PROPERTY AND CLAIMS AND ON THE ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 22, 1965
Tokyo, Japan

Japan and the Republic of Korea,

Desiring to settle [the] problem concerning property of the two countries and their nationals and claims between the two countries and their nationals; and

Desiring to promote the economic co-operation between the two countries;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. To the Republic of Korea Japan shall:

(a) Supply the products of Japan and the services of the Japanese people, the total value of which will be so much in yen as shall be equivalent to three hundred million United States dollars ($300,000,000) at present computed at one hundred and eight billion yen (¥108,000,000,000), *in grants* [on a non-repayable basis] within the period of ten years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement. The supply of such products and services in each year *shall be limited to* [shall be such] such amount in yen as shall be equivalent to thirty million United States dollars ($30,000,000) at present computed at ten billion eight hundred million yen (¥10,800,000,000); in case the supply of any one year falls short of the set amount, the remainder shall be added to the amounts of the supplies for the next and subsequent years. However, *the ceiling on* the amount

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of the supply for any one year can be *raised* [increased] by agreement between the Governments of the Contracting Parties.

(b) Extend long-term and low-interest loans up to such amount in yen as shall be equivalent to two hundred million United States dollars ($200,000,000) at present computed at seventy-two billion yen (¥72,000,000,000), which the Government of the Republic of Korea may request and which shall be used for the procurement by the Republic of Korea of the products of Japan and the services of the Japanese people necessary in implementing the projects to be determined in accordance with arrangements to be concluded under the provisions of paragraph 3 of the present Article, within the period of ten years from the date of the entry into force of the present Agreement. Such loans shall be extended by the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund of Japan, and the Government of Japan shall take necessary measures in order that the said Fund will be able to secure the necessary funds for implementing the loans evenly each year.

The above-mentioned supply and loans should be such that will be conducive to the economic development of the Republic of Korea.

2. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall establish, as an organ of consultation between the two Governments with powers to recommend on matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the present Article, a Joint Committee composed of representatives of the two Governments.

3. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall conclude necessary arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of the present Article.

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Article II

1. The Contracting Parties confirm that [the] problem concerning property, rights and interests of the two Contracting Parties and their nationals (including juridical persons) and concerning claims between the Contracting Parties and their nationals, including those provided for in Article IV, paragraph (a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, is settled completely and finally.

2. The provisions of the present Article shall not affect the following (excluding those subject to the special measures which the respective Contracting Parties have taken by the date of the signing of the present Agreement):

(a) Property, rights and interests of those nationals of either Contracting Party who have ever resided in the other country in the period between August 15, 1947, and the date of the signing of the present Agreement;

(b) Property, rights and interests of either Contracting Party and its nationals, which have been acquired or have come within the jurisdiction of the other Contracting Party in the course of normal contacts on or after August 15, 1945.

3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, no contention shall be made with respect to the measures on property, rights and interests of either Contracting Party and its nationals which are within the jurisdiction of other Contracting Party on the date of the signing of the present Agreement, or with respect to any claims of either Contracting Party and its nationals against the other Contracting Party and its nationals arising from the causes which occurred on or before the said date.

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Article III

1. Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation and implementation of the present Agreement shall be settled, first of all, through diplomatic channels.

2. Any dispute which fails to be settled under the provision of paragraph 1 shall be referred for decision to an arbitration board composed of three arbitrators, one to be appointed by the Government of each Contracting Party within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt by the Government of either Contracting Party from the Government of the other of a note requesting arbitration of the dispute, and the third to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen within a further period of thirty days or the third arbitrator to be appointed by the government of a third country agreed upon within such further period by the two arbitrators, provided that the third arbitrator shall not be a national of either Contracting Party.

3. If, within the periods respectively referred to, the Government of either Contracting Party fails to appoint an arbitrator, or the third arbitrator or a third country is not agreed upon, the arbitration board shall be composed of the two arbitrators to be designated by each of the governments of the two countries respectively chosen by the Governments of the Contracting Parties within a period of thirty days and the third arbitrator to be designated by the government of a third country to be determined upon consultation between the governments so chosen.

4. The Governments of the Contracting Parties shall abide by any award made by the arbitration board under the provisions of the present Article.

Article IV

The present Agreement shall be ratified. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Seoul as soon as possible. The

present Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo, in the Japanese and Korean languages, both being equally authentic, this twenty-second day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five.

For Japan:	For the Republic of Korea:
Etsusaburo Shiina	Tong Won Lee
Shinichi Takasugi	Dong Jo Kim

Appendix C

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND JAPAN

April 28, 1952
Taipei, Taiwan

The Republic of China and Japan,

Considering their mutual desire for good neighborliness in view of their historical and cultural ties and geographical proximity;

Realizing the importance of their close cooperation to the promotion of their common welfare and to the maintenance of international peace and security;

Recognizing the need of a settlement of problems that have arisen as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries,

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China: Mr. Yeh Kung Chao;

The Government of Japan: Mr. Isao Kawada;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Appendix C

Article I

The state of war between the Republic of China and Japan is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty enters into force.

Article II

It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.

Article III

The disposition of property of Japan and its nationals in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores), and their claims, including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including debts, against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Japan. The terms nationals and residents whenever used in the present Treaty include juridical persons.

Article IV

It is recognized that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the war.

Article V

It is recognized that under the provisions of Article 10 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has renounced all special rights and

its interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and has agreed to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Article VI

(a) The Republic of China and Japan will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their mutual relations.

(b) The Republic of China and Japan will cooperate in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and, in particular, will promote their common welfare through friendly cooperation in the economic field.

Article VII

The Republic of China and Japan will endeavor to conclude, as soon as possible, a treaty or agreement to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations, on a stable and friendly basis.

Article VIII

The Republic of China and Japan will endeavor to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement relating to civil air transport.

Article IX

The Republic of China and Japan will endeavor to conclude, as soon as possible, an agreement providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Appendix C

Article X

For the purposes of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendents who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores).

Article XI

Unless otherwise provided for in the present Treaty and the documents supplementary thereto, any problem arising between the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco Treaty.

Article XII

Any dispute that may arise out of the interpretation or application of the present Treaty shall be settled by negotiation or other pacific means.

Article XIII

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Taipei as soon as possible. The present Treaty shall enter into force as from the date on which such instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Appendix C

Article XIV

The present Treaty shall be in the Chinese, Japanese, and English languages. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate at Taipei, this Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Forty First year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the Twenty Eighth day of the Fourth month of the Twenty Seventh year of Showa of Japan and to the Twenty Eighth day of April in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty Two.

For the Republic of China:	For Japan:
Yeh Kung Chao	Isao Kawada

Appendix D

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

September 29, 1972
Peking, People's Republic of China

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communiqué of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighboring countries, separated only by a strip of water with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese

people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communiqué is issued.

2. The Government of Japan recognizes that Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

4. The Government of Japan and the Government of People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with

international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to

expanding interchanges of people, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

Done at Peking, September 29, 1972

Prime Minister of Japan
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

Appendix E

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND JAPAN

August 12, 1978
Peking, People's Republic of China

The People's Republic of China and Japan,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan issued a Joint Statement in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis,

Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Statement constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Statement should be strictly observed,

Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected,

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world,

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The People's Republic of China:
Huang Hua, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Japan:
Sunao Sonoda, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Appendix E

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The Contracting Parties shall develop durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

2. In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Contracting Parties affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

Article II

The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Article III

The Contracting Parties shall, in a good-neighbourly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavour to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

Article IV

The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.

Appendix E

Article V

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in the Chinese and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August 1978.

For the People's Republic of China:
Huang Hua

For Japan:
Sunao Sonoda

Appendix F

Nos. 01-17197, 01-17201, 01-17203, 01-17207
01-17211, 01-17243, and 01-17251

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SUK YOON KIM, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ISHKAWAJIMA HIRIMA HEAVY INDUS. CO., LTD., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING GROUP 4 IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, THE HONORABLE VAUGHN R. WALKER

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INTRODUCTION

The Constitution assigns to the Federal Government exclusive responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign policy. At the conclusion of World War II, the President and Senate determined that the United States' interests in security and stability in Asia would be best served by rebuilding Japan into a strong, democratic ally. They recognized that this would not be possible as long as Japan and its industrial base were subject to ongoing compensation claims arising out of the war. At the same time, the United States insisted that Japan pay some compensation for the untold injury it had caused during the war.

Balancing these interests, the Treaty of Peace between the United States, other Allied nations, and Japan, provided for resolution, on a government-to-government basis, of all war related claims and, in return, required Japan to relinquish billions of dollars in foreign assets to those who had suffered at the hands of the Japanese.

Now, half a century after the war's end, the California legislature has adopted a statute that encourages litigation of precisely those claims that the Treaty provided should be resolved by inter-governmental arrangement. California's World War II forced labor statute goes far beyond the State's legitimate domestic interests and interferes in a direct and significant way in matters of foreign relations, undermining in the process long-established federal policy.

BACKGROUND

1. The 1951 Treaty of Peace.

The Treaty of Peace signed on September 8, 1951 between the United States, 47 other Allied powers, and Japan formally concluded World War II with respect to the Pacific Theater. *See* 3 U.S.T. 3169. The Treaty reflects the United States

government's foreign policy determination that all war-related claims against Japan and its nationals — including private claims and including the claims of those whose governments were not party to the Treaty — should be resolved by government-to government agreement rather than litigation.[1]

John Foster Dulles, the United States' principal negotiator, believed that continued demands for war claims compensation would prevent Japan's economic recovery and its development into a reliable democratic ally against communism. The Korean War had begun; communist forces had taken control of the Chinese mainland; and Soviet expansionism was a world-wide threat. Japan was at the center of these geopolitical forces. The United States viewed an economically stable, anti-communist Japan as essential to the United States' interests in the Pacific region. Japan could not play that role if it were subject to continuing war-related claims that might stifle its economy. *See generally* August 2000 Statement, 3-7 [Signatory SER 340-44].

Nor did the United States and the Allies want to repeat the experience of the Versailles Treaty after World War I, which many consider to be one of the root causes of World War II. *See generally id.* at 4-6 [Signatory SER 341-43]. Finally, the United States government, having assumed sole responsibility for Japan's recovery during the occupation of Japan following the war, concluded that any substantial payment of war-related claims ultimately would come out of the pockets of the American taxpayers. *See ibid.* For these reasons, the President, and the Senate in its advise-and-consent role, determined that

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[1] The history of the 1951 Treaty is discussed in much greater detail, with extensive citations to the historical record, in the August 9, 2000, and December 6, 2000, Statements of Interest filed by the United States with the district court. *See* Supplemental Excerpts of Record Concerning Groups 1, 2, & 3 [Signatory SER], 328 ("August 2000 Statement"); Supplemental Excerpts of Record filed in Kim et al [Non-Signatory SER], 498 ("December 2000 Statement").

all claims against Japan and its nationals should be waived in exchange for the forfeiture by Japan and its nationals of their foreign assets.

The Allied nations that are parties to the Treaty, including the United States, expressly waived all claims that they or their nationals might have against Japan and its nationals arising out of the war. Article 14 of the Treaty authorized Allied governments "to seize * * * all property, rights and interests of * * * Japan and Japanese Nationals" located in the Allies' respective jurisdictions in exchange for a commitment by Japan to help rebuild the territory it had occupied and a waiver of claims by Allied governments and their nationals against Japan and Japanese nationals. Art. 14. The waiver provision states:

> Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Art. 14(b).

In addition to finally resolving the Allies' own war claims and those of their nationals, the Treaty also provided that the war claims of non-signatory countries and their nationals were to be resolved by government-to-government negotiations. These claims, especially those of China and Korea, were extremely large. Japan's infamous conduct in Nanking and its use of Asian slave labor was well documented by the time of the Treaty's negotiation. *See* December 2000 Statement, 4-6 [Non-Signatory SER 507-09]. If left unresolved, these potentially enormous liabilities would likely have prevented Japan's economic recovery. Permitting assertion of these claims would thus have been flatly at odds with one of the chief reasons for the Allies' agreement to waive their own claims and

those of their nationals. *See ibid.* *See also* Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons), Washington, Jan. 17, 1951 (Ex. 8 to the December 2000 Statement) ("any reparations which might be paid to the Koreans by the Japanese would in fact come from the United States taxpayers"). The Allies thus determined that the Treaty should also provide for the resolution of these nonsignatory claims.

Implementing this policy posed significant difficulties. No consensus existed among the Allies as to whether the People's Republic of China ("PRC") or the Republic of China ("Taiwan") legally represented China. Neither could Korea be a party to the Treaty because Korea, as part of the Japanese empire, had fought against the Allies during the Pacific War. As a result of these complications, no Chinese or Korean political entities signed the 1951 Treaty, and Article 14(b)'s waiver provision does not, by its own terms, cover the PRC, Taiwan, or North or South Korea. *See generally* December 2000 Statement 4-6 [Non-Signatory SER 507-09].

To achieve their foreign policy goals, the Allies inserted into the Treaty several other provisions intended to ensure that Chinese and Korean war claims against Japan were also resolved through government-to-government arrangements. Although China and Korea were not signatories, the Treaty provided that China and Korea would receive from Japan the same compensation that the Allies had obtained for themselves in return for waiving their claims. In turn, the Treaty obligated Japan to enter into bilateral agreements with Chinese and Korean representatives on terms similar to those provided in the Treaty.

Article 21 of the Treaty gave China the benefits of Articles 10, in which Japan renounced all rights and interests in China, and 14(a)2, which authorized China to seize and liquidate all assets of Japan and Japanese nationals located in Chinese territory. These provisions were extremely significant to China;

almost half of all Japanese-owned foreign assets were located in China. *See* December 2000 Statement at 4 [Non-Signatory SER 507]. In return, Article 26 provided that Japan was expected to enter into a separate treaty settling the war with a Chinese political entity "*on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty.*" Art. 26 (emphasis added). As contemplated by Article 26, a subsequent treaty between Japan and the Republic of China ("Taiwan") states that "property of such authorities and residents [of Taiwan] and their claims against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of China and the Government of Japan." *See* Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan, April 28, 1952, 1858 U.N.T.S. 38 [Non-Signatory SER .

The Treaty of Peace dealt with Korean war claims against Japan in a similar fashion. Article 21 stated that Korea was entitled to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9, and 12 of the Treaty. Article 2 required Japan to recognize Korea's independence and renounce all claims to Korea. Article 4(b), as construed by the United States, gave Korea the same benefits the Allies had obtained for themselves. It authorized the seizure by Korean authorities of all Japanese-owned assets in Korea – assets worth billions of dollars. *See* December 2000 Statement, 8 [Non-Signatory SER 511]. In turn, Article 4(a) provided that the "claims * * * of [Korean] authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and [Korean] authorities."

As contemplated in Article 4(a), Japan and the Republic of Korea ("South Korea") entered into an agreement in 1965, following years of protracted negotiations in which the United States was heavily involved. 8473 U.N.T.S. 258 [Non-Signatory SER, 352]. The terms of this agreement were greatly influenced by the fact that Korea had already received substantial compensation under Article 4(b) of the 1951 Treaty. Article II.1 of the Japan-ROK treaty specifically provides that

the "problem * * * concerning claims between the Contracting Parties and their nationals, including those provided for in Article IV, paragraph (a) of the [1951] Treaty of Peace * * * is settled completely and finally." Non-Signatory SER, 354. A similar agreement between Japan and North Korea is currently under negotiation.

2. California's World War II Forced Labor Statute.

In 1999, California enacted a statute that permits World War II slave and forced laborers to sue the companies that benefited from their labor. *See* Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 354.6. The author of the provision, State Senator Tom Hayden, stated at the time of its enactment that the law was intended to "*send[] a very powerful message from California to the U.S. government and the German government,* who are in the midst of rather closed negotiations about a settlement" of World War II-era claims. *See* Henry Weinstein, *Bill Signed Bolstering Holocaust-Era Claims*, Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1999, at A3 (1999 WL 2181642) (emphasis added). The "message," according to Hayden, was that "[i]f the international negotiators want to avoid very expensive litigation by survivors * * *, they ought to settle. Otherwise, this law allows us to go ahead and take them to court." *Ibid.*

The California statute creates a cause of action for victims of slave labor practices of the "Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers" with uniquely favorable substantive and procedural rules. *See* Cal. Civ. Pro. § 354.6. The statute permits any "prisoner-of-war," "concentration camp" prisoner, or "member of the civilian population conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers," who was forced "to perform labor without pay for any period of time between 1929 and 1945, by the Nazi regime, its allies and sympathizers," or companies within their jurisdictions, to bring suit to recover the "market value" of the labor they performed. *Ibid.* California has defined the cause of action so as to remove any defense

based on the law of the place where the conduct occurred, *id.* § 354.6(b), affixed damages in a manner to eliminate the effect of post-war inflation, *id.* § 354.6(a)(3), made corporations doing business in California liable for the debts of their Asian and European affiliates, without regard to traditional principles of corporate identity, *id.* § 354.6(b), and set aside generally-applicable statutes of limitations in favor of a limitations period that extends to 2010, *id.* § 354.6(c).

3. Proceedings in the District Court

Plaintiffs are nationals of China and Korea who allege that, during World War II, they were forced by the Japanese government to perform labor for Japanese companies in support of Japan's war effort. *See, e.g.*, Non-Signatory ER 11-25, 43-57, 98-99. Plaintiffs, purporting to represent all similarly situated Korean and Chinese nationals, filed class action suits against the companies for which they were forced to work as well as their American affiliates. Plaintiffs allege claims under California's Section 354.6 as well as common law causes of action. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing, among other grounds, that plaintiffs' claims present non-justiciable political questions, that the suits are barred by the 1951 Treaty of Peace, and that California's forced labor statute is unconstitutional.

The United States, appearing as amicus curiae, filed a Statement of Interest supporting dismissal. The United States explained that California's forced labor statute frustrates the foreign policy of the United States, established in the 1951 Treaty of Peace, that claims such as plaintiffs' are to be resolved through government-to-government arrangements rather than through litigation.

On September 17, 2001, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims. *See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Although the district court found that the Treaty of Peace did

not directly bar plaintiffs' claims, because neither Korea nor China had signed the Treaty, *id.* at 1165-66, the court held that the California legislature had impermissibly attempted to intrude into the conduct of foreign policy when it attempted to create a cause of action for wrongs committed by Japan and its nationals during World War II, *id.* at 1166-78. With respect to plaintiffs' Alien Tort Statute and remaining state-law claims, the court held that, even under the longest statute of limitations that might arguably apply, plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. *Id.* at 1178-83.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The Constitution grants to the Federal Government exclusive authority to conduct the nation's foreign relations, an area that the Framers determined should "be left entirely free from local interference." *Hines v. Davidowitz,* 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941). The Supreme Court has enforced the constitutional design by striking down state laws that would frustrate the objectives of established federal foreign policy and, even in the absence of federal action, setting aside state regulations that have more than an indirect effect on the nation's foreign relations. Under these precedents, California's policy of promoting litigation of World War II forced labor claims must give way. The State's foreign policy conflicts with the considered judgment of the President and Senate, reflected in the 1951 Treaty of Peace, that such claims against Japanese nationals should be resolved by government-to-government agreement, rather than individual litigation.

2. Section 354.6 also violates additional constitutional limits on the jurisdictional reach of state law. It is an inherent constraint of our federal system of government, reflected in both the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, that each State may legislate only with respect to matters that take place within its borders. A

contrary view would permit the proliferation of conflicting legal obligations.

California's forced labor statute is a clear example of extraterritorial legislation. The conduct that California seeks to regulate took place exclusively in foreign lands, with no perceptible connection to California. The fact that certain named plaintiffs have subsequently moved to California does not give California the authority to apply its substantive law to events that took place entirely outside the State's boundaries.

The legislation cannot be saved by casting it as a mere "statute of limitations." The structure and language of Section 354.6 betray the State's attempt to define the substantive as well as procedural rules under which the defendants' liability is to be determined.

ARGUMENT

I. THE CONSTITUTION PRECLUDES CALIFORNIA FROM INTERFERING IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS SHOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS.

A. The Constitution Vests Full and Exclusive Responsibility For Foreign Relations In The Federal Government.

From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution's specific commitment of foreign affairs powers to the national government[2] and the

[2] The Constitution grants to Congress the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," *id.*, cl. 10. The Constitution also designates the President as the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the

express prohibitions on the States' activities in that sphere[3] reflect a general rule of exclusive federal authority over international relations. "Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively." *United States v. Pink*, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942). *See also Hines v. Davidowitz*, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (the Federal Government is entrusted "with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties"); *United States v. Arjona*, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887) (power to define and punish violations of the Law of Nations is "conferred by the constitution on the government of the United States exclusively").

In light of the "imperative[] * * * that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference," Hines, 312 U.S. at 63, the Supreme Court has held that state "regulations must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy," *Zschernig v. Miller*, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).

United States," *id.*, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and gives him the authority to "make Treaties" and "appoint Ambassadors" with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate," *id.*, cl. 2, and to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," *id.*, § 3.

The Constitution also confers upon Congress the authority "[t]o lay and collect * * * Duties, Imposts and Excises," and "provide for the common Defence," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization," *id.*, cl. 4, "[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," *id.*, cl. 11, "[t]o raise and support Armies," *id.* cl. 12, "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy," *id.* cl. 13, and to regulate "the land and naval forces," *id.* cl. 14.

[3] The Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" or, without the consent of Congress, "lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports," "keep Troops or Ships of War in time of Peace," "enter into any Agreement or Compact * * * with a foreign Power," or "engage in War, unless actually invaded." U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10.

Appendix F

Because the conduct of foreign policy is committed to the Federal Government, and because of the unique concerns raised by state action in that arena, federal preemption of a state law concerning foreign affairs may be more readily inferred than in the domestic context where federal and state governments share regulatory authority. When the States act in an area in which federal interests predominate, "[t]he conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when Congress legislates in a field which the states have traditionally occupied." *Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.*, 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (quotation omitted). "Preemption of a whole field * * * will be inferred where the field is one in which 'the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." *Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.*, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting *Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.*, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Thus, when a State legislates in an area affecting foreign affairs, the courts are "more ready to conclude that a federal Act * * * supersede[s] state regulation." *Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.*, 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).

Just as the Supreme Court is more willing to infer affirmative preemption when a state statute intrudes into the foreign policy arena, the Court has also made clear that a state law that directly implicates the conduct of foreign policy will be set aside even if there is no affirmative preemption. In *Zschernig v. Miller*, the Supreme Court made clear that a state policy that disturbs foreign relations must give way "even in [the] absence of a treaty" or federal statute. 389 U.S. at 441. *See also* Laurence H. Tribe, *American Constitutional Law*, § 4-5 at 656 (3d ed. 2000) ("all state action, whether or not consistent with current foreign policy, that distorts the allocation of responsibility to the national government for the conduct of American diplomacy is void as an unconstitutional

infringement on an exclusively federal sphere of responsibility").

The California forced labor statute has far more than an "incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries." *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 434-35. Rather, the State has deliberately undertaken the formulation of foreign policy in an area subject to international treaty obligations, adopting a strategy that directly impairs the accomplishment of federal policy and prevents the nation from speaking with one voice on a matter of international concern.

Because the policy reflected in California's forced labor statute is in direct tension with the nation's foreign policy expressed in the 1951 Treaty of Peace, the state statute "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of federal policy and is, thus, affirmatively preempted. *Hines*, 312 U.S. at 67; *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). However, even if the Court were to conclude that the forced labor statute has not been affirmatively preempted, it is plain that the statute in design and effect impermissibly intrudes into the conduct of foreign affairs and is therefore beyond the authority of the State to enact.

B. Federal Law Preempts California's Forced Labor Statute, Which Stands As An Obstacle To Achieving The United States' Foreign Policy Established In The 1951 Treaty Of Peace.

The 1951 Treaty of Peace reflects the President and Senate's considered judgment that all claims arising out of Japan and Japanese nationals' conduct in the course of World War II, including claims between private individuals, should be resolved through inter-governmental negotiations. The Allied parties to the Treaty, including the United States, expressly "waive all * * * claims of the Allied Powers *and their nationals* arising out of any actions taken by Japan *and its nationals* in the

course of the prosecution of the war." Art. 14(a) (emphasis added). The Treaty of Peace likewise provides that the claims of Korea and China, and those of their nationals, will be resolved through inter-governmental agreements rather than litigation. While the Treaty may not be directly binding on Korea and China, who were not parties to the Treaty, the Treaty does establish the law of the United States with respect to the war-related claims of Korean and Chinese nationals. Indeed, it would be ironic to think that the United States foreclosed the war-related claims of its own nationals while leaving its courts open to litigating the claims of foreign nationals.

As noted above, the Treaty of Peace both ensured for Korea and China the same benefit as the Allied parties had obtained for themselves and directed that war-related claims of Koreans and Chinese, like those of Allied nationals, would be settled on a government-to-government basis. Japan was required to renounce its interests in Korea and China, and the Korean and Chinese authorities were allowed to seize and liquidate all Japanese assets within their territories — assets worth billions of dollars. *See* Art. 4(b) (Korea); Art. 10, 14(a)(2), 21 (China). In return, both Korea and China were expected to settle, as the Allied parties had, the war-related claims of themselves and their nationals against Japan and its nationals. *See* Art. 4(a) ("claims * * * of [Korean] authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and [Korean] authorities"); Art. 26 (providing that Japan was to enter a peace treaty with China, settling the war "*on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty*" (emphasis added)).

California's forced labor statute runs directly contrary to the United States' foreign policy of relegating the war-related claims of Korean and Chinese nationals to inter-governmental resolution. Whereas federal law provides that the claims of Korean and Chinese nationals, like those of Americans themselves, are to be resolved by government-to-government

settlements, the California statute grants such claims a preferred status, with uniquely favorable substantive and procedural rules. *See, e.g.*, Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 354.6(a)(3) (affixing damages in a manner to eliminate the effect of post-war inflation), § 354.6(b) (making corporations doing business in California liable for the debts of their Japanese affiliates, without regard to traditional principles of corporate identity), § 354.6(c) (setting aside generally-applicable statutes of limitations in favor of an 81-year limitations period).

The district court mistakenly believed that the federal Treaty could preempt the California statute with respect to plaintiffs' claims only if the Treaty itself actually resolved the Korean and Chinese claims. *See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1165-68 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Thus, the district court found it conclusive that the Treaty itself did not "waive the claims of the Korean and Chinese plaintiffs." *Id.* at 1165. *See also id.* at 1168 (Treaty does not "control claims of individuals from non-signatory nations"). This misconceives the nature of both the Treaty and federal preemption. It is not necessary for the Treaty to finally resolve plaintiffs' claim in order for the federal law to preempt California's attempt to encourage litigation of those claims. It is sufficient that the Treaty establishes, as a matter of United States law, that plaintiffs' claims are to be resolved by inter-governmental arrangements, rather than litigation. It is irrelevant, therefore, whether, as a matter of Korean or Chinese law, plaintiffs could pursue their claims in the courts of those nations; they may not, consistent with the United States' policy adopted in the Treaty, pursue their claims in the courts of the United States. The California statute plainly "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of the Treaty. *Hines*, 312 U.S. at 61; *Crosby*, 520 U.S. at 373-77 & n.10 (rejecting as "cramped," Massachusetts' argument that the Federal Burma Act had given the President had flexibility over *federal* sanctions but "implicitly left control over state sanctions to the State").

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C. Even if Not Affirmatively Preempted, the California Forced Labor Statute Is an Unconstitutional Intrusion Into the Conduct of Foreign Affairs.

The Supreme Court has established that, even apart from statutory preemption, the Constitution's commitment to the Federal Government of the exclusive responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign affairs acts as an independent constraint on state activity. Thus, "even in [the] absence of a treaty" or federal statute, a state policy that disturbs foreign relations must be set aside. *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 441. *See also Chy Lung v. Freeman,* 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (striking down California statute requiring ship to post bond for certain foreign immigrants without finding conflict with any federal statute or treaty). It is not a question of "balanc[ing] the nation's interest in a uniform foreign policy against the particular interests of a particular state"; rather, "there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed." *National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,* 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 1999), *aff'd*, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).

Zschernig is illustrative. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon probate law that prevented the distribution of estates to foreign heirs if, under foreign law, the proceeds of the estate were subject to confiscation. 389 U.S. at 431. The Court noted that application of the statute required state courts to engage in "minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law" and to judge the credibility and good faith of foreign counsels, *id.* at 435, with outcomes turning upon "foreign policy attitudes" regarding the Cold War, *id.* at 437. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the statute had "a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems." *Id.* at 441. The Court held that this "kind of state involvement in foreign affairs and international relations — matters which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government" — was "forbidden state activity." *Id.* at 436.

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The California forced labor statute represents a similar impermissible intrusion into the Federal Government's authority to regulate foreign affairs. California is plainly of the view that Japanese companies' use of unpaid forced labor, even if condoned by the Imperial Japanese government, violated principles of international human rights law. But under our constitutional scheme, only the Federal Government has the authority to prescribe penalties for foreign violations of international law. *See* U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 10; *United States v. Arjona,* 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887).

This is particularly so where, as here, the international law violations at issue were committed in conjunction with a foreign government during the course of a war against the United States. As the Supreme Court has recognized, war-related claims, including the claims of nationals, are frequently the subject of government-to-government negotiations at the conclusion of hostilities. *See, e.g., United States v. The Schooner Peggy,* 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) (upholding the Federal Government's power to abolish, by way of treaty, private prize claims against foreign property); *Ware v. Hylton,* 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230 (1796) (refusing to adjudicate a personal debt, confiscated by Virginia during the Revolutionary War, because the treaty of peace concluding the war had not provided for such claims). The decision whether to risk continued animosity with a foreign power by creating claims in American courts arising out of foreign nationals' participation in their government's atrocities is a determination that only the Federal Government is authorized to make. *See Pink*, 315 U.S. at 225 (noting that "the existence of unpaid claims against Russia *and its nationals* which were held in this country * * * had long been one impediment to resumption of friendly relations between these two great powers" (emphasis added)).

Even a State with the best of intentions lacks the resources and breadth of view necessary to assess the impact of punishing particular international law violations on the United States'

multi-faceted international interests. *See, e.g., Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,* 530 U.S. 363, 381-82 (2000) (observing that independent state activity would undermine President's ability to coordinate the country's multi-pronged policy of encouraging democratic change in Burma through enticements, threats, and cooperation with other foreign nations). A state legislature is in a poor position to assess what risks to our relations with Germany and Japan are entailed by a statute that aims to redress the wrongs of World War II, or to weigh those risks against other foreign policy objectives that depend upon the good will of those governments. The interests of the nation as a whole should not be made dependent upon the judgment of any one State which lacks both the responsibility and the capacity to formulate foreign policy.

Plainly, the California legislature has engaged in a policy-oriented balancing of interests and decided that the benefits of adopting a law with respect to German and Japanese forced labor claims were worth the risks entailed in antagonizing the target companies and the German and Japanese governments. As to the States, such foreign policy debates are "forbidden activity." *Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 435-36.[4] Like other state statutes that have been held invalid under *Zschernig*, this statute

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[4] At the time of the bill's signing, the provision's author made clear that the statute was intended to influence the conduct of the United States and German governments in their discussions relating to Holocaust-era claims:

> [Section 354.6] *sends a very powerful message from California to the U.S. government and the German government,* who are in the midst of rather closed negotiations about a settlement. * * * If the international negotiators want to avoid very expensive litigation by survivors * * *, they ought to settle. * * * Otherwise, this law allows us to go ahead and take them to court.

See Henry Weinstein, *Bill Signed Bolstering Holocaust-Era Claims*, Los Angeles Times, July 29, 1999, at A3 (1999 WL 2181642) (emphasis added).

unacceptably compromises the nation's interest in having its foreign policy conducted by a national government responsible to the citizens of all states. *See Natsios,* 181 F.3d at 53 (Massachusetts statute restricting the ability of state agencies to purchase goods or services from companies that also did business in Burma was specifically designed to affect the affairs of a foreign country); *Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County,* 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176-77, 1180 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (by requiring public contractors to certify that neither they nor their subcontractors had engaged in commerce with Cuba, Cuban products or Cuban nationals, county had impermissibly inserted itself into a "hotbed of foreign affairs" with the intent to "protest and condemn Cuba's totalitarian regime"); *Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ.,* 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1376-80 (1980) (state university's policy of denying admission to Iranian students in retaliation for the Iranian hostage crisis intruded upon "the arenas of foreign affairs and immigration policy, interrelated matters entrusted exclusively to the federal government"); *Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson,* 503 N.E.2d 300, 302-03 (Ill. 1986) (state law regarding the sale of South African coins was unconstitutional where adopted "as an expression of disapproval of that nation's policies"); *New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights,* 361 N.E.2d 963, 968 (N.Y. 1977) (striking down prohibition on advertising jobs in South Africa as an impermissible intrusion upon foreign relations). *Compare Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,* 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding state "Buy America" statute in part because the law did not involve evaluation of specific foreign nations), *cert. denied,* 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).

Further, as with the Massachusetts Burma statute, the potential foreign policy impact of California's forced labor statute must be assessed within the "broader pattern of state and local intrusion." *Natsios*, 181 F.3d at 53. If California is free to redress the wrongs associated with forced labor during World War II, then each State is free to adopt similar — or even

inconsistent — laws relating to their preferred foreign human rights issue, whether it be repression in Burma, *cf. Natsios*, 181 F.3d at 53, or communism in Cuba, *cf. Miami Light Project,* 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. In addition to violating the territorial limitations on state jurisdiction, discussed below, such a rule would severely undermine American foreign policy. Individual States cannot be permitted to force their favored issues or preferred resolutions into the Federal Government's diplomacy. *See Crosby*, 530 U.S. at 382-83 (observing that Massachusetts had undermined federal policy toward Burma by making the state law the focus of diplomacy, rather than Burma's conduct).

As discussed above, the conflict with federal policy in this case is real and direct. The Federal Government made the determination at the conclusion of World War II that the nation's strategic need for a strong, democratic ally against communism in Asia required that claims against Japan and Japanese companies be resolved finally through inter-governmental negotiation. Thus, the Allies, including the United States, foreclosed litigation of their nationals' war-related claims in exchange for the right to confiscate and distribute Japanese assets within their territory. The Allies directed that the claims of Korean and Chinese nationals be dealt with similarly. California's forced labor statute moves in precisely the opposite direction, encouraging and facilitating litigation of the exact claims that the federal policy seeks to bar.

Actual adjudication of plaintiffs' claims would draw the courts even deeper into the terrain of foreign affairs. The court would be called upon to adjudicate whether Japan's bilateral treaties with South Korea and the Republic of China do, in fact, resolve plaintiffs' legal claims. If the parties to those agreements disagree on their meaning, a court ruling either way might well inflame simmering international disputes. Moreover, a finding that the treaties had not finally resolved those claims would be equivalent to a determination that Japan violated its obligations under the terms of the 1951 Treaty of

Peace. An individual state legislature cannot interject its courts into such foreign policy thickets. *See Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 435-37.

Plaintiffs mistakenly contend that this Court's opinion in *Gerling Global Reins. Corp. of America v. Low*, 240 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001) ("*Gerling-Low*") controls the foreign affairs analysis in this case. As the district court explained, the *Gerling-Low* decision turned on factors that, in this case, require dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. In *Gerling-Low*, the Court found that the disclosure provisions of the HVIRA were related to the State's *domestic* interest in monitoring the bona fides of insurance companies doing business in the State. 240 F.3d at 744-45. A disclosure requirement alone, the Court stated, would not affect the "decision making authority" of insurance companies "to pay or not to pay claims." *Ibid.* Moreover, Congress had, in the Court's view, "expressly delegated to the states the power to regulate insurance," *id.* at 744-46 (citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act), and had even "embrace[d] state legislation like HVIRA," *id.* at 748 (citing the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1988).

The California forced labor statute, in contrast, is an attempt to force foreign companies and their affiliates to pay damages, according to a formula determined by the California legislature, for wrongs committed in foreign lands.[5] Federal policy is precisely to the contrary. Thus, the forced labor statute is quite distinct from the HVIRA, as construed by the Court, and more akin to those provisions of California insurance law that the Court specifically declined to address in the *Gerling-Low* decision. *See* 240 F.3d at 745 (reserving "for another day" consideration of the constitutionality of California Ins. Code

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[5] As described further below, *infra* at 31, plaintiffs' and the State of California's characterization of Section 354.6 as merely a "statute of limitations" cannot be squared with the provision's language.

§ 790.15, which authorizes license suspensions of insurance companies who have not paid Holocaust-era claims, and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.5, which allows claims for payment on Holocaust-era insurance policies issued in Europe).

Plaintiffs would construe the *Gerling-Low* ruling so broadly as to overturn the Supreme Court's *Zschernig* decision. In plaintiffs' view, the *Gerling-Low* court held *Zschernig* inapplicable wherever the defendants are simply businesses and no foreign government has been named as a defendant, and where the statute at issue is not directed at a particular country. *See* Kim Br. at 25. Under this construction, the *Gerling-Low* opinion necessarily overruled the holding in *Zschernig* because no foreign government was a party to the litigation in Zschernig, and the statutes there at issue were not, on their face, directed at any particular country. *See Zschernig*, 389 U.S. at 430, 432.[6] Plainly, this Court did not purport to overrule Supreme Court precedent. *See Agostini v. Felton,* 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); *United States v. Pacheco-Zepeda,* 234 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. THE CALIFORNIA WORLD WAR II FORCED LABOR STATUTE IS EXTRATERRITORIAL LEGISLATION THAT IS BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE TO ENACT.

In addition to Section 354.6's impermissible interference with federal foreign policy, the state statute also violates the federal Constitution's prohibition on States attempting to project their legislative jurisdiction beyond their borders.

A. The Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution "has long been understood" not only as an affirmative grant of authority to the Federal Government, but as a constraint upon

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[6] Even if this were the test, Section 354.6 is, in fact, expressly directed at particular foreign countries: "Nazi [Germany], its allies or sympathizers."

the power of the States, which "'provide[s] protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress has not acted.'" *Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board,* 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994) (quoting *Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,* 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)).

As the Supreme Court has explained, the Commerce Clause precludes a State from applying its law "to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders." *Edgar v. MITE Corp.,* 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion). *See also BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,* 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (State may not "impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the [violator's] lawful conduct in other States"). Extraterritorial regulation "exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature." *Healy v. Beer Institute,* 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).

These principles apply with particular force in the international arena, and the Supreme Court has recognized that the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause prevents States from regulating commerce in a manner that "prevents the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.'" *Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,* 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979) (quoting *Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,* 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)). A state statute "will violate the 'one voice' standard if it *either* implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear federal directive." *Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,* 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)

Similar principles, inherent in the constitutional requirement of due process, also limit a State's ability to project its law beyond its borders. *See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,* 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981) (plurality) ("if a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or

transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional"); *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,* 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985); *Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,* 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930). *See also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,* 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) ("[t]he Due Process Clause 'requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax'" (citation omitted)). The due process limitations on a State's extraterritorial legislation look "not only at whether the *parties* * * * have contacts with [the State], but also and more importantly * * * at whether the subject [of the legislation] has a sufficient nexus to [the State]." *Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Gallagher,* 267 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2001) ("*Gerling-Gallagher*").

Applying these principles, the Eleventh Circuit in *Gerling-Gallagher* recently enjoined application of a Florida statute that attempted to force European insurance companies and their Florida affiliates to pay on insurance policies issued in Europe prior to and during World War II. *See Gerling-Gallagher,* 267 F.3d at 1238. The court explained it was insufficient that, subsequent to the Holocaust, some victims had moved to Florida or that affiliates of the European insurers did business in Florida. *Ibid.* The State lacked a sufficient nexus to "the *subject*" of the legislation - "the German affiliates' payment or non-payment of Holocaust-era policy claims." *Ibid.*

B. In enacting its Second World War forced labor statute, the California legislature sought to create and define a cause of action to provide compensation for victims of German and Japanese forced labor practices during World War II. Section 354.6 establishes the cause of action, Cal. Civ. Pro. § 354.6(b), defines the class of plaintiffs who may sue, *id.* § 354.6(a)(1), (2), affixes the measure of damages (eliminating the effect of post-war inflation), *id.* § 354.6(a)(3), makes corporations doing business in California liable for the debts of their Asian and European affiliates, without regard to traditional principles of corporate identity, *id.* § 354.6(b), and sets aside generally-

applicable statutes of limitations, substituting an 81-year statute of limitations that extends to 2010, *id.* § 354.6(c).

Contrary to plaintiffs' and the California Attorney General's suggestion, the statute thus is considerably more than a state "statute of limitations." Indeed, the paragraph that establishes the limitations period expressly disavows any general application to causes of action that arise under other provisions of substantive law. To the contrary, the limitations provision applies only to "[a]ny action *brought under this section.*" *Id.* § 354.6(c) (emphasis added).

The principles outlined above plainly preclude this extraterritorial legislation. As noted, both the "dormant" Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause prohibit a State from projecting its laws into other jurisdictions. *See Healy v. Beer Institute,* 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (Commerce Clause); *Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,* 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930) (Due Process Clause). The California legislature can no more regulate conduct that takes place in Asia or legislate what damages should be paid for such conduct, than it can impose its regulatory policies on New York.

Section 354.6 applies to conduct in territory "conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers" at any time during World War II. *See* Cal. Civ. Pro. § 354.6(a)(2). By definition, therefore, the statute applies only to conduct that occurred outside of California. Nor does the statute represent an attempt to afford protection to California citizens victimized in foreign nations. The statute seeks to provide relief to persons "taken from a concentration camp or ghetto" in Europe, or "member[s] of the civilian population[s] conquered by the Nazi regime, its allies or sympathizers." *Id.* § 354.6(a). Indeed, with respect to claims concerning the Pacific Theater, the *only conceivable* plaintiffs are individuals who were not nationals of the United States in 1951, when the United States explicitly waived all such claims. Although some of the named plaintiffs may subsequently have moved to California, it is well-established

that the mere presence of the parties in a State is not an adequate basis for that State to apply its substantive law to activity with no other significant contact with the State. *Allstate Ins. Co.*, 449 U.S. at 310-11 (citing *John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates*, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)).

C. Plaintiffs cannot avoid the territorial limitations of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses by arguing that Section 354.6 merely authorizes suit against conduct that violated universal norms of international law. *Cf.* Kim Br. at 36-38. As discussed above, the authority to "define and punish Offences against the Law of Nations," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 10, is "conferred by the constitution on the government of the United States exclusively." *United States v. Arjona*, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887).[7] Thus, it is beyond the authority of the California legislature to provide redress for violations of international law beyond what remedies might be provided by federal law. *See also* The Federalist, No. 3 (Jay) (Rossiter ed. 1961) 43 (in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, where each State had independent authority to adjudicate points of international law, "[u]nder the national government, * * * the laws of nations will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner").

Plaintiffs' reliance on the history of state courts exercising jurisdiction over "transitory" torts, *cf.* Kim Br. at 33-34, is misplaced. As the Second Circuit explained in *Filartiga v. Pena-Irala*, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), upon which plaintiffs rely, a state court may provide a remedy for foreign conduct only "as long as the conduct complained of was unlawful where performed," *id.* at 885. *See also ibid.* (exercise of jurisdiction over transitory torts "is an expression of comity to give effect to

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[7] Of course, the States retain jurisdiction to prescribe and punish conduct that occurs in their own territory that might also violate international law. *See Arjona*, 120 U.S. at 487.

the laws of the state where the wrong occurred"). Here, in contrast, plaintiffs' Complaints acknowledge the full cooperation and involvement of the Imperial Japanese government in defendants' alleged conduct. *See, e.g.*, ER 12, 43-44, 98.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

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Nos. 02-1776, 02-1784

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

LESTER I. TENNEY, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
MITSUI & CO., LTD., ET AL.,
Respondents.

ALBERTO SALDAJENO, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA LTD., ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The decision below in these related petitions (Nos. 02-1776, 02-1784) held that California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.6 is preempted by the foreign affairs power of the federal government. These petitions ask this Court to resolve the following questions related to that decision:

1. Whether the decision is correct.

2. Whether the multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169 ("Treaty") prohibits these private causes of action against private Japanese companies.

3. Whether the Treaty violates international law by waiving the claims at issue in certain of these cases, given that they involve allegations of wartime forced labor.

4. Whether the court below properly decided a question of state law that the court noted "did not affect the outcome" of the case.

5. Whether there is removal jurisdiction over certain of these cases.

Rule 29.6 Corporate Disclosure Statement

Ishihara Corporation (U.S.A.)'s ultimate parent corporation is Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., and no other publicly traded company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd. does not have any parent companies. Mitsui & Co, Ltd. is the only publicly held company that owns 10% or more of its stock.

ISK Americas Incorporated is a subsidiary of Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd. No other publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd. is a Japanese public company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Mitsui Mining USA, Inc. is a 100% subsidiary of Mitsui Mining Co., Ltd.

Mitsubishi Corporation is a public company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of the outstanding stock of Mitsubishi Corporation. Mitsubishi International Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. is a Japanese public company and is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. No publicly held company owns 10% or more of its stock. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

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Nippon Steel Trading America, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nippon Steel Trading Co., Ltd.

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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

Petitioners in these related cases (Nos. 02-1776, 02-1784) offer no plausible reason why this Court should review the decision below. The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly holds that a California statute creating a cause of action for World War II era reparations claims – section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure – is preempted by the core federal power to make and resolve war. The United States exercised this power in the multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169 ("Treaty") (02-1776 Pet. App. 87a), which explicitly precludes the claims asserted by petitioners. The court of appeals' ruling is supported by the *amicus curiae* position of the United States below.[1]

Petitioners do not contend that there is any conflict between the ruling below and any decision of this Court. Nor do they identify any conflict among the federal courts of appeals or state courts of last resort with respect to any question addressed by the court below. Indeed, the petitions are effectively moot. Shortly after the petitions were filed, this Court issued its decision in *American Insurance Association v. Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003). In circumstances where the state law intrusion into the federal government's exclusive foreign affairs power was less obvious than it is here, *Garamendi* held another California statute regulating

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[1] The United States filed a Statement of Interest in the district court below, advocating dismissal of petitioners' claims on foreign relations grounds. *See* Statement of Interest of the United States of America ("Statement of Interest") (SER 338-75). "SER" refers to the Supplemental Excerpts of the Record filed jointly in the Ninth Circuit by respondents in the cases brought by each of the petitioners here. The United States filed an *amicus curiae* brief in the court of appeals reaffirming its view that section 354.6 impermissibly interferes with foreign relations and is preempted by federal law. *See* Brief for *Amicus Curiae* The United States of America, Nos. 01-17115 *et al.* (9th Cir. June 6, 2002).

World War II claims to be preempted by the foreign affairs power of the federal government. *Garamendi* confirms the court of appeals' conclusion that the statute at issue in these cases is preempted. The petitions should be denied.

OPINIONS BELOW

The petition in No. 02-1776 fails to note that the district court opinion included in its appendix, 02-1776 Pet. App. 69a, only applies to petitioners in Nos. 01-17115, 01-17124, 01-17134, 01-17155, 01-17185, 01-17195, 01-17252, and 01-17499.[2] The petition properly reflects that this opinion is reported at 114 F. Supp. 2d 939. With respect to the remaining POW petitioners (in Nos. 01-17116, 01-17123, and 01-17157), the opinion of the district court is unreported and is attached in the appendix hereto. App. 1a-6a.

The petition in No. 02-1784 correctly observes that the relevant opinion of the district court is reported at 164 F. Supp. 2d 1153.[3]

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[2] The following cases are before the Court as part of this petition: *Hutchison v. Mitsubishi Materials Corp.*, No. 01-17115; *Tenney v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.*, No. 01-17116; *Rubenstein v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd.*, No. 01-17123; *Heimbuch v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd.*, No. 01-17124; *Solis v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, No. 01-17134; *Corre v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.*, No. 01-17155; *Dunn v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, No. 01-17157; *Eneriz v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.*, No. 01-17185; *Poole v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, No. 01-17195; *Alfano v. Mitsui & Co. (USA), Inc.*, No. 01-17252; and *Price v. Mitsubishi Corp.*, No. 01-17499. Six other cases involving U.S. or Allied POWs with claims under section 354.6 – *King v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, No. 01-17160; *Levenberg v. Nippon Sharyo Ltd.*, No. 01-17189; *Wheeler v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.*, No. 01-17210; *Mente v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.*, No. 01-17230; *Terrence v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.*, No. 01-17260; and *Titherington v. Japan Energy Corp.*, No. 01-17265 – were also consolidated at the district court and the court of appeals, but the plaintiffs in those cases did not join the petition here.

[3] The following cases are part of this petition: *Llanza v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.)*, No. 01-17172; *Saldajeno v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd.*, No. 01-17176; and *Santo Domingo v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd.*, No. 01-

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES AND STATUTES

The following provisions of the United States Constitution are included in the appendix attached hereto:

Article I, § 8, cls. 1, 10-14 (App. 21a).

Article I, § 10, cls. 1, 3 (App. 22a).

Article II, § 2, cls. 1, 2 (App. 22a-23a).

The 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan is included in the petitioner's appendix in No. 02-1776 (02-1776 Pet. App. 87a-121a).

Relevant excerpts of the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended and codified in 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2001 et seq., are included in the appendix attached hereto (App. 7a-20a).

Section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is set forth in full in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, 02-1776 Pet. App. 42a-43a, and in the petitioners' appendix in No. 02-1776 (*id.* at 122a).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners in No. 02-1776, and the putative classes they claim to represent, are United States service members, or their heirs, who claim they were subjected to forced labor during the time they were held as prisoners of war ("POWs") by Japan during World War II. Petitioners in No. 02-1784, and the putative classes they claim to represent, are citizens and residents of the Philippines during World War II (or

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17177. Another case involving Filipino claims – *Resus v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.*, No. 01-17204 – was also consolidated at the district court and the court of appeals, but the plaintiffs in that case did not join this petition.

their heirs) who claim to have been subjected to forced labor during the Japanese occupation.[4]

A. Background

Beginning in 1999, petitioners filed lawsuits (ultimately combined in a single multidistrict litigation proceeding) seeking reparations for the labor they allegedly were forced to perform for Japanese corporations while held as POWs by the Japanese military, or as internees in the Philippines. The purported authority for these lawsuits, brought almost sixty years after the alleged underlying acts occurred, is section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.

Section 354.6 permits any "Second World War slave labor victim . . . or Second World War forced labor victim" to bring suit "to recover compensation for labor performed" during World War II against "any entity or successor in interest thereof, for whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a subsidiary or affiliate." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.6(b) (2003). The statute defines "compensation" as "the present value of wages and benefits that individuals should have been paid and damages for injuries sustained." *Id.* § 354.6(a)(3). The statute also provides that an action brought under it will be timely if commenced on or before December 31, 2010. *See id.* § 354.6(c).

This statute was enacted nearly fifty years after the United States and forty-six other Allied Powers formally ended the war in the Pacific by signing the multilateral Treaty, *supra*, 3 U.S.T. 3169-3328 (02-1776 Pet. App. 87a-

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[4] All references to "POW petitioners" are to the petitioners in No. 02-1776. All references to "Filipino petitioners" are to the petitioners in No. 02-1784. No classes have been certified in any of petitioners' cases; putative class members allegedly number in the "thousands." *E.g.*, *Alfano* Complaint (SER 124); *Saldajeno* Complaint (ER tab 2).

121a).[5] Under the Treaty, Japan agreed to pay the Allied Powers approximately $4 billion in reparations from various sources – primarily from the assets of Japanese nationals, including Japanese companies, located in Allied and neutral nations. *See* U. S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. VI: Asia and the Pacific, Pt. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O. (1977) (SER 473). While the Treaty "recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war," the Treaty also recognized that the resources of Japan were not sufficient "to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering." Treaty, *supra*, art. 14(a), at 3180 (02-1776 Pet. App. 97a). Accordingly, except for the reparations explicitly provided for in the Treaty, the Allied Powers agreed to "waive all reparations claims" as well as "other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war." *Id.* art. 14(b), at 3183 (02-1776 Pet. App. 99a). The Treaty does not create – expressly or otherwise – a private right of action against Japan or its nationals, nor does it authorize any State of the United States to create such a right.

The decision to limit the amount of reparations paid by Japan, and to waive all other war-related claims, was dictated by a number of foreign policy concerns. *See generally* Statement of Interest, *supra*, at 1-2 (SER 338-39). At the time the Treaty was negotiated, the Korean War was underway, communism had taken hold of China, and Soviet expansionism was viewed as a worldwide threat. *See* Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations, Mar. 9, 1951, printed in Execu-

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[5] The Philippines was one of the "Allied Powers" under the Treaty. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The Philippines ratified the Treaty on July 23, 1956, and deposited the ratification with the United States pursuant to Article 24 of the Treaty. *Id.*

tive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (Historical Series) vol. III, Part I, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, at 261 (1976) ("Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations") (SER 427). This political reality caused the United States to view an economically stable, anti-communist Japan as essential to U.S. interests in the Pacific region. *See* Statement of Interest, *supra*, at 4 (citing Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations, *supra*, at 261) (SER 341). Japan would be unable to be an effective Cold War ally if its economy was stifled by the ongoing burden of unresolved war claims. *See id.* at 4, 5 (citing Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations, *supra*, at 266-67) (SER 341-42).

The United States also wanted to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, which imposed crushing reparations on Germany at the end of World War I, and which many considered to be one of the root causes of World War II. *See* Statement of Interest, *supra*, at 2 (SER 339). If the Treaty had "validated, or kept contingently alive, monetary reparations claims against Japan, her ordinary commercial credit would vanish, the incentive of her people would be destroyed and they would sink into a misery of body and spirit which would make them easy prey to exploitation." U.S. Dept. of State, Record of Proceedings of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan 82-83 (1951) (SER 391).

Finally, the United States government concluded that its assumption of sole responsibility for Japan's recovery following the war would mean that any substantial payment of war-related claims would ultimately become the responsibility of U.S. taxpayers. *See* Statement of Interest, *supra*, at 4-5 (citing Japanese Peace Treaty Negotiations at 266-67) (SER 341-42). For all these reasons, the United States and its Allies agreed in the Treaty to waive all claims against Japan and its nationals in exchange for the forfeiture by Japan and its nationals of their foreign assets.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending approval of the Treaty notes these concerns:

> Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy of . . . the United States . . . .

Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, S. Rep. No. 82-2, at 2 (1952) (SER 407). The Committee recognized that the Treaty did not "give a direct right of return to individual claimants except in the case of those having property in Japan." *Id.* at 13 (SER 408). Rather, the Committee endorsed the position of the State Department that "United States nationals, whose claims are not covered by the treaty provisions . . . must look for relief to the Congress of the United States." *Id.* at 14 (SER 409).[6]

Congress decided to use the reparations it received from Japan under the Treaty – the confiscated assets of Japanese companies, other Japanese nationals, and the Japanese government located in the United States – to compensate U.S.

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[6] Article 14(b) was hotly debated in Congress, and a reservation was proposed that would have preserved individual claims by providing that "nothing contained in this Treaty shall be construed to abrogate the . . . just and proper claims of private citizens of the United States." Statement of Interest, *supra*, at 9 (quoting 98 Cong. Rec. 2365, 2567-71 (1952)) (SER 346). That reservation was deemed to be "in direct conflict with Article 14(b)," was defeated, and the Treaty ratified, unchanged. *Id.* (quoting Memorandum to The Secretary of State from Adrian S. Fisher (the Legal Adviser), Mar. 19, 1952, at 4, 5) (SER 346).

nationals who were held as POWs during the war.[7] Accordingly, it established in the War Claims Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2001 et seq. (App. 7a-20a), a federal claims mechanism by which former POWs, including these POW petitioners, could seek a share of the reparations received from Japan. Recognizing "that the question of war claims ... is too complex to be approached by the Congress on a piecemeal basis and that the subject in its entirety must be studied thoroughly before any intelligent action can be taken," H.R. Rep. No. 801-976, at 4 (1947) (SER 490), Congress charged the War Claims Commission with the adoption of uniform standards and procedures for handling war claims. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2007 (App. 18a-19a); *see also* 94 Cong. Rec. 567 (1948) (SER 504). The War Claims Act required POWs to submit their claims to the federal War Claims Commission, which was to make a final decision with respect to each claim. *See* 50 U.S.C. app. § 2010 (App 19a-20a).

The War Claims Act was intended to be the exclusive remedy for the payment of reparations to POWs. The Act does not permit any private lawsuits, and the final agency decision constitutes the only means for POWs to obtain compensation. In fact, a proposal that would have allowed federal courts to adjudicate war compensation claims was rejected because of the complexity of the issues and the need to have the claims "classified by experts who are qualified to do so" in order to "get some rationality out of this situation

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[7] The Treaty did not specify how the Allied Powers were to distribute the reparations they received from Japan. While the United States established claims mechanisms for former POWs to receive a share of the reparations, it was "the responsibility of each government to provide such compensation to the persons enjoying its protection as it may determine to be equitable out of reparations received from Japan or from other sources." Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific, 82d Cong. 147 (1952) (SER 465); *see also* S. Rep. No. 82-2, at 13 (SER 408).

. . . [and] to determine the categories of claims that should be allowed." 94 Cong. Rec. 564 (1948) (SER 501).

In 1997, dissatisfied with the federal government's policies regarding the appropriate level and means of compensating victims of World War II, the California legislature launched its own efforts to provide a state law remedy for wartime injuries. One element of California's reparations legislation was section 354.6, which, as discussed above, *supra* p. 4, provides a private cause of action for "Second World War" forced and slave labor victims, including former POWs such as certain of the petitioners. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.6(b).

California also provided a private cause of action for any Holocaust victim, heir or beneficiary who "has a claim arising out of an [unpaid] insurance policy or policies purchased or in effect in Europe before 1945." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.5(b) (2003). Section 354.5 was complemented by the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 ("HVIRA"), Cal. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 13800-13807, which required insurance companies licensed to do business in California to disclose information relating to unpaid policies issued either by themselves or affiliated companies in Europe between 1920 and 1945. This Court held the HVIRA to be preempted by the foreign affairs power of the federal government in *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2379.

B. Proceedings in the District Courts

Shortly after section 354.6 was enacted, petitioners brought these actions in California state court. Each action, as well as several others not part of these petitions, was removed to federal court. Upon removal, some of the petitioners unsuccessfully sought remand.

For example, in *Tenney*, No. 01-17116, the district court found removal was proper because federal question jurisdic-

tion exists under the complete preemption doctrine. The district court explained that Congress's intent in ratifying the Treaty was to "preempt other laws, including state laws . . . relating to losses suffered by individuals during WWII," and to supplant them with a "trust fund for the payment of war claims as provided by the War Claims Act of 1948." SER 252-53. The district courts in other of the related cases found jurisdiction on additional grounds, including the federal common law of foreign relations. *See, e.g.*, *Poole*, No. 01-17195; *Solis*, No. 01-17134.

Eventually, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred petitioners' cases to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for coordinated pretrial proceedings, along with fourteen other actions by U.S., Allied, Filipino, Korean, and Chinese plaintiffs pursuing similar claims under section 354.6.

In the Northern District of California, respondents initially moved to dismiss twelve actions by U.S. and Allied POWs. Respondents were supported in the district court by the United States, which filed a Statement of Interest urging dismissal on the ground that section 354.6 is preempted by the foreign affairs power of the federal government. SER 328-75. In opposing dismissal, petitioners again argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their claims. In a single opinion, the district court reaffirmed that it had subject matter jurisdiction because each of the actions asserted claims implicating the common law of foreign relations. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942-43 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The district court then concluded that all of the claims by U.S. POWs were barred by the Treaty and the War Claims Act. Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaints. *Id* at 944-49. In a subsequent order, the court dismissed three later-transferred POW cases on the same grounds. App. 1a-6a.

The respondents in the Filipino cases also moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the Filipino complaints on the ground that the claims were all barred by the Treaty. *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. Unlike the POW petitioners, the Filipino petitioners did not contest jurisdiction below. The district court subsequently dismissed the remaining related actions by Korean and Chinese plaintiffs.

C. The Court of Appeals Decision

The dismissals of all twenty-eight actions were appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The United States filed an *amicus curiae* brief and appeared at oral argument to urge affirmance of the district court's ruling. In a single opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of all actions.[8]

The court of appeals began by noting that section 354.6 "create[s] a specific cause of action for persons subjected to slave labor by the Nazis and their allies and sympathizers." 324 F.3d at 707. The court then analyzed whether section 354.6 unconstitutionally interferes with the foreign affairs power of the federal government, in particular, "the federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims." *Id.* at 712. The court noted that of the eleven clauses of the Constitution granting foreign affairs power to the President and Congress, seven "concern preparing for war, declaring war, waging war, or settling war." *Id.* at 711; *see* U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cls. 1, 2 (App. 22a-23a); art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11-14 (App. 21a). The Constitution also expressly limits the States' foreign af-

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[8] The twenty-eight cases dismissed by the Northern District of California were consolidated on appeal, along with another case based on section 354.6, *Deutsch v. Turner*, No. 00-56673. Of the consolidated cases, several are the subjects of separate petitions to this Court. *See Kim v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd.*, No. 02-1773; *Ma v. Kajima Corp.*, No. 02-1778.

fairs powers, particularly in the area of war. *See* U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (App. 21a). Emphasizing that "it is clear that matters concerning war are part of the inner core of [the foreign relations] power," 324 F.3d at 711, the court concluded that "[m]atters related to war are for the federal government alone to address," *id.* at 712.

In addition, the court of appeals noted that the federal government had already exercised its exclusive authority to resolve World War II and any claims arising out of it. The United States had signed the Treaty with Japan, which did not "create[] – explicitly or implicitly – a private right of action against Japan or its nationals." 324 F.3d at 714. In the absence of some specific action of the federal government authorizing states to exercise foreign affairs powers, California had no power to modify the federal government's resolution of the war. *Id.* With regard to the POW petitioners in particular, the court noted that their claims "were addressed by the federal government" in the War Claims Act, which "conceived of no private right of action against . . . Japanese entities." *Id.* at 714-15. The court of appeals accordingly held section 354.6 unconstitutional. *Id.* at 714-16.

After eliminating section 354.6 as a basis for petitioners' lawsuits, the court considered all of the other claims and concluded they were all time-barred. 324 F.3d at 716. Finally, the court of appeals declined to revisit the argument of some petitioners that federal jurisdiction was lacking. The court did note that diversity jurisdiction existed in some cases, including *Dunn v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, No. 01-17157. *See* 324 F.3d at 718.

Petitioners requested rehearing and rehearing en banc, which were unanimously denied. Following this Court's decision in *Garamendi*, petitioners in the related case *Ma v. Kajima Corp.*, No. 02-1778, filed for reconsideration. The

Ninth Circuit denied that motion at the same time it issued the mandate on July 30.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR REVIEW OF THE MERITS OF THE DECISION BELOW

The petitions in Nos. 02-1776 and 02-1784 raise a number of related questions challenging the merits of the court of appeals' conclusion that section 354.6 unconstitutionally interferes with the foreign affairs power of the federal government. Those questions were effectively addressed and resolved in this Court's recent *Garamendi* decision. Furthermore, the decision below is independently justified on at least two alternate grounds: section 354.6 is unconstitutional because it violates due process, and the political question doctrine dictates that these cases are not justiciable. The existence of these alternate grounds for affirmance of the opinion below also counsels against review.

A. The Court of Appeals Properly Held Section 354.6 Interferes With The Foreign Policy Choices Reflected In The Treaty of Peace With Japan And The War Claims Act

Petitioners argue that this Court should review whether the court of appeals mistakenly interpreted the Treaty as prohibiting the assertion of private causes of action by individuals against "private Japanese companies that enslaved them." 02-1776 Pet. at i; *see also* 02-1784 Pet. at 11 ("private Japanese corporations for their profit-making activities"). This question is inappropriate for review in light of *Garamendi*.[9]

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[9] The POW petitioners mistakenly characterize the decision below as necessarily resting on a conflict between the terms of the Treaty and section 354.6. 02-1776 Pet. at 12. In fact, the court of appeals did not rest its decision on any particular reading of the Treaty, but rather on a broader holding that "[m]atters related to war are for the federal govern-

Garamendi directly undercuts petitioners' fundamental assertion that their claims are private, not governmental, and therefore "neither are, nor are similar to, reparations claims." 02-1776 Pet. at 21; 02-1784 Pet. at 12. A similar argument was made by the State of California regarding the private insurance claims at issue in *Garamendi*. This Court rejected that distinction, noting that the frustration of private insurance claims "fell within the subject of reparations, which became a principal object of Allied diplomacy soon after the war." 123 S. Ct. at 2380. More so than private insurance claims, claims by POWs and others held captive by the enemy during the war are quintessential reparations claims to be resolved by governments at war's end. The Treaty fully and finally resolved those claims. Treaty, *supra*, art. 14(b), 3 U.S.T. at 3183 (02-1776 Pet. App. 99a).

Petitioners similarly assert that "no treaty in the history of this Republic has ever been held by this Court to preclude the assertion of private rights of action by private citizens against foreign non-government defendants." 02-1776 Pet. at i. But *Garamendi* expressly held that the United States may properly resolve claims against foreign corporations as well as foreign governments:

> [T]he distinction does not matter. Historically, wartime claims against even nominally private entities have become issues in international diplomacy . . . . Untangling government policy from private initiative during war time is often so hard that diplomatic ac-

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ment alone to address." 324 F.3d at 712. While noting that neither the Treaty nor the War Claims Act authorized any private cause of action against Japan or its nationals, the court of appeals held that "section 354.6 is impermissible because it intrudes on the federal government's exclusive power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for resolving war claims." *Id.* at 712. According to the court of appeals, the real issue is the "lack of state power" to provide its own resolution of the war. *Id.* at 715.

> tion settling claims against private parties may well be just as essential in the aftermath of hostilities as diplomacy to settle claims against foreign governments.

123 S. Ct. at 2387 (footnote omitted).

Petitioners' other arguments regarding the proper interpretation of the Treaty have been consistently rejected by the United States, *see* Statement of Interest, *supra* (SER 328-75), and are clearly without merit. Petitioners offer no rationale for this Court to accept review of these questions. Petitioners are wrong that different language used in Article 19 of the Treaty to waive claims by Japan and its nationals against the United States and its nationals suggests that Article 14(b) does not waive the claims here. 02-1776 Pet. at Part C.1.a; 02-1784 Pet. at 14-21. There is nothing ambiguous about the scope of the waiver in Article 14. As *Garamendi* made clear, the concept of "reparations" includes the types of claims asserted by petitioners, and Article 14 waives those claims, along with all other claims arising in the course of the prosecution of the war.[10] The distinctions in phrasing between Articles 14(b) and Article 19(a) reflect the different positions of the Allied Powers and Japan – which, for example, had to waive claims arising out of the post-war occupation. Petitioners' reading ignores both the plain language of Article 14(b) and the foreign policy goal underlying the Treaty – the full and final resolution of wartime claims against Japan.

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[10] The Filipino petitioners argue here, as they did below, that Article 14(b) cannot apply to their claims because their forced labor in the occupied Philippines, which was ruled by the Japanese military, did not occur "in the course of the prosecution of the war." 02-1784 Pet. at 15-20. The district court correctly rejected this argument based on its careful analysis of allegations made in the Filipino petitioners' own complaints, *In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1157-58, finding the argument "seriously disingenuous." *Id.* at 1157.

The POW petitioners are also wrong to assert that the waiver of their claims by Article 14(b) was revoked by subsequent treaties between Japan and other countries. 02-1776 Pet. at Part C.2. In particular, they invoke Article 26, which provides that "[s]hould Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the *parties* to the present Treaty." Treaty, *supra*, art. 26, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3190-91 (emphasis added) (02-1776 Pet. App. 106a). Even if it could be assumed that any other nation was ever granted a "greater advantage" than that provided to the United States with respect to Article 14(b)'s waiver, it is the United States as a *party* to the treaty who has the right to invoke that clause, and the United States has never done so, nor has any other Treaty party. As the court of appeals correctly held, petitioners cannot invoke this provision, as they were not parties to the treaty. 324 F.3d at 714 n.13.

The Filipino petitioners argue that because their claims arise from violation of "*jus cogens*" norms, the claims could not be waived by any treaty.[11] 02-1784 Pet. at Part III. This question is not worthy of this Court's attention. The Filipino petitioners point to no conflict among the circuits, no conflict with any holding of this Court, and no conflict with any holding of a state court of last resort.[12] Indeed, the only other court of appeals to interpret the Treaty has held that

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[11] The POW petitioners made similar arguments below, but abandoned them in their petition to this Court.

[12] In fact, the Filipino petitioners have twisted the *jus cogens* argument beyond recognition. There is no *jus cogens* right to the remedy they seek – civil litigation in tort and quasi-contract. The Treaty acknowledged that Japan owed compensation to the Allies for war-related injuries and wrongs, including forced labor, and required Japan to pay reparations. As this Court recognized in *Garamendi*, for the "last half century" the resolution of such claims has been the subject of diplomacy and treaties. 123 S. Ct. at 2390.

claims such as plaintiffs' could be and were in fact settled and waived. *See Joo v. Japan*, 332 F.3d 679, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of claims by comfort women from the Phillipines, Korea, China, and Taiwan because the Treaty created "a settled expectation, left undisturbed by the Congress, that Japan would not face suit in the courts of the United States for its actions during World War II").

Indeed, the Filipino petitioners' position would undermine the ability of the United States and other nations to resolve wars and establish peace through the settlement of claims, and would require the abrogation of the Treaty and other international agreements that resolved World War II. Petitioners' argument is impossible to reconcile with this Court's decision in *Garamendi* affirming the settlement of the wartime claims of individuals as a "traditional subject matter of foreign policy." 123 S. Ct. at 2390; *see also Dames & Moore v. Regan*, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981); *United States v. The Schooner Peggy*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801).

Finally, without citing any authority, the Filipino petitioners argue that the court below erred in holding their non-section 354.6 claims to be time-barred.[13] 02-1784 Pet. at 27. However, petitioners base this argument on the dual assumption that section 354.6 is constitutional, and that it revives and extends the statute of limitations on their remaining claims. Both assumptions are wrong. As noted herein, section 354.6 is unconstitutional, even if it is viewed as purely procedural. Moreover, by its own terms, section 354.6(c) only extends the statute of limitations on "action[s] brought

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[13] Relying on the same facts underlying their section 354.6 causes of action, petitioners alleged a variety of additional claims (including accounting, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, quantum meruit, and unfair business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.). The POW petitioners do not challenge the dismissal of these claims.

under this section" – not on other actions. Petitioners do not identify any California statute of limitations, apart from section 354.6(c), that permits sixty-year-old claims.

For all the foregoing reasons, petitioners have raised no issue that would warrant review of whether the Treaty preempts the assertion of their claims.

B. The Court of Appeals Did Not Inappropriately Resolve A Question of State Law

The POW petitioners argue that the court of appeals erred in holding that section 354.6 was a substantive statute creating a cause of action, rather than a purely procedural statute reviving and extending the statute of limitations on sixty-year-old claims. 02-1776 Pet. at 11. This issue does not merit review, because the court of appeals made clear that its decision did "not depend on [its] conclusion that section 354.6 is substantive law." 324 F.3d at 708. The court noted that

> [w]hether substantive or procedural, section 354.6 creates a special rule that applies only to a newly defined class of tort actions – actions brought by Second World War slave labor victims against the entities that enslaved them. This new rule profoundly alters the likelihood that such actions will succeed, by not only extending the statute of limitations for claims that were timely when the statute took effect (although we doubt that any such claims existed), but, far more important, by reviving claims that were already time-barred.

Id. Because the question whether section 354.6 is procedural or substantive "does not affect the outcome here," review is unwarranted. *Id.*

Even if the court of appeals' decision had turned on its characterization of section 354.6 as a substantive statute cre-

ating a private cause of action, review would still be unnecessary. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, this Court has expressly held that a federal appellate court may assess "how the highest court of a State would resolve a question of interpretation of State law." 02-1776 Pet. at i. *See, e.g., Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch*, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (noting that when there is no decision by a State's highest court, a federal court must apply what it "find[s] to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State").[14] Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion that section 354.6 creates a private cause of action was both appropriate and unremarkable.[15]

Review is particularly unwarranted in light of this Court's recent decision in *Garamendi.* In that case, the insurance statute at issue (the HVIRA) was nothing more than a reporting requirement. Nonetheless, this Court held that the HVIRA employed "'a different, state system of economic pressure'" that "undercut[ ]" the foreign policy choices made

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[14] The POW petitioners assert that the California Supreme Court will soon decide whether section 354.6 is substantive or procedural in a group of related World War II-era cases. 02-1776 Pet. at 6. In fact, the California Supreme Court stayed proceedings in those cases pending this Court's resolution of *Garamendi*. Given this Court's decision in *Garamendi*, the California Supreme Court should have no need to decide whether section 354.6 is substantive or procedural, since, as discussed above, no matter its proper interpretation, the statute is clearly preempted.

[15] Rejecting petitioners' argument that section 354.6 merely extended the statute of limitations, the court of appeals correctly noted that the statute provides that certain individuals "may bring an action." 324 F.3d at 707 (quoting *Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n*, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 1759 (2002), in which this Court noted that language in a statute providing that a party "may bring an action" "reads like the conferral of a private right of action"). In addition, the court of appeals noted that the statute "defines the class of plaintiffs who may sue under that cause of action, *see* § 354.6(a)(1), (2), sets the method for measuring damages, *see* § 354.6(a)(3), and establishes a special rule regarding liability of corporations affiliated with the wrong-doer *see* § 354.6(b)." 324 F.3d at 707.

by the President in resolving wartime claims. 123 S. Ct. at 2391 (quoting *Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000)). The Court noted that the President had entered into an Executive Agreement reflecting a foreign policy decision to "encourage European governments and companies to volunteer settlement funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions." *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2390. California, however, undertook "a different tack of providing regulatory sanctions to compel disclosure and payment" that impermissibly interfered with the executive policy. *Id.* at 2391. Significantly, this Court referred to California's Civil Procedure Code section 354.5 – the sister act to section 354.6 – as "a new cause of action for Holocaust survivors." *Id.*

Whether section 354.6 is interpreted as creating a cause of action or as resurrecting a statute of limitations on existing causes of action, it is clearly more intrusive on federal foreign affairs than the HVIRA. Unlike the insurance claims in *Garamendi,* which were not resolved at the end of World War II, but were subject to a voluntary settlement process under a later Executive Agreement, petitioners' claims were explicitly settled and waived by the Treaty. And unlike the HVIRA, which on its face did not purport to facilitate the resolution of war claims, section 354.6 applies *only* to "Second World War" forced and slave labor victims, and creates (or at least resurrects) those precise war claims. Even more than the insurance regulation in *Garamendi*, section 354.6 interferes with a "traditional subject matter of foreign policy in which national, not state, interests are overriding, and which the National Government has addressed." *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2390. It matters not whether the California Supreme Court one day interprets section 354.6 as substantive or procedural.

C. The Decision Below Is Independently Justified On Two Separate Bases

Although the court below did not need to reach several alternate arguments made by respondents, it could have reached the same outcome on at least two alternate theories. These alternate bases, too, indicate that review by this Court is not warranted.

First, applying California law to these types of claims would violate due process given the "weakness of the State's interest, against the backdrop of traditional state legislative subject matter." *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2392. In *Garamendi*, the Court held that California's interest in assisting several thousand Holocaust survivors in the State could not displace "general standards for evaluating a State's claim to apply its forum law to a particular controversy or transaction." *Id.* at 2393 (citing *Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts*, 472 U.S. 797, 820 (1985)). In *Shutts*, the Court held that the State must have "'significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts' to the claims asserted" in order to ensure that the application of state law would not be "arbitrary or unfair." 472 U.S. at 821-22 (quoting *Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague*, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)). Here, the conduct at issue is wholly unconnected to California. Neither petitioners nor respondents, at the time of the events, could "reasonably have anticipated that their actions would later be judged" by California law. *Allstate*, 449 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Furthermore, whether section 354.6 is procedural or substantive in nature does not cure the due process violation. Even if the statute were interpreted as merely a procedural extension of the statue of limitations on claims against former enemy nationals, it would run afoul of the constitutional prohibition on retroactive legislation. *See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498, 538-39 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concur-

ring) (legislation with retroactive effect is a particular concern for the courts and subject to distrust under due process jurisprudence); *cf. Stogner v. California*, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2448 (2003) (invalidating California's retroactive extension of a criminal statute of limitations as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause). The court below, while not deciding the retroactivity issue, recognized that "[s]uch a revival of liability – even civil liability – is troubling and raises serious due process questions." 324 F.3d at 708.

Second, the political question doctrine renders the claims brought in these cases non-justiciable. The power to make war and to enter into treaties is committed solely to the political branches. *See* U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 12, 14 and art. II, § 2 (App. 21a-23a). As discussed above, the negotiations culminating in the Treaty involved complex foreign policy considerations and compromises. Petitioners seek nothing less than a judicial reexamination of policy decisions made half a century ago, pursuant to which Japan became and continues to be a vital ally of the United States. Such a reexamination would undermine the policy choices of the political branches embodied in the Treaty, involve the courts in balancing competing foreign policy concerns, and potentially expose the United States and its nationals to claims from Japanese nationals injured during the war. Even if "judicially . . . manageable standards" existed to allow courts to resolve every injury resulting from a major world war, the separation of powers precludes such a judicial undertaking. *See Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).[16]

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[16] The court of appeals opined that no political question is raised "by the simple application of the requirements of a treaty to which the United States is a party." 324 F.3d at 713 n.11. With regard to petitioners' claims, however, it is not the interpretation of the Treaty that raises a political question, but rather petitioners' attempt to use the courts to undo the foreign policy decisions made by the President and Congress in the

II. FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNQUESTIONABLY EXISTS IN THESE CASES

In addition to challenging the court of appeals' decision on the merits, the POW petitioners argue that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over their claims because they are merely state law "wage claims." 02-1776 Pet. at 4. The Filipino petition raises no jurisdictional issues.[17]

The jurisdictional issue the POW petitioners raise is insubstantial and does not warrant review by this Court. First, petitioners cannot show that a determination of whether there was federal jurisdiction would change the decision on the merits, as there is undisputed jurisdiction in some of the consolidated cases. Second, petitioners have not shown, and cannot show, that any – let alone all – of the several grounds on which the various district courts found federal jurisdiction are ones on which the circuits are split, or are issues important enough to require this Court's intervention. Thus, under the Court's traditional criteria for granting certiorari, there is no reason for review of this issue. Finally, the POW petitioners' jurisdictional argument misconstrues both the nature of their own claims and the governing law. Under multiple rationales, federal jurisdiction unquestionably exists in these cases.

A. Diversity Jurisdiction Exists In At Least One Case

The court of appeals observed that in some of the actions, including one of the actions that is part of the petition in No. 02-1776, *Dunn v. Nippon Steel Corp., et al.*, No. 01-17157, there is diversity jurisdiction. 324 F.3d at 718. Petitioners

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aftermath of World War II. *See generally Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2386-87.

[17] Indeed, the Filipino petitioners affirmatively argued to the district court that federal subject matter jurisdiction was proper under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. *See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.

do not and cannot challenge this ruling. Petitioners argue generally that "[t]he presence of California plaintiffs and defendants precludes federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship." 02-1776 Pet. at 3 n.2. However, in *Dunn*, complete diversity exists, as the plaintiff is a citizen of California, and no defendant is a citizen of California. *See* 324 F.3d at 718. Thus, the lower courts unquestionably had jurisdiction to decide the issues raised in this Court.

B. The Treaty And The War Claims Act Completely Preempt Petitioners' Claims

Petitioners' efforts to divorce their claims from the wartime context in which they arose and to recharacterize them as simple state law wage claims does not survive this Court's decision in *Garamendi*. In that case, the State of California argued that the HVIRA was merely a "consumer protection" regulation designed to inform California residents which insurers failed to pay claims. 123 S. Ct. at 2392. The Court saw through this argument and held that the HVIRA was actually designed to assist "several thousand Holocaust survivors" in pursuing reparations claims. *Id.* at 2393. Noting that the resolution of "Holocaust-era insurance claims" was part of the federal government's ongoing diplomatic efforts to address the "issue of restitution for Nazi crimes," the Court held this area was a "traditional subject matter of foreign policy" that overrode state regulation. *Id.* at 2390. Where, as here, the POW petitioners' claims involve the powers of the federal government to make war and peace, and where the President and Congress have exercised their foreign affairs authority to resolve the claims of POWs exclusively through the Treaty and the War Claims Act, petitioners' purported state law claims are completely preempted, giving rise to federal jurisdiction.

Federal question jurisdiction exists as to each of the POW petitioners' actions because the Treaty and the War

Claims Act completely preempt World War II claims against Japan and its nationals. Where federal law completely preempts an area of state law, even complaints that purport to bring only state law claims are nonetheless "necessarily federal in character." *Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor*, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987); *accord Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams*, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) ("Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.").

This Court recently explained that in determining whether Congress intended that a particular statute would completely preempt state laws on the same subject, it is appropriate to consider whether the statute concerns a subject the "special nature" of which requires "[u]niform rules . . . prescribing exclusive remedies" so as to assure "protection from 'possible unfriendly State legislation.'" *Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson*, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2003) (quoting *Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo.*, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 412 (1874)).[18]

Under these principles, federal law completely preempts state laws, such as section 354.6, dealing with claims by POWs for injuries they incurred during World War II. "Vindicating victims injured by acts and omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is . . . within the traditional subject mat-

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[18] Treaties have the same preemptive force as statutes. *See, e.g.*, *Husmann v. TWA*, 169 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 1999) (Warsaw Convention); *Asante Techs. v. Pmc-Sierra, Inc.*, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods). Moreover, the complete preemption doctrine may be satisfied when the federal law provides a federal administrative remedy rather than a private cause of action and even when the federal law provides no remedy at all. *See Caterpillar*, 482 U.S. at 391 n.4; *Botsford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mont., Inc.*, 314 F.3d 390, 396-97 (9th Cir. 2002).

ter of foreign policy in which national, not state, interests are overriding, and which the National Government has addressed." *Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2390.[19]

With regard to wartime claims against Japan, the Treaty required Japan to pay reparations to the Allied Powers, in exchange for a waiver of all other reparations claims or other claims arising out of the war. As noted above, the Treaty reflected political and foreign policy decisions to fully and finally resolve war claims against Japan.

Using the reparations it received from Japan (the seized assets of Japan and its nationals, including Japanese companies, in the United States), Congress enacted the War Claims Act to distribute these funds to former POWs. The War Claims Act alone, which the POW petitioners inexplicably fail even to mention, provides the "exclusive" means of compensating former POWs. *Cf. Beneficial Nat'l Bank*, 123 S. Ct. at 2063-64. The Act does not authorize private lawsuits by POWs, and it makes abundantly clear that the federal government has "set forth procedures and remedies governing" such claims. *Id.* at 2063. Those "procedures and remedies" leave no room for the approach taken by California in section 354.6.

Indeed, as the legislative history of the War Claims Act shows, the need for uniform federal rules in this area was viewed as particularly important, with the question of war claims deemed "too complex" to be approached by the "piecemeal basis" of lawsuits. H.R. Rep. No. 801-976, at 4

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[19] In addition, statutes directly addressing foreign affairs – and the resolution of war claims in particular – are comparable to statutes dealing with Indian law, which displace state law even when there is no express indication of an intent to do so because of the "special federal interest" in such statutes. *Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney*, 88 F.3d 536, 543 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing *Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida*, 414 U.S. 661 (1974)). The federal interest in statutes such as the War Claims Act is at least as unique. *Cf. Garamendi*, 123 S. Ct. at 2390.

(1947) (SER 490). Thus, Congress considered and rejected a proposal to allow federal courts to adjudicate war compensation claims because of the need to "get some rationality out of this situation." 94 Cong. Rec. 564 (1948) (SER 501). Instead, Congress chose an exclusive federal commission "in view of the large number of claimants and the diversity in the specific circumstances giving rise to the claims." *Wiener v. United States*, 357 U.S. 349, 355 (1958). Given the overriding federal interest in the resolution of war claims, the need for uniformity in this area, and the complete and final resolution of their claims under the Treaty and the War Claims Act, it is beyond question that petitioners' claims are "necessarily federal in character." *Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 481 U.S. at 63-64; *see also Beneficial Nat'l Bank*, 123 S. Ct. at 2064 (noting relevance of special federal interest in subject area in making complete preemption determination).[20]

The POW petitioners concede as they must that the "complete preemption doctrine" provides a proper basis for federal question jurisdiction. 02-1776 Pet. at 8. Nonetheless, they argue that federal law does not completely preempt their claims because common law claims between employees and employers are traditionally governed by state law, and their claims merely involve a state's regulation of "the fairness

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[20] In *Beneficial National Bank*, the Court stressed the importance of the historical need for a national banking system free from state interference. 123 S. Ct. at 2064 (citing *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819)). The historical recognition of the need for federal exclusivity of foreign relations, particularly the resolution of war claims, is at least as firmly rooted. *See Ware v. Hylton*, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Indeed, the need to consolidate this power in the national government was one of the motivating forces behind the abandonment of the articles of confederation and the adoption of the Constitution. *See, e.g., The Federalist No. 3*, at 14 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); *The Federalist No. 42*, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); *The Federalist No. 80*, at 535-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

with which [its] citizens are treated in the workplace." 02-1776 Pet. at 8. Petitioners' argument ignores that at the time their claims arose, they were not employees in a workplace traditionally subject to state law regulation. Rather, they were active duty members of the United States military who were held as prisoners of war by Imperial Japan.

C. Federal Jurisdiction Exists Because A Substantial Federal Question Is An Essential Element of Petitioners' Claims

Federal question jurisdiction also exists as to each of the POW petitioners' cases because they require the resolution of a substantial federal question. *City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons,* 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997) (where resolution of federal law question is necessary to a decision on the merits, federal question jurisdiction exists); *see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n*, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 1758-59 (2002) ("the district court has [federal question] jurisdiction if the right of the [plaintiffs] to recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another"). To state a claim under section 354.6, petitioners were required to prove the amount of wages or compensation they "should have been paid." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 354.6(a)(3). Because petitioners were active duty members of the military and prisoners of war at the time their claims arose, determining the amount of wages they should have been paid for their labor necessarily requires construction of both treaties and federal statutes governing the proper pay for military personnel held as POWs.[21] *See,*

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[21] Treaties to which the United States is a party govern whether, how much, and by whom petitioners "should have been paid" for their labor as prisoners of war during World War II. The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021, and its 1949 counterpart, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, provide comprehensive rules for when and under what circumstances prisoners of

e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. (providing comprehensive rules for when and under what circumstances POWs are entitled to be paid); 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021 (same); *To T.F. Conway, Dep't of the Army*, 37 Comp. Gen. 29, 30 (1957) (declaration by the Comptroller General of the United States that wages and fees received by members of the military for labor that is connected in some way to their military service belong to the federal government and must be turned over to the federal treasury).

Thus, even though petitioners purport to assert only state law causes of action, a necessary element of their claim requires the resolution of substantial questions of federal law: whether and to what extent active duty military personnel held as POWs have a right to wages from third parties for whom they worked during their captivity.[22]

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war are entitled to be paid. For example, Article 34 of the 1929 Geneva Convention provides that "belligerents" are entitled to "fix[]" the wages of prisoners of war "by agreements." 47 Stat. at 2042. Article 34 further limits and defines which prisoners are entitled to working pay and under what circumstances. *Id.* For example, prisoners working in certain capacities (*e.g.*, camp administration) are generally not entitled to pay, while others (*e.g.*, those doing work "for the account of . . . private persons") are to be paid under "conditions . . . regulated by agreement with the military authority." *Id.* Similarly, Article 62 of the 1949 Geneva Convention allows the "Detaining Power" to establish a "fair working rate of pay," which may not be less than one-fourth of one Swiss franc for a full working day. 6 U.S.T. at 3364.

[22] The Northern District of California relied on an additional, independent basis for federal jurisdiction in these cases, holding correctly that the subject matter of petitioners' claims is governed by the federal common law of foreign relations. 02-1776 Pet. App. 75a & n.6. This Court has recognized that federal common law provides the rule of decision in cases involving foreign relations. *See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.*, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981); *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). Several courts of appeals have concluded that the federal common law of foreign relations provides a

In sum, federal jurisdiction exists over all of these cases on several independent grounds. For all of the reasons stated above, the POW petitioners' jurisdictional arguments are not worthy of this Court's attention.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners have provided no plausible reason why this Court's limited resources should be devoted to reviewing the decision below. To be sure, many of the petitioners are World War II veterans who "incur[red] enormous personal loss to preserve our way of life against severe and imminent threats." 02-1776 Pet. at 6-7. Nevertheless, the inherent flaws in their legal arguments, especially following this Court's *Garamendi* decision, strongly counsel against review. Indeed, as one court noted with respect to claims similar to those brought by petitioners, "[i]t would be a disservice to [the] heroes of World War II to create the false hope of some sort of monetary recovery" based on state statutes that are constitutionally infirm. *Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior Ct.*, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

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basis for removal jurisdiction. *See, e.g.*, *Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.*, 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997); *Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos*, 806 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986); *cf. New SD, Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.*, 79 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1996). Petitioners suggest, but do not directly argue as they did below, that the Ninth Circuit rejected the federal common law of foreign relations as a basis for removal in *Patrickson v. Dole Food Co.*, 251 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001), *aff'd on other grounds*, 123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003). 02-1776 Pet. at 4. But petitioners' suggestion reads *Patrickson* too broadly. *Patrickson* held only that removal jurisdiction could not be based on the simple fact that a foreign government had expressed an interest in the outcome of a commercial dispute. 251 F.3d at 803. The court did not have before it a case involving the federal government's exclusive powers to make wars, establish peace, and enter into treaties, nor did *Patrickson* purport to overrule other Ninth Circuit precedent such as *New SD, Inc.*, which held that federal common law can provide a basis for removal jurisdiction.

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Dated August 5, 2003

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE: WORLD WAR II ERA JAPANESE FORCED LABOR LITIGATION	**Master File No. MDL-1347 VRW** **ORDER NO. 5**
This document relates to: *Dunn v. Nippon Steel Corporation, et al.* *Llanza v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.) Inc., et al.* *Mente v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.* *Resus v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.* *Rubenstein v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., et al.* *Saldajeno v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., et al.* *Tenney v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.* *Terrence v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.*	

Further to this Court's Order No. 4 entered September 21, 2000, to the Court's oral directive on September 21, 2000 regarding application of Order No. 4 to other matters, and pursuant to agreement by counsel that Order No. 4 shall apply to the five cases listed in the next paragraph,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following actions be and hereby are dismissed, on the same grounds as the dismissal of the actions identified in the caption of Order No. 4. The actions dismissed by virtue of this Order No. 5 as to which the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants, are as follows:

Dunn v. Nippon Steel Corporation, et al.

Mente v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.

Rubenstein v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., et al.

Tenney v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.

Terrence v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.

In view of the parties' inability to reach agreement as to whether Order No. 4 applies to cases in which the plaintiffs are or were nationals of the Philippines, that issue shall be determined through further proceedings. The four such cases currently pending in this Court are:

Llanza v. Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.) Inc., et al.

Resus v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., et al.

Saldajeno v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., et al.

Santo Domingo v. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd., et al.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

(Approval as to form by counsel does not constitute an appearance by any defendant in any action in which such defendant has not been served with summons or appeared, notwithstanding that such counsel may represent or have appeared for such defendant in some other action)

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By: /s/ Paul F. Doyle

Paul F. Doyle

IT IS SO ORDERED:

/s/ Vaughn R. Walker

VAUGHN R. WALKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPENDIX B

THE WAR CLAIMS ACT

The War Claims Act of July 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 1240 (50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2001 et seq.) provides in pertinent part:

SEC. 2001. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States

(a) Employment of personnel; use of other facilities and services

The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") may, in accordance with the provisions of the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1949, as amended [5 U.S.C. 5101 et seq., 5331 et seq.], appoint and fix the compensation of such officers, attorneys, and employees, and may make such expenditures, as may be necessary to carry out its functions. Officers and employees of any other department or agency of the Government may, with the consent of the head of such department or agency, be assigned to assist the Commission in carrying out its functions. The Commission may, with the consent of the head of any other department or agency of the Government, utilize the facilities and services of such department or agency in carrying out the functions of the Commission.

(b) Rules and regulations; delegation of functions; time limit on filing of claims

The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions, and may delegate functions to any member, officer, or employee of the Commission. The Commission shall give public notice of the time when, and the limit of time within which, claims may be filed, which notice shall be published in the Federal Register. The limit of time within which claims may be filed with the Commission shall in no

event be later than March 31, 1952. The Commission shall take immediate action to advise all persons entitled to file claims under the provisions of this title [sections 2001 to 2016 of this Appendix] administered by the Commission of their rights under such provisions, and to assist them in the preparation and filing of their claims.

(c) Subpenas; issuance; contempt; witness fees; administration of oaths

(1) For the purpose of any hearing, examination, or investigation under this title [sections 2001 to 2016 of this Appendix], the Commission and those employees designated by the Commission shall have the power to issue subpenas requiring persons to appear and testify or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place where such hearing, examination, or investigation is being held. The Commission or any employee so designated shall, upon application of a claimant, issue to such claimant subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of documents, or both, required by such claimant in hearings upon his claim: *Provided*, That the claimant making such application pay the witness fees and mileage of any witness or witnesses subpenaed upon his request. The production of a person's documents at any place other than his place of business shall not be required, however, in any case in which, prior to the return date specified in the subpena with respect thereto, such person either has furnished the issuer of the subpena with a copy of such documents (certified by such person under oath to be a true and correct copy) or has entered into a stipulation with the issuer of the subpena as to the information contained in such documents.

(2) The Commission may, in case of a failure or refusal on the part of any person to comply with any such subpena, invoke the aid of any United States district court within the jurisdiction of which the hearing, examination, or

investigation is being conducted, or such person resides or transacts business. Such court may issue an order requiring such person to appear at the designated place of hearing, examination, or investigation, there to give or produce testimony or documentary evidence concerning the matter in question. Any failure to obey such order of the court shall be punishable by such court as a contempt thereof. All process in any such case may be served in the judicial district wherein such person resides or transacts business or wherever such person may be found.

(3) Witnesses subpenaed under this subsection shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are allowed and paid witnesses in United States district courts.

(4) Any member of the Commission, and any employee of the Commission authorized by the Commission to do so, may administer to, or take from, any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit when such action is necessary or appropriate in the performance of the functions or activities of the Commission.

* * *

SEC. 2005. Prisoners of war

(a) "Prisoner of war" defined

As used in subsection (b) of this section, the term "prisoner of war" means any regularly appointed, enrolled, enlisted, or inducted member of the military or naval forces of the United States who was held as a prisoner of war for any period of time subsequent to December 7, 1941, by any government of any nation with which the United States has been at war subsequent to such date.

(b) Payment of claims; rate allowed; certification of claims

The Commission is authorized to receive, adjudicate according to law, and provide for the payment of any claim

filed by any prisoner of war for compensation for the violation by the enemy government by which he was held as a prisoner of war, or its agents, of its obligation to furnish him the quantity or quality of food to which he was entitled as a prisoner of war under the terms of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. The compensation allowed to any prisoner of war under the provisions of this subsection shall be at the rate of $1 for each day he was held as a prisoner of war on which the enemy government or its agents failed to furnish him such quantity or quality of food. Any claim allowed under the provisions of this subsection shall be certified to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out of the War Claims Fund established by section 13 of this title [section 2012 of this Appendix].

(c) Persons entitled to payments

Claims pursuant to subsection (b) shall be paid to the person entitled thereto, and shall in case of death of the persons who are entitled be payable only to or for the benefit of the following persons:

(1) Widow or husband if there is no child or children of the deceased;

(2) Widow or husband and child or children of the deceased, one-half to the widow or husband and the other half to the child or children of the deceased in equal shares;

(3) Child or children of the deceased (in equal shares) if there is no widow or husband; and

(4) Parents (in equal shares) if there is no widow, husband, or child.

(d) Additional definition of "prisoner of war"; payment of claims; rate allowed; persons entitled to payments

(1) As used in this subsection the term "prisoner of war" means any regularly appointed, enrolled, enlisted, or inducted member of the military or naval forces of the

United States, who was held a prisoner of war for any period of time subsequent to December 7, 1941, by any government of any nation with which the United States has been at war subsequent to such date.

(2) The Commission is authorized to receive, adjudicate according to law, and to provide for the payment of any claim filed by any prisoner of war for compensation--

(A) for the violations by the enemy government by which he was held as a prisoner of war, or its agents, of such government's obligations under title III, section III, of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relating to labor of prisoners of war; or

(B) for inhumane treatment by the enemy government by which he was held, or its agents. The term "inhumane treatment" as used herein shall include, but not be limited to, violation by such enemy government, or its agents, of one or more of the provisions of articles 2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 13, 21, 22, 54, 56, or 57, of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929.

(3) Compensation shall be allowed to any prisoner of war under this subsection at the rate of $1.50 per day for each day he was held as a prisoner of war on which he alleges and proves in a manner acceptable to the Commission--

(A) the violation by such enemy government or its agents of the provisions of title III, section III, of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929; or

(B) any inhumane treatment as defined herein.

Any claim allowed under the provisions of this subsection shall be certified to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out of the War Claims Fund established by section 13 of this title [section 2012 of this Appendix]. In no event shall the compensation allowed to any prisoner of war under this subsection exceed the sum of $1.50 with respect to any one day.

(4) Claims pursuant to subsection (d)(2) shall be paid to the person entitled thereto, or to his legal or natural guardian if he has one, and shall, in case of death of the persons who are entitled be payable only to or for the benefit of the following persons:

(A) widow or husband if there is no child or children of the deceased;

(B) widow or husband and child or children of the deceased, one-half to the widow or husband and the other half to the child or children of the deceased in equal shares;

(C) child or children of the deceased (in equal shares) if there is no widow or husband; and

(D) parents (in equal shares) if there is no widow, husband, or child.

(e) Extension to Korean War prisoners

(1) As used in this subsection the term "prisoner of war" means any regularly appointed, enrolled, enlisted, or inducted member of the Armed Forces of the United States who was held as a prisoner of war for any period of time subsequent to June 25, 1950, by any hostile force with which the Armed Forces of the United States were actually engaged in armed conflict subsequent to such date and prior to the date of enactment of this subsection [Aug. 21, 1954], or any person (military or civilian) assigned to duty in the U.S.S. Pueblo who was captured by the military forces of North Korea on January 23, 1968, and thereafter held prisoner by the Government of North Korea for any period of time ending on or before December 23, 1968, except any person who, at any time, voluntarily, knowingly, and without duress, gave aid to or collaborated with or in any manner served any such hostile force.

(2) The Commission is authorized to receive and to determine, according to law, the amount and validity, and

provide for the payment of any claim filed by any prisoner of war for compensation for the failure of the hostile force by which he was held as a prisoner of war, or its agents, to furnish him the quantity or quality of food prescribed for prisoners of war under the terms of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. The compensation allowed to any prisoner of war under the provisions of this paragraph shall be at the rate of $1 for each day on which he was held as a prisoner of war and on which such hostile force, or its agents, failed to furnish him such quantity or quality of food.

(3) The Commission is authorized to receive and to determine, according to law, the amount and validity and provide for the payment of any claim filed by any prisoner of war for compensation--

(A) for the failure of the hostile force by which he was held as a prisoner of war, or its agents, to meet the conditions and requirements prescribed under title III, section III, of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relating to labor of prisoners of war; or

(B) for inhumane treatment by the hostile force by which he was held, or its agents. The term "inhumane treatment" as used herein shall include, but not be limited to, failure of such hostile force, or its agents, to meet the conditions and requirements of one or more of the provisions of articles 2, 3, 7, 10, 12, 13, 21, 22, 54, 56, or 57 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929.

Compensation shall be allowed to any prisoner of war under this paragraph at the rate of $1.50 per day for each day on which he was held as a prisoner of war and with respect to which he alleges and proves in a manner acceptable to the Commission the failure to meet the conditions and requirements described in subparagraph (A) or the inhumane treatment described in subparagraph (B). In no event shall the compensation allowed to any prisoner of war under this

paragraph exceed the sum of $1.50 with respect to any one day.

(4) Any claim allowed by the Commission under this subsection shall be certified to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out of funds appropriated pursuant to this subsection and shall be paid by the Secretary of the Treasury to the person entitled thereto, and shall, in case of death or determination of death of the persons who are entitled, be paid only to or for the benefit of the persons specified, and in the order established, by paragraph (4) of subsection (d) of this section.

(5) Each claim filed under this subsection must be filed not later than one year from whichever of the following dates last occurs:

(A) The date of enactment of this subsection [Aug. 21, 1954];

(B) The date the prisoner of war by whom the claim is filed returned to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States; or

(C) The date upon which the Department of Defense makes a determination that the prisoner of war has actually died or is presumed to be dead, in the case of any prisoner of war who has not returned to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States;

(D) In the case of any person assigned to duty in the U.S.S. Pueblo referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, one year after the date of enactment of this subparagraph [June 24, 1970].

The Commission shall complete its determinations with respect to each claim filed under this subsection at the earliest practicable date, but in no event later than one year after the date on which such claim was filed.

(6) Any claim allowed under the provisions of this subsection shall be paid from funds appropriated pursuant to paragraph (7) of this subsection.

(7)(A) There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subsection, including necessary administrative expenses.

(B) The Commission shall determine, from time to time, the share of its administrative expenses attributable to the performance of its functions under this subsection and make the appropriate adjustments in its accounts, and determinations and adjustments made pursuant to this subparagraph shall be final and conclusive.

(f) Vietnam conflict; definitions; authority of Commission; classes of claims; rate of compensation; certification for payment; persons entitled to payments; filing date; determination of claims; fund for payment; appropriations

(1) As used in this subsection--

(A) the term "Vietnam conflict" relates to the period beginning February 28, 1961, and ending on such date as shall thereafter be determined by Presidential proclamation or concurrent resolution of the Congress; and

(B) the term "prisoner of war" means any regularly appointed, enrolled, enlisted, or inducted member of the Armed Forces of the United States who was held as a prisoner of war for any period of time during the Vietnam conflict by any force hostile to the United States, except any such member who, at any time, voluntarily, knowingly, and without duress, gave aid to collaborated with, or in any manner served, such hostile force.

(2) The Commission is authorized to receive and to determine, according to law, the amount and validity, and provide for the payment of any claim filed by any prisoner of

war for compensation for the failure of the hostile force by which he was held as a prisoner of war, or its agents, to furnish him the quantity or quality of food prescribed for prisoners of war under the terms of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949. The compensation allowed to any prisoner of war under the provisions of this paragraph shall be at the rate of $2 for each day on which he was held as a prisoner of war and on which such hostile force, or its agents, failed to furnish him such quantity or quality of food.

(3) The Commission is authorized to receive and to determine, according to law, the amount and validity and provide for the payment of any claim filed by any prisoner of war for compensation--

(A) for the failure of the hostile force by which he was held as a prisoner of war, or its agents, to meet the conditions and requirements prescribed under chapter VIII, section III, of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, relating to labor of prisoners of war; or

(B) for inhumane treatment by the hostile force by which he was held, or its agents. The term "inhumane treatment" as used in this subparagraph shall include, but not be limited to, failure of such hostile force, or its agents, to meet the conditions and requirements of one or more of the provisions of articles 3, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 97, or 98 of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949.

Compensation shall be allowed to any prisoner of war under this paragraph at the rate of $3 per day for each day on which he was held as a prisoner of war and with respect to which he alleges and proves in a manner acceptable to the Commission the failure to meet the conditions and requirements described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph or the inhumane treatment described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. In no event shall the

compensation allowed to any prisoner of war under this paragraph exceed the sum of $3 with respect to any one day.

(4) Any claim allowed by the Commission under this subsection shall be certified to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out of funds appropriated pursuant to this subsection and shall be paid by the Secretary of the Treasury to the person entitled thereto, and shall, in the case of death or determination of death of the persons who are entitled, be paid only to or for the benefit of the persons specified, and in the order established, by subsection (d)(4) of this section.

(5) Each claim filed under this subsection must be filed not later than three years from whichever of the following dates last occurs:

(A) the date of enactment of this subsection [June 24, 1970];

(B) the date the prisoner of war by whom the claim is filed returned to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States; or

(C) the date upon which the Department of Defense makes a determination that the prisoner of war has actually died or is presumed to be dead, in the case of any prisoner of war who has not returned to the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Commission shall complete its determinations with respect to each claim filed under this subsection at the earliest practicable date, but in no event later than one year after the date on which such claim was filed.

(6) Any claim allowed under the provisions of this subsection shall be paid from funds appropriated pursuant to paragraph (7) of this subsection.

(7) There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this subsection, including necessary administrative expenses.

(g) Manner of payment

Where any person entitled to payment under this section is under any legal disability, payment may be made in accordance with the provisions of subsection (e) of section 5 [section 2004(e) of this Appendix].

* * *

SEC. 2007. Commission's report on personal injury and property claims to President; findings; recommendations; public property; legislative effect

(a) The Commission shall inquire into and report to the President, for submission of such report to the Congress on or before March 31, 1950, with respect to war claims arising out of World War II, other than claims which may be received and adjudicated under the preceding sections of this title [sections 2001 to 2006 of this Appendix], and shall present in such report its findings on--

(1) the estimated number and amount of such claims, classified by types and categories; and

(2) the extent to which such claims have been or may be satisfied under international agreements or domestic or foreign laws.

(b) The report of the Commission shall contain recommendations with respect to--

(1) categories and types of claims, if any, which should be received and considered and the legal and equitable bases therefor;

(2) the administrative method by which such claims should be considered, and any priorities or limitations which should be applicable; and

(3) any limitations which should be applied to the allowance and payment of fees in connection with such claims.

(c) The Commission shall include in such report--

(1) such other recommendations as it deems appropriate; and

(2) such proposals for legislation as it deems appropriate for carrying out the recommendations made in such report.

(d) Such report, with accompanying evidence, shall be printed as a public document when received by the Congress.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to imply that the Congress will enact legislation--

(1) adopting any recommendations made under this section with respect to the consideration or payment of any type of claim; or

(2) making any moneys, including moneys remaining in the war claims fund after the making of payments from such fund provided for by this title [sections 2001 to 2016 of this Appendix], available for the payment of such claims.

* * *

SEC. 2010. Hearings on claims; finality of decision

The Commission shall notify all claimants of the approval or denial of their claims, and, if approved, shall notify such claimants of the amount for which such claims are approved. Any claimant whose claim is denied, or is approved for less than the full allowable amount of such claim, shall be entitled, under such regulations as the Commission may prescribe, to a hearing before the Commission or its representatives with respect to such claim. Upon such hearing, the Commission may affirm, modify, or revise its former action with respect to such claim, including a denial or reduction in the amount theretofore allowed with respect to such claim. The action of the Commission in allowing or denying any claim under this title [sections 2001 to 2016 of this Appendix] shall be final and conclusive on all

questions of law and fact and not subject to review by any other official of the United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise, and the Comptroller General is authorized and directed to allow credit in the accounts of any certifying or disbursing officer for payments in accordance with such action.

APPENDIX C

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

1. The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 1, provides:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

2. Section 8, Clause 10 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power:

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

3. Section 8, Clause 11 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power:

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

4. Section 8, Clause 12 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power:

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

5. Section 8, Clause 13 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power:

To provide and maintain a Navy;

6. Section 8, Clause 14 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power:

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

7. Section 10, Clause 1 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that:

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility

8. Section 10, Clause 3 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that:

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

9. Section 2, Clause 1 of Article II of the United States Constitution provides that:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

10. Section 2, Clause 2 of Article 2 of the United States Constitution provides that:

[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of

the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

(3) (3) (3) (4)

Nos. 02-1773, 02-1776, 02-1778, 02-1784

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
AUG 0 4 2003
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

SUK YOON KIM, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Petitioner,

v.

ISHIKAWAJIMA HARIMA HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD., *et al.*,

Respondents.

[Additional Captions On Inside Cover]

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

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13 pp

No. 02-1776

LESTER I. TENNEY, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

MITSUI & CO., LTD., *et al.*,

Respondents.

No. 02-1778

ZHENHUAN MA, SHANG-TING SUNG, AIZHU SU, and CHUNSHENG TIAN, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Petitioners,

vs.

KAJIMA CORPORATION, *et al.*,

Respondents.

No. 02-1784

ALBERTO SALDAJENO, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

ISHIHARA SANGYO KAISHA LTD., *et al.*,

Respondents.

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BRIEF OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

The State of California as amicus curiae files this brief pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

INTEREST OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AS AMICUS CURIAE

The Attorney General of the State of California submits this amicus curiae brief in support of the petition for writ of certiorari filed by petitioners urging the Court to grant certiorari of the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Deutsch v. Turner*, 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003). In that decision, the Ninth Circuit struck down a California statute extending the limitations period for claims for unpaid wages and injury owed to slave laborers forced to work for private companies during World War II. The Court of Appeals found the California statute, which provides a forum for the adjudication of such claims, to violate the foreign affairs provisions of the United States Constitution. The Ninth Circuit's overly expansive interpretation of the foreign affairs doctrine is at odds with this Court's recent analysis of the foreign affairs doctrine in *Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi*, 539 U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 156 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2003). The lower court ruling, moreover, has far-reaching implications for the sovereignty of the States. Absent guidance from the Court, the lower court's decision will impede the ability of States to enact legislation in areas of traditional state competence.

As California's chief law officer (see CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13), the Attorney General has a strong interest in defending the validity of this important and historic legislation, which compels him to urge review of the lower court's decision. Accordingly, the Attorney General submits this brief in support of these four petitions, all of which seek certiorari of the Ninth Circuit's decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The State of California urges review of *Deutsch v. Turner* because of the important, indeed historic, interests at stake and the wide-ranging harm that may be caused by the Ninth Circuit's misapplication of the foreign affairs doctrine.

The statute at issue, California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6 ("Section 354.6"), is state legislation that has traditionally been deemed within the authority and province of the States to enact, namely, the extension of a statute of limitations and the provision of a state forum for the litigation of tort-related grievances. In this case, that state authority has been applied to a matter of undeniable importance, claims for unpaid wages and injury owed to slave laborers who were forced to work for private companies during World War II.

The Ninth Circuit below, however, held that Section 354.6 violates the foreign affairs provision of the United States Constitution. The Ninth Circuit reached this decision by applying a novel and unworkable standard, namely, that state regulation of "matters related to war" violates the foreign affairs doctrine, regardless of the

absence of a conflicting federal statute or treaty, regardless of how incidental or tangential the nexus between the statute and foreign affairs powers might be, and regardless of the importance of the State's countervailing interest underlying the statute.

The lower court's unprecedented and expansive standard jeopardizes the States' sovereign interests in this important matter and, further, will impair the ability of States to enact legislation in areas of traditional state competence.

Moreover, certiorari is warranted, not simply because the *Deutsch* decision is at odds with *Garamendi*, but also because *Garamendi* does not fully resolve the unique and important questions presented here.

ARGUMENT

I. THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION UPSETS THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BY UNDULY ENCROACHING UPON THE STATES' SOVEREIGN POWERS.

The Ninth Circuit's expansion of the foreign affairs doctrine undermines California's sovereignty in an area of state interest that is centuries old.

"[O]ur Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government." *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). "The powers not delegated to the United States Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. art. X.

"Within this system, the Federal Government is vested with limited powers, while the States retain substantial sovereign authority." *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. at 457. This federalist system requires a proper balance between the States and the Federal Government. "In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty." *Id.* at 459.

In 1999, the California Legislature exercised this sovereignty by enacting Section 354.6, an emergency measure that extends the limitations period for a defined class of claims relating to forced or slave labor performed prior to and during World War II.

Statutes of limitations are creatures of legislative grace, subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control. *Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson*, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). As the Court noted in *Sun Oil v. Wortman*, 486

U.S. 717 (1988), "a State's interest in regulating the workload of its courts and determining when a claim is too stale to be adjudicated certainly suffices to give it legislative jurisdiction to control the remedies available in its courts by imposing statutes of limitations." 486 U.S. at 730.

Accordingly, like the statute of limitations in *Sun Oil,* Section 354.6 is a valid exercise of California's sovereign authority to assess the workload of its courts and extend its own limitations periods to the types of claims identified in Section 354.6.

The magnitude of the compelling state interests underlying the enactment of Section 354.6 cannot be overstated. The horrors suffered by petitioners and numerous other persons before and during the Second World War who were subject to slavery at the hands of private corporations has not been seen since. Hopefully, it will not reoccur in our lifetimes or those of our children. The sheer gravity of harms, and the unique place these harms occupy in history, should compel the Court, at a minimum, to rectify the Ninth Circuit's sweeping construction of the foreign affairs doctrine.[1]

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[1] The importance of this issue to the State of California is illustrated by the fact that the California Supreme Court has accepted review of California appellate decisions addressing California Code of Civil Procedure section 354.6 and the claims brought pursuant to the statute. See *Mitsubishi Materials Corp. v. Superior Court*, 106 Cal.App.4th 39, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 734 (2003), review granted, depublished, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 147 (2003); *Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court*, 105 Cal.App.4th 398, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 451 (2003), review granted, depublished, 133 Cal.Rptr. 2d 147 (2003).

The California Legislature, recognizing the unspeakable anguish suffered by these slave laborers, exercised its sovereign powers in enacting a law that extends the limitations period and provides a forum in California courts for claims for lost wages and personal injury suffered by these slave laborers. As noted above, the State of California acted wholly within its sovereign powers in regulating its limitations period. *Sun Oil v. Wortman*, 486 U.S. at 722.

An equally compelling state interest underlying the California Legislature's actions was its desire to ensure that companies doing business within California, who avail themselves of the benefits of California's economy, compensate workers such as the slave laborers who toiled for those companies before and during the Second World War.

Despite these compelling state interests and California's legitimate exercise of its sovereignty, the Ninth Circuit invalidated Section 354.6, based upon a novel and highly questionable application of foreign affairs preemption.

Rather than applying the various tests set forth in *Zschernig v. Miller*, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), and without the guidance of *Garamendi*, the Ninth Circuit interprets the foreign affairs provisions implicit in the Constitution as primarily concerning war or designed to prevent war. 324 F.3d at 711. Although the Ninth Circuit characterizes "the power to make and resolve war, including the resolution of claims arising out of such actions," as a subset of the foreign affairs powers, it impliedly rejects the nuanced analysis of foreign affairs preemption previously articulated by this Court in *Zschernig*. *Id.* at 712. Instead, the

Ninth Circuit sweepingly declares off-limits to the States "matters related to war . . . ," without analyzing the nexus of the state regulation to foreign affairs, the impact of the regulation upon foreign affairs, and the existence of any conflicting federal treaty or statute. *Id.*

The State of California respectfully submits that this "matters related to war" standard is rife with ambiguity. Unless rejected or clarified, it will result in an unwarranted erosion of state sovereign powers, in areas of traditional state competence.

II. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE ON A MATTER OF HISTORIC IMPORTANCE.

In addition to the confusion and disharmony created by the *Deutsch* court's decision, certiorari is warranted because these cases present an opportunity for the Court to clarify the foreign affairs preemption doctrine. In *Garamendi*, the Court's most recent treatment of this still unsettled doctrine, the Court ruled based upon the facts presented it, leaving for another day questions regarding the full scope of this doctrine.

Specifically, in *Garamendi,* this Court addressed California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 ("HVIRA"), Cal. Ins. Code §§ 13800 et seq., which required any insurer doing business in California to disclose information about all policies the business or anyone related to the business sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945. Finding an actual and "sufficiently clear" conflict between the terms of the HVIRA and the President's foreign policy as expressed in executive agreements such as the German

Foundation Agreement and in statements by high-level Executive Branch statements, the Court held that the reporting provision at issue in HVIRA was preempted under the foreign affairs doctrine. *Garamendi*, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 2390-2392. The Court thus based its decision on conflict preemption within the foreign affairs doctrine, without needing to resolve the larger question of what standard to apply in the absence of an actual conflict.

Because it recognized an actual conflict, this Court in *Garamendi* appropriately deferred for another day the "fair question whether respect for the executive foreign relations power requires a categorical choice between the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident in the *Zschernig* opinions, . . . " *Garamendi*, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 2389 (footnote omitted).

In contrast, all petitioners in these cases now before the Court assert there is no conflict between their claims and any treaties or executive agreements. Indeed, in none of these cases is the German Foundation Agreement, relied upon by this Court in *Garamendi,* applicable.

Accordingly, these cases present the Court with the opportunity to complete the foreign affairs analysis it began in *Garamendi*. In doing so, the Court can and should address the appropriate standard to apply where, unlike the facts presented in *Garamendi*, a "sufficiently clear" conflict is not present. In this manner, the Court can clarify *Zschernig's* current relevance in defining foreign affairs preemption.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State of California respectfully urges the Court to grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

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